


AD 743 512

POLICE ROLE OF INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN INTERNAL DEFENSE

by
Norman A. LaCharité
and
Joan Rodman Wolfgang

May 1972



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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
The American Institutes for Research Kensington Office		Unclassified
		2b. GROUP
		--
3. REPORT TITLE		
Police Role of Internal Security Forces in Internal Defense		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)		
Technical Report Summer 1968 - Spring 1970		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)		
Norman A. LaCharité and Joan Rodman Wolfgang		
6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
May 1972	viii + 146	Numerous
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NO (S)	
b. PROJECT NO		
c.		
d.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO (S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
[REDACTED]		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY
		Office of The Provost Marshal General, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
13. ABSTRACT		
<p>This report consists of four case studies on the organization and operations of police and police-type security organizations. The countries selected for study are India, Thailand, Bolivia, and Guatemala. The report also deals with a vast array of problems facing the internal security forces such as recruitment, the collection of intelligence, and the security of border and coastal access points as well as the nature of insurgent operations, the public's confidence in the incumbent government, and the cleavages in the population and the civil disturbances arising from them. Discussion includes the political parameters of the conflict, the social and economic dimensions that contributed to its intensification, and the influences within the community that tended to ameliorate the conflict and lighten the government's effort.</p> <p><i>Details of illustrations in this document may be better studied on microfiche</i></p>		

DD FORM 1 NOV 65 1473

Unclassified

Security Classification

-146-

Unclassified

Security Classification

14	KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
		ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
	Security Forces Internal Security Insurgency India Thailand Bolivia Guatemala						

Unclassified

Security Classification

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THE AUTHORS

Norman A. LaCharité is a Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at The American University. He received his M.A. in Soviet Area Studies (1963) and a B.A. in International Relations (1959) from The American University. Since 1961 he has devoted much time to the study of various aspects of internal war. He has had primary responsibility for research and preparation of studies on Southeast Asian countries, and is presently conducting research for projects on internal security problems, oriented to police-type operations in developing countries. His publications include a number of case studies in insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

Joan Rodman Wolfgang is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology at the University of Maryland. She received her M.A. in Sociology from the University of Oklahoma (1968) and a B.A. in Psychology from Boston University (1958). Since 1968 she has researched and written analytic case studies of personnel in Latin American countries, has content-analyzed foreign press and journals, and has published articles dealing with the public's attitude toward socially and physically stigmatized individuals.

ABSTRACT

This report consists of four case studies on the organization and operations of police and police-type security organizations. The countries selected for study are India, Thailand, Bolivia, and Guatemala. The report also deals with a vast array of problems facing the internal security forces such as recruitment, the collection of intelligence, and the security of border and coastal access points as well as the nature of insurgent operations, the public's confidence in the incumbent government, and the cleavages in the population and the civil disturbances arising from them. Discussion also includes the political parameters of the conflict, the social and economic dimensions that contributed to its intensification, and the influences within the community that tended to ameliorate the conflict and lighten the government's effort.

Research and writing
completed November 1970.

FOREWORD

This study is the latest in a continuing research project designed to describe and probe the structure, functions, roles, problems, methods, and operational techniques of civil, paramilitary, and military police forces in the developing countries during a period of insurgency.

Three such studies have been undertaken. Combating Subversively Manipulated Civil Disturbances (AD 642-320), published in October 1966, systematically describes the behavior and relationships of subversive manipulators, crowds, and riot control forces. Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases (AD 645-939), published in December 1966, is concerned with the structure, functions, roles, and problems of internal security forces engaged in internal defense against insurgents. A third study (AD 503-141L), on insurgent terrorism, focuses on the patterns and characteristics of terrorism used and directed by the Viet Cong at nonmilitary targets and the relationships between these patterns and characteristics and other situational factors. It was published in July 1969.

The present study derives from requirements posed by the Office of The Provost Marshal General (OTPMG). A need was established to increase the store of information on the organization and operations of security forces involved in police-type activities in developing countries experiencing internal conflict. The work is keyed to a series of case studies presenting essentially the same kinds of information contained in Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases. The use of a common outline for all four cases in this study focuses the information on the countries' respective internal security problems and facilitates comparisons between countries. Content analysis was employed where the data permitted. However, the general nature and limitation of the sources did not provide a sufficiently broad base for sophisticated in-depth quantitative analysis. Therefore, descriptive techniques were employed.

The study is divided into two parts. Part I contains a summary, selected findings, an introduction describing the purpose and methodology of the study, and a statement of concepts and definitions. Part II contains the four cases and a summary of them.

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PART I
Summary, Selected Findings, and Introduction

IX

CHAPTER 1

SUMMARY AND SELECTED FINDINGS

PROBLEM

This study describes the roles, functions, organization, and techniques of police or police-type security units in developing countries during an insurgency. Because these police or police-type security units are generally part of a larger organization of security presumably working at some level of harmony with other units, including the regular armed forces, their roles, functions, organization, and techniques will be described within the larger context.

METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

Definitions

With few exceptions, developing nations maintain security units that perform police functions. Functions of police or police-type organizations in developing countries differ remarkably from those performed by police organizations in more developed countries. Because these organizations may be the sole representatives of government authority in outlying areas, their functions ordinarily include tasks which in the United States or in European countries are performed by other branches of government administration. The police enforce national laws; they collect taxes, conduct the census, and enforce customs laws; they guard borders; they control civil disturbances of various kinds; they provide security for high government officials and official installations; they operate the networks of intelligence; and they conduct small-scale operations during periods of insurgency.

In this study an insurgency refers to a condition in which an established regime is violently threatened by an organized group or groups of individuals acting against the vulnerabilities of that regime. Insurgent activity is manifested in numerous ways including the use of propaganda techniques; kidnapping and assassination; urban agitation such as strikes and riots; and guerrilla tactics--primarily small unit affairs consisting of attacks and ambushes against government personnel and installations.

Facts Bearing on the Problem

Rapid social, economic, and political changes have created problems in the maintenance of internal security in many developing nations. External agents at times attempt to promote insurgency in order to undermine existing regimes. Security forces, especially police units, are often among the insurgents' primary targets, because the police are a first line of internal defense. The best time to counter an insurgency is at the earliest possible moment. In fact, a preventive approach to internal defense, including ameliorative measures hitting at underlying causes of insurgency as well as arrest and detention of subversive elements, may prove more effective and economical than remedial programs instituted after an insurgency has started.

Data

Information for this study was drawn from a wide variety of unclassified documents and publications. Primary sources included published diaries and official reports. In some instances, current information on developments in the countries studied was drawn from foreign broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, and periodicals.

Approaches

Two approaches were used to arrive at an understanding of the role played by the internal security forces in the cases examined. The first of these was a case study approach, and the second involved the use of content analysis as a technique for the collection and analysis of data.

The case study approach takes an historical view of the role played by these forces, with special focus on police-type units, in the developing nations of India, Thailand, Bolivia, and Guatemala. This approach is used to investigate historical and situational factors, problems of internal security forces, organization of the security forces, the objectives and designated functions of these forces, their methods and techniques, and military assistance from external sources. The categories used are those developed and employed by Jones and Molnar in an earlier study, Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases.

The content analysis approach is used here as a technique for systematically collecting information from the mass media. From two capital city newspapers, El Diario of La Paz, Bolivia, and El Imparcial of Guatemala City, Guatemala, data on violent incidents were drawn. These data were then coded, transferred onto IBM cards, and subjected to analysis. The reliability of the coder was checked by independent coders.

SELECTED FINDINGS

In the opinion of the authors, the following are significant findings that describe the police role of the security forces in four selected cases. It should be noted at the outset that, at least in the four countries selected for this study, the police role was not given solely to police or police-type units, but to all units of the security forces, which in spite of their primary objectives and functions seem to have found it necessary to maintain secondary missions in which the obvious roles of regular, paramilitary, and police or police-type units become almost interchangeable. In all four countries, military forces, paramilitary forces, and civilian police forces became involved in countering the activities of insurgent and antisocial groups. In many instances the distribution of responsibility among these government forces for dealing with the insurgent and antisocial groups was not clearly established: Police-type functions were performed by units of the regular armed forces, and police-type units conducted small-scale antiguerrilla operations.

Three other general observations are worth noting. First, rivalry between military forces, paramilitary forces, and civilian police units was rampant; and although negative effects stemming from this rivalry cannot be determined, it can be assumed that where it existed it slowed the pace of the government effort. Second, countries dealing with an insurgency generally support centralized national police forces for the general maintenance of public order. However, among the four cases presented here, Guatemala supported a decentralized police organization. And finally, all four countries did establish paramilitary organizations to supplement their police and armed forces.

TABLE 1
SELECTED FINDINGS

INDIA

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
Army, Central Reserve Police units, and Border Security Forces	Border control	Operations consisted of routine apprehension of bandits and infiltrators. Frequent smuggling, banditry, and illegal border crossings and infiltration were never completely halted by security forces. They are continuing problems in India.
Territorial Army	Internal security	The Territorial Army is a volunteer service organized along military lines into urban and rural units to conduct various internal security operations during emergencies.
People's Assistance Corps	Training and drilling	Their function is to train local inhabitants living along border areas in basic military and police matters. Nearly 700,000 men were trained by this organization in an eleven-year period.
Police Central Bureau of Investigation and police undercover agents	Intelligence operations	Operations are conducted under a civil intelligence system. Police are also involved in processing strategic intelligence along with internal security intelligence. The system was reevaluated in the 1960's, and it was planned to remove police from strategic intelligence for which they were unsuited. Police undercover agents infiltrate ranks of agitators leading to the successful breakup of some organizations.
Indian Police Service	Administrative and line operations	This service provided recruiting and training for police: usually under supervision of state authorities, but subject to national control in national and local emergencies. Some units had specialized functions such as guarding public installations. Border security forces combined police and military functions.
Police, general	Internal and external defense	The police interchanged roles with regular units of the armed forces when called upon during emergency periods on external as well as internal defense missions.
Police, general	Resettlement and population control	Regrouping of scattered Mizo mountain villages to new areas under police control and population resettlement were apparently successful. The operation was accompanied by high insurgent casualties and breakup of hard-core Mizo units. Food supply and sources of new recruits were cut off.

TABLE 1--Continued

INDIA

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
Mobile strike units of state police battalions	Antidemonstration and riot control operations	Violent localized outbursts resulting from political agitation have been frequent occurrences in various states, especially during special occasions such as elections. Such outbursts resulted in many arrests (at times numbering in the thousands) and casualties. Regular troops have been called in to assist police units in civil outbursts.
Assam Police and Assam Rifles	Counterinsurgency operations	These units conducted operations against Naga rebels and minor skirmishes with insurgent units, including police-type operations. When the initial effort against Nagas failed, the government sent in regular army units, which took over primary responsibility of counter-insurgent effort. Assam Rifles were effective fighters made up of hill tribespeople.
Central Reserve Police units	Internal security operations	These units assisted police forces of the various states in emergencies.
Village Guards	Emergency and auxilliary operations	These units, also made up of tribespeople organized, trained, and armed by government forces, assisted in police operations. Mobilized as resistance to insurgents, the guards provided assistance to police during floods, riots, and other forms of civil turmoil.
Railway Protection Force	Security and guard operations	This force was set up to protect railroad installations and yards.
Paramilitary and reserve units	Police functions	These units assumed police functions in internal security operations during emergency periods and served to secure borders and coastlines. They are considered ill-equipped and ineffective. The armed constabulary, reinforced by village guards, performed police services.

THAILAND

National Police	Internal security operations	The National Police Department is responsible for maintenance of law and order, is diversified in function, and is capable of conducting relatively large-scale operations with commandos, tanks, and planes. Its operational units include Provincial Police, Border Patrol Police, and Metropolitan Police.
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TABLE 1—Continued

THAILAND

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
National Police	Intelligence operations	This organization was considered generally inadequate in the early 1960's. A combined effort of intelligence operations with a Malaysian security unit along common borders led to a few successful operations against insurgents.
Second Army of Royal Thai Army	Internal security operations	In late 1960's this unit took primary responsibility from the National Police in counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast, including gradual control over civic action teams.
Third Army of Royal Thai Army	Internal Security operations	This unit took a leading role in counterinsurgency operations from the Border Patrol Police in the northern provinces, especially Nan Province where most of the fighting was taking place. It conducted a successful open arms campaign.
Provincial Police	General police services	Responsible for providing police services everywhere except along borders and in metropolitan Bangkok, the Provincial Police scored limited successes against bandits, particularly in the Northeast.
Border Patrol Police	Border control	This group is the best equipped and trained, is autonomous in numerous enterprises, is responsible for the protection of borders against smugglers, bandits, and infiltrators, and also has engaged in extensive and successful civic action. In the 1960's the force included quick reaction mobile strike units and an airborne group.
Metropolitan Police	Riot control	The force is prepared for the prevention of demonstrations and riots, which have been rare occurrences in Bangkok.
Volunteer Defense Corps	Internal security operations	This part-time militia, operating as an auxiliary reserve force for the police at village level, provided immediate security where the army or police were unavailable. It dealt, but not successfully, with infiltration across the Mekong River. The provincial governors sometimes combined the corps and Home Police Guards with other police officers and civil workers into political action teams.
Royal Security Guards	Security operations	This is an interservice corps providing internal and perimeter security for military installations.

TABLE 1--Continued

THAILAND

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
Home Police Guards	Patrol operations	Made up of volunteer villagers, the Home Police Guards had special responsibility for maintaining security along Freedom Road.
Combined military and paramilitary units	Patrol and sweep operations	Although designed to flush out insurgent fighting units, the operations of these units were not intensive enough to have more than limited success, except in the southern provinces against the insurgent logistics system.

BOLIVIA

National Police and Carabineros	Police service	Made up of functional units that included border patrol and customs control for preventing smuggling and illegal border crossings, these U. S. -trained (riot control and counterinsurgency) units performed general police line functions, including patrol and investigation and operation of police stations and local detention centers. They compared favorably with the army in combat readiness. As a detaining and arresting authority the police were more active than the army.
Police, Criminal Investigation Department	Intelligence operations	This department investigated guerrilla contacts and infiltration routes and supplemented the intelligence mission of Bolivian army units.
Police, Criminal Investigation Department	Internal security and public safety operations	This was one of the most active of the security forces in conducting operations against insurgents as well as against bandits.
Second Section of Bolivian Army	Intelligence operations	This unit successfully gathered information on insurgent activities through captured documents and prisoner interrogation. Their arrest and interrogation of suspects in the capital city led to the breakup of urban support. They were assisted by active peasants who voluntarily informed on whereabouts of guerrillas.
Customs police	Border control	Integrated into National Police to combat smuggling and infiltration, these police patrolled borders and policed vessels for contraband on Lake Titicaca on the Peruvian-Bolivian border. They received border control assistance from neighboring countries and international organizations.

TABLE 1—Continued

BOLIVIA

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
Civilian militias	Security operations	Established and trained for handling such internal security problems as disorderly mobs, these decentralized and autonomous units were maintained by peasant and industrial unions. Factory workers' militias were the most effective in urban areas. Although poorly trained and equipped, they made up for it with good morale. With their intimate knowledge of the land and its resources and sufficient capability to handle insurgents, they were preferred over regular forces for maintaining security in provincial towns.
Army	Counterinsurgency operations	The army was involved in a proportionately larger number of incidents with insurgents and other antisocial groups than were the police.

GUATEMALA

National Police	Maintenance of public order	The members of the various units are appointed by the governors or mayors responsible for recruiting and supervising. Units varied in composition and quality, with many in the ranks serving on a part-time basis. Reorganized, trained, and modernized under U. S. sponsorship, they are subject to integration into the regular armed forces in emergencies. Their operations were focused on insurgents and their bases, bandits, and other antisocial groups. They are the most active of the police forces, but have a reputation for corruption and inefficiency.
Judicial Police	Internal security operations	This secret police agency, under the control of the Director General of National Police, concentrated on rounding up insurgents and suspected subversive elements in the cities. Techniques were often clumsy and ineffective, and their activities generated much opposition to the government from a normally nonpolitical population.

TABLE 1--Continued

GUATEMALA

Unit(s)	Action(s)	Remarks
Military Commissioners	Internal security operations	Although this local military reserve detachment is used in recruiting and training tasks, a more important function is its use as an internal security force during emergencies. Under direction of armed forces, they are sophisticated and wide-ranging in their activities. Their role as a police-type organization is vital to success in rural operations.
Customs Police	Border control	Under direction of the Treasury Department, they are stationed along borders and coasts to guard against smugglers and infiltrators and are limited in their counterinsurgency operations.
Private police	Security operations	Established to provide security for individuals or institutions from whom they receive their salaries, they are under the supervision of the National Police.
Police, general	Security operations	Guatemalan police experienced positive improvement in the 1960's. The most active of all government forces participating in countering insurgents, they initiated over half of total government encounters. During a state of siege or state of alarm, the scope of police activities, particularly in the area of population control, was extended.
Peasant militia	Counterinsurgency operations	Consisting of 2,000 men recruited in Zacapa area and credited with much of the success of the counterinsurgency campaign in the area, these units made up for a lack of training by their enthusiasm. They were not very discreet in selecting targets.
Army	Counterinsurgency operations	The army's stated aims are to preserve and defend territory from outside invasion and to preserve internal security and public order. The police role of the army increases during intensification of violence. Ineffective intelligence and lack of training in counterinsurgency initially hampered their efforts. They controlled all armed groups, including the police, during emergency periods.

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This study was undertaken at the request of The Office of the Provost Marshal General (OTPMG). Its purpose is to provide OTPMG with information that could assist in evaluating doctrine concerned with internal security problems of civil, paramilitary, and military police operations related to overseas internal defense and development. It is part of a continuing research project designed to describe and analyze the structure, functions, roles, and problems of civil, paramilitary, and military police forces in the developing countries and to describe and analyze the methods and techniques of their operations during a period of insurgency.

To date, three studies have been undertaken. The study Combating Subversively Manipulated Civil Disturbances, published in October 1966, systematically describes the behavior and relationships of subversive manipulators, crowds, and riot control forces. Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases, published in December 1966, is concerned with the structure, functions, roles, and problems of internal security forces engaged in internal defense against insurgents. A third study, on insurgent terrorism, focuses on the patterns and characteristics of terrorism used and directed by the Viet Cong at nonmilitary targets and the relationships between these patterns and characteristics and other situational factors. It was published in July 1969.

The present study grew from discussions conducted in 1967 between The Office of the Provost Marshal General and the Center for Research in Social Systems. At that time OTPMG felt the need to increase its store of information concerning the organization and operations of security forces involved in police-type activities in developing countries experiencing internal conflict. The request called for a series of case studies presenting essentially the same kinds of information contained in Internal Defense Against Insurgency: Six Cases, which provided the guidelines for the present study.

Within these boundaries, then, these four case studies will perform several important functions. They will serve as a means to bring together seemingly unrelated bits of information organized around a central theme or problem—in this instance, the police role of internal security forces in internal defense. The use of a common outline for all four cases will focus the information on the countries' respective internal security problems and will facilitate comparisons between countries. For the sponsor, the study will not only provide information for instructional purposes, but will also assist in evaluating existing doctrine and programs. The study should, as well, have wide applicability in planning operations.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Approaches

Two approaches were employed to study the organization and operations used by these police-type units. The first was a case study approach consisting of a review and synthesis of the pertinent portions of available and unclassified documents and publications. The second was a content analysis of violent incidents reported in the mass media.

The case studies are not chronological narratives of internal security problems experienced by the selected countries and the way in which the respective government forces attempted to deal with them. Instead, they are descriptions of factors which are treated separately over a period of time. These factors, enumerated later, bear directly or indirectly on internal security problems, the organizational makeup of the security forces, and their modes of operations which, on the basis of prior studies, have been identified as being related to the occurrence, form, and outcome of violent internal conflict.

The common outline shared by these and previous case studies prepared for the same sponsor was developed on the basis of a general review of internal security problems, consideration of the types of organizational and operational questions to which knowledge of violent internal conflict can be applied, and the anticipated use of the case studies for instructional purposes or general reference. Although a straight chronological account would have been more readable, it would not have allowed for ready comparisons of the cases—a major consideration here.

The research effort for the preparation of the case studies consisted of several direct steps. First, a cross section of available literature was reviewed. Persons knowledgeable in the different geographic areas were consulted to identify the major secondary documentary literature (unclassified) that covered various aspects of the subject under study. Using the common outline as a guide, information on factors related to internal security problems was collected, synthesized, and summarized. Gaps in coverage were filled in by further search of secondary sources, use of primary sources when readily available, or through interviews with area experts. When differences in views could not be resolved on the basis of available evidence, all views were included. A summary report of the case studies was prepared to underscore aspects of major importance.

Selected Countries

The countries studied were selected intentionally from three geographic regions: South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. They include India, Thailand, Bolivia, and Guatemala. Aside from geographic distribution, selection of countries was further guided by considerations of: (1) extent of security problems, (2) importance, and (3) availability of information. Thus, those countries selected had to have acknowledged ongoing insurgencies (all four countries at the time of selection were seriously threatened by organized forces bent on the overthrow of their respective governments); had to be judged important in terms of worldwide U.S. security interests (China's and Pakistan's designs on territory claimed by India compounding internal security problems, extensive U.S. aid to Thailand, Cuban sponsorship of insurgencies in Bolivia and Guatemala); and had to have sufficient and open information in published sources to permit an adequate description of the organization and operations of security forces (secrecy shrouding the Laotian insurgency, for instance, precluded its selection as a case for study).

Study Emphasis

Emphasis in the four case studies is on the organization and operations of police and police-type security organizations. However, because these organizations usually operated as part of a larger security force that included units of the regular armed forces employing more conventional types of military operations, the studies include the composition and description of all internal security forces available, and the combined methods and techniques of their operations. The studies will also deal with the vast array of problems facing the internal security forces such as recruitment, the collection of intelligence, and the security of border and coastal access points, as well as the nature of the insurgent operations, the public's confidence in the incumbent government, and the cleavages in the population and the civil disturbances arising from them. Discussion will also include the political parameters of the conflict, the social and economic dimensions that contributed to its intensification, and the influences within the community that tended to ameliorate the conflict and lightened the government's effort.

Sources of Information

Information for the case studies was drawn entirely from unclassified sources. These sources were far from exhaustive, but they did represent a good sample of scholarly works and government documents along with the more sensational kind of reporting in popular journals and newspapers. However, very few of these open sources discussed at length the organization and operations of internal security forces. Such information had to be drawn bit by bit from a wide variety of sources and pieced together to give as large and complete a picture as possible. A large number of sources used for the Bolivian and Guatemalan studies—newspapers, radio broadcasts, and popular periodicals—were supportive of the insurgent cause. It was their reporters who had a penchant for entering "hot areas" to interview rebel leaders, describe operations in great detail, and discuss the operational role of U.S. military assistance. Many of these reports—some of them left-oriented and bombastic—were later validated in governmental sources including official U.S. reports and surveys, some of them classified. These sources were screened carefully so that biases could be identified and information used divested of their particular points of view.

In the Indian and Thai cases, the respective governments were better able to manage the news emanating from the war zones. In Thailand, the only sources of information with respect to the insurgency appear to have been from the office of the prime minister. This simplified validation of facts appears in various publications since all reporters and analysts drew from the same source. However, there is confusion in the official Thai reporting system, and the data that come from it are highly dubious.* Reporters claiming interviews with insurgent leaders have been discredited both by officials and reporters. India has perhaps been one of the most studied countries in the developing world, and therefore scholarly source materials are readily obtainable.† Here again, however, information on the manner in which government forces handled the Naga and Mizo insurgencies is scarce in the open literature.

* The literature was evaluated by Dr. Peter Poole, professor of political science at Howard University, a former chief of the Technical Services, ARPA Field Unit, who spent several years in Thailand during the 1960's. He has conducted extensive research in Thailand.

† Although the 1970 edition of the U. S. Army's Area Handbook for India was not completed when research was conducted for this report, those responsible for its preparation were interviewed and material from their manuscripts used when appropriate.

Validity of facts and accuracy of author description and interpretation in the case studies were verified through intensive in-house review and revision and through review by area experts and external consultants.

Since so much material pertaining to the internal security forces and their activities was either unavailable or classified, an effort was made in a second research approach to content-analyze the leading and least biased newspapers in two countries: Guatemala and Bolivia. Content analysis in this study was used as a technique for systematically collecting data on the following content elements: (1) the various kinds of violent antisocial actions conducted within the countries, (2) the location of the actions, (3) the time of occurrence, (4) the number of persons involved in each incident, (5) the types of security forces responding to the incidents, (6) the kinds of incidents, (7) the actions with which they responded, (8) the casualties and fatalities that resulted from each encounter and, (9) the amount of property damage or loss incurred. Also obtained was a list of those who initiated the violent actions and against which targets. Because the governments in the countries mentioned had the power to regulate the press, an analysis was made of the priorities given to insurgency and insurgency-related news by measuring the column inches of coverage granted to insurgent-initiated incidents as opposed to security force-initiated encounters and their respective locations within the newspapers.

One newspaper from each of the two Latin American countries was selected: El Imparcial of Guatemala City and El Diario of La Paz, Bolivia. Both papers have been considered by experts as the leading newspapers of their respective countries. Moreover, according to a study conducted by the University of Missouri School of Journalism to determine the level of the freedom of the press for 1966 in 94 countries,* both Bolivia and Guatemala received relatively high ratings, placing them within the top 36 countries. However, changes in conditions and leadership during the periods under study for the two countries (March 1963 to January 1968 for Guatemala, and March 1966 to January 1968 for Bolivia) often led to news management by the government and perhaps a distortion of the larger picture of the insurgencies.

In many ways this news management was offset by the kinds of information collected for analysis. The content elements collected are referred to as "manifest content" or "hard information." In other words, there was no reading between the lines or interpretation of the elements involved in drawing the information from the newspapers. There was no interest in the editorial content of the articles. The only concern was for completeness of the news items, that is, concern for how many of the content elements required by the study were contained in the news accounts of violent incidents.

The reliance of manifest content, moreover, lessened coding ambiguity and in turn led to greater interanalyst reliability. Interanalyst reliability was checked by having the same incidents of political violence reported in newspaper accounts coded independently by three coders. Disagreements and differences arising largely as a result of coder mistakes were corrected. Those arising from coder judgment or interpretation were settled through interanalyst conferences so that total agreement in coding was reached. After all incidents for both countries were coded, the data were then transcribed onto IBM cards and were analyzed.

* Freedom of Information Center Report No. 181, World Press Freedom, 1966. School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Colombia, May 1967.

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding to the case studies, it seems appropriate to discuss the "fit" of the police role of internal security forces in internal defense. It is generally accepted that many countries in the world today, such as the four selected for this study, are particularly vulnerable to internal and external subversion. These countries are characterized as having underdeveloped economies, unstable political systems, and physical environments conducive to guerrilla operations. The U. S. government, through its overseas internal defense policy, has been in the past and is presently involved in assisting some of these countries in building and supporting military strength to help guard against subversion. Accordingly, the U. S. Army Military Police, along with other interested agencies of the U. S. armed forces, may be given the responsibility to lend assistance to civil and military authorities in friendly countries and to aid the host government in establishing, maintaining, or restoring internal security.

Host governments, usually with some degree of U. S. assistance, combine a two-pronged strategy directed at establishing a climate of order conducive to social progress: defense of the country from internal and external subversion and development of stable political and economic institutions. The objectives of the strategy are also twofold: to establish internal security and to assure the growth of social organizations.

INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Conceptually, four basic sets of operations in pursuit of these objectives can be distinguished:*

1. Internal Defense. Tasks performed by indigenous civil and military organizations aimed at establishing internal security.
2. Internal Defense Assistance. Tasks performed by allied civil and military organizations aimed at establishing internal security.
3. Internal Development. Tasks performed by indigenous civil and military organizations aimed at the assured growth of political and economic institutions.
4. Internal Development Assistance. Tasks performed by allied civil and military organizations aimed at the assured growth of political and economic institutions.

* This information was derived from correspondence dated 13 February 1967 on "New Terminology in Counterinsurgency" received by the Commanding General, U. S. Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe, from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

SPECIFIC TASKS

Each set of operations may be further subdivided into specific tasks, some that are characteristically military in nature and others that are characteristically civilian. In the general area of internal defense, military involvement is much broader than the involvement of other government and civil organizations. Military tasks of the indigenous forces may include, for instance, army counter guerrilla operations, counterintelligence operations, interdiction by unconventional warfare operations, riverine warfare, development of communications systems, and police operations. Military tasks of the assisting country may include army counter guerrilla advisory operations, counterintelligence advisory operations, riverine warfare advisory operations, psychological operations, helicopter support, signal advisory operations, logistics command support, military and paramilitary police advisory operations, and civic action.

Similarly, there are task requirements within the area of internal development for both host and assisting countries. But since the primary focus of this study is on internal defense, operations falling under internal development will not be discussed here.

By and large, activities of other government and civil organizations from the host country as well as from the assisting country are more narrow in scope in the area of internal defense than they are in the area of internal development. In internal defense, tasks of the host government in part include civil police operations and development of telecommunications projects. The tasks of the assisting government include civil police advisory operations, special operations of intelligence, and other undercover agencies.

Here again, the tasks of government and civil organizations in the area of internal development are omitted since they do not fall directly within the scope of this study.

POLICE ROLE IN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

Within the overall context of internal defense operations, police functions are a vital aspect of the concerted efforts of indigenous and allied armed forces against threats to social order. These functions in developing countries may be performed by various organizations—civil, paramilitary, and military forces—of the host and assisting governments.* There are what may be referred to as normal police operations: investigation, detection, detention, and intelligence collection. These normal operations are generally carried out under varying conditions in much the same manner in most underdeveloped countries and are primarily directed at the maintenance of discipline and proper conduct within the civilian community and military establishment according to already existing and oftentimes long-standing national laws and military codes of justice. There are also tactical operations in which the situation requires an action or a series of actions to clear an area of insurgent forces and to secure that area in order to prevent the return of the insurgents. Police functions in this case are required to provide intelligence, carry out search and seizure or raid operations, man checkpoints and roadblocks, and begin a population and resources control program. Finally, there are advisory operations that aid in the training of military, paramilitary, and civil police forces. These operations are largely carried out by the assisting countries. It becomes clear from the foregoing discussion that the level and type of police operations and the degree of cooperation between units performing these police operations and units performing purely military operations is likely to vary from country to country depending on the extent or level of insurgency.

* See U. S. Department of the Army, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations, FM31-73, Washington, D. C., October 1967.

POLICE ROLE AND PHASES OF INSURGENCY

In order to pursue further the notion that there is a direct relationship between the development of insurgency and the level and type of police operations, insurgency will be viewed as a phenomenon that undergoes three phases of development, each phase having its own peculiar characteristics in terms of the activities in which the insurgents engage. The following is a simplified model of an insurgency. Very similar models are widely used in brief articles on insurgency and counterinsurgency and are particularly useful for illustrative purposes. Phase one, also referred to as the subversive or terrorist phase, is frequently characterized as that in which insurgent leaders establish their networks of clandestine organizations. These activities are generally accompanied by an increase in lawlessness, including robberies, kidnappings, and assassinations. Insurgent movements during this phase rely heavily on the support of disaffected segments of society gained through varying amounts of persuasion and intimidation. Phase two is characterized by small-scale guerrilla operations carried out by insurgent units, initially at squad strength but growing according to the success of the insurgency. Subversive and terroristic activities, perhaps even stepped up, continue through this phase. Here again, the insurgents are highly dependent on the support, voluntarily given or gained through intimidation, of some segments of society. Phase three is characterized by open warfare. During this phase the insurgents challenge directly the conventional forces and engage in the kind of warfare that may reach the proportions of conventional war.

In reality, however, the phases of insurgency are not quite so clear cut. Since phase one and phase two activities are not abandoned but are also carried on in phase three, transitions from one phase to another become obfuscated and are not clearly identifiable. Moreover, uneven development of the insurgency from one part of a country to another in some cases, and the possible reversion of the insurgency to an earlier phase as a result of unsuccessful attempts to move ahead to another phase in other cases, also add to the complexity of insurgency.

The type and extent of the role played by units performing police functions and by those performing military functions will vary and will depend upon the phase of the insurgency. In phase one, for instance, the major burden of the insurgency generally rests in the hands of security forces performing police functions. In other words, the subversive activities in which the insurgents engage during this phase are within the purview of the police. The extent of police activities will, of course, depend on local laws, customs, and jurisdiction. They may include the arrest of insurgents disseminating antigovernment leaflets; dispersing or controlling crowd demonstrations instigated by the insurgents; taking steps to offset the effects of threats of violence and intimidation; breaking up and eliminating underground cells of insurgent groups; and conducting psychological and civic action operations to counter similar insurgent activities. There is no need for the services of conventional forces in this phase other than to support the police in roadblocks, search, and security operations or to deter outside intervention.

In phase two of insurgent development, police units still make up the first line of defense, although here they may require field capabilities. Investigations, interrogations, and search operations to capture the insurgent and confiscate his caches of materials make up much of the police activities. And since the insurgent becomes increasingly dependent on the local population for assistance, population and resources control measures also become a feature of police activities. Insurgent guerrilla units in this phase are still too small and too elusive for the use of conventional forces, but there is still a growing need for the use of these forces in roadblocks and search and security operations.

In phase three, the insurgents, in much larger units, begin to challenge directly the conventional military forces of the government. As a result of this change in its development, the insurgency becomes largely a military problem rather than a police problem. Police operations still continue and may even be intensified, but they are subordinated to military operations.

The primary concern of the insurgent leaders during the development of the insurgency is to gain the support of the civil population from which they draw fresh recruits and within which they establish agencies of the insurgent hierarchy. In countering these insurgent activities, the governments of developing countries respond through internal defense and internal development efforts in which the operations of police-type units of the security forces play a major role.

PART II
Case Studies

CHAPTER 4

INDIA

GENERAL

After independence, the Indian government, unlike governments in many other newly independent states, retained the democratic institutions of civilian rule that had developed over the years to become the world's largest democracy. This government was able to maintain a relatively high degree of effectiveness and stability through the combination of a strong party and competent leadership working toward a modern, unified, democratic, and socialist state. Since the consensus of the large Indian population was unattainable, the executive tended to be dominant, still maintaining the necessary element of legitimate authority.

This phenomenal growth toward political modernization came in the face of great odds. Throughout its independent life, India has had to deal with serious internal security problems while holding the line against the intrusion of Communist Chinese military forces in Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency, and Pakistani irregulars in Kashmir. Twice during the 1960's India has had to meet its adversaries in the field, resulting in an embarrassing defeat with one and a standoff with the other. Both wars led to a complete revamping of Indian military forces so that toward the end of the decade India was judged militarily capable of withstanding aggressive assaults from most of its potential enemies except the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Internally, India was experiencing serious economic and social instability. Although a potential industrial giant, India's economy was desperately poor and was straining to meet the rising costs of defense expenditures. People everywhere were living in poverty and many, particularly the lower income groups, outwardly expressed dissatisfaction. The population, rarely united, was organized into an extremely complex social order reflecting seemingly unbridgeable cleavages between religious, racial, regional, linguistic, and class groups. The government opposed and fought to discourage the particularistic interests of these groups and in spite of its continued rejection of violence as a political method, has used it rather successfully at times.

Political unrest initiated by most of these groups at various times in the 1960's has been expressed in many ways from mild forms of political agitation to outright rebellion. The extent of Communist involvement in India's political unrest also varied. In many instances, Indian Communists instigated minor rebellions which failed partly as a result of a serious split within the Communist organization itself and partly as a result of the effective operations of the government's security forces. In the Naga and Mizo rebellions, the extent of Communist participation has been limited to military assistance and other forms of support offered the insurgents by Communist China.

A combination of political and administrative actions and police and military operations has been responsible for the containment of political unrest in India. Through political and administrative actions, the government partially fulfilled the aims of the insurgents thereby splitting their movements into competing factions of moderates willing to negotiate further




Figure 1. Map of India

with the government and extremists pursuing their goals through violent means but with decreasing popular support. Police and military operations apparently have been adequate in suppressing localized forms of political agitation and keeping under control the rebellious activities of the insurgents in the hills.

The main instruments for maintaining law and order have been police organizations and regular armed forces, used singly or in combination depending on the circumstances. The central and state governments often worked jointly in the employment of these forces. In some instances, police operations have been hindered by state governments reluctant for political reasons to allow the speedy and effective suppression of dissident groups. In such cases, however, the president has had the power to step in to replace state authorities whenever he deemed the existence of a grave emergency. Over the years the police role has remained flexible and broad to meet situations requiring immediate aid or action.

INDIA'S SECURITY PROBLEMS

India's pressing security problems that seriously threatened the system of government and tested the capabilities of the network of police forces in the late 1960's stemmed from a wide variety of sources. First, there was her continuing feud with Pakistan over the status of Kashmir. There was an equally violent feud with Communist China over boundary lines established by the British during colonial days that reached a high point in the fall of 1962. Internally, India was experiencing a nationalist uprising of the Naga tribes in its northeast state of Assam that erupted into open warfare in the middle 1950's. A similar uprising in the same state was set off in the 1960's by Mizo tribespeople who were following the Naga example. Occasionally, India was faced with violent communal outbreaks over such issues as ethnicity, language, and religion, which tended to intensify the separatist tendencies of some regions that made up the country. And finally, India was subjected to potentially violent political agitation well established in her political process as a form of redress for grievances but operating outside existing political and parliamentary institutions.

During this period India's security forces were reorganized and expanded. The brief war with China in 1962 and the more recent encounter with Pakistan in 1965 forced a reappraisal of India's defense capabilities and a subsequent military buildup that made her armed forces one of the largest in the world. By mid-1968, however, an open and all-out war, especially a two-front war with Pakistan and China, was seen by Indian defense officials as unlikely. The conflict with Pakistan had settled to an arms race, and the conflict with China, the bigger and longer-term threat, appeared resolved for the moment.¹

The main concern here, however, is with India's internal security problems that in many ways were actually tied to her external ones, as will be indicated later. The Naga independence movement, one of the most serious of India's internal security problems, was conceived during World War II when Nagas were recruited into small fighter units pitched against the Japanese in Burma. After the war, Nagas organized themselves politically for postwar reconstruction and established the Naga National Council. It set out to bring together all Naga tribespeople and help them to repair damage incurred during World War II.² The council represented the top leadership of a vertical organization that reached down several levels. At the bottom, villages were formed into groups and local inhabitants popularly elected a local tribal council for each group. The presidents of each of these local councils made up the councils for the next step up the organizational ladder. Presidents of these councils in turn comprised the Naga National Council. The president, vice president, and general secretary of the council were elected by council members. Accordingly, the organization was set up to operate in

democratic fashion whereby suggestions for policy went up to the top and policy decisions filtered down to the bottom.³

At first, the organization began to negotiate for local autonomy and then by 1948 for complete separation from India. Rebuffed by the Indians, the Nagas in 1953 then turned to violence and took the course of armed conflict against the government authorities. From then on, a gradual escalation in the insurgency ensued, beginning with propagandizing and intimidation of local inhabitants and leading to the ambushing and attacking of government security units and small outposts.⁴ These phase one insurgent activities expanded the police limited combat and combat support missions.

In March 1956 the movement was further complicated by the formation of the Naga Federal Government, established to govern what at that time was declared the Nagaland People's Sovereign Republic.⁵ Apparently, a struggle within the Naga National Council led to a split in the leadership which prompted the moderates to break away and form the government. However, the two organizations were not really in competition, according to one of the council leaders, but performed different functions for the movement. The Naga National Council retained its supremacy over the entire movement, and the government was founded to handle administrative matters.⁶

The military segment of the movement became known as the Home Guard, a guerrilla force led by a commander in chief and growing over the years to an estimated 15,000 troops.⁷ Each of the Naga tribes controlled a division of approximately 500 officers and men commanded by a major general. These troops wore regular uniforms and even sported an Indian insignia.⁸

Many of the auxiliary tasks seemed to have been performed by the Naga Women's Society. Members nursed and cooked for the troops, manufactured and mended uniforms and clothes, supplied rations to those who worked underground, handled the procurement of medical supplies, and acted as an intelligence unit collecting information and carrying messages.⁹

At the outset the Naga insurgents depended on arms and ammunition left behind after World War II. The Nagas hid them after the war and the Home Guard recovered them during the preparation for their revolt. Later the Naga guerrillas acquired their military supplies from raided police stations and outposts, and from East Pakistan and Communist Chinese sources. They also manufactured homemade guns and mortars for captured ammunition.¹⁰

Fierce fighting occurred between 1955 and 1957, the peak of the insurgency, with the armed guerrilla force building up to an estimated 15,000 men.¹¹ In 1956, when the movement leadership divided into two main wings, the moderates were willing to negotiate, but the extremist wing carried on the fighting with a greatly weakened organization. A cease-fire, agreed upon by the Nagas and the authorities in September 1964 and extended several times, brought an end to the major part of the fighting. However, some minor skirmishes have been reported since then as attempts at negotiating a real settlement have continued.

Drawing their inspiration from the Naga experience, Mizo nationalists also set out to acquire their independence from the Indian central government through armed violence. They organized the Mizo National Front to pave the way for their own insurrection which began in south Assam early in 1966. The front, formerly known as the Mizo National Famine Front, was originally set up to help the state government distribute rice during a grain shortage in the late 1950's. In 1960 it dropped the word "famine" from its name, converted itself into a political organization, and in 1963 successfully ran several of its leaders for political office. By that time the front leadership had taken a militant stance and adopted the goal of complete separation from the central government of India.¹² In 1966 it became the shadow government of the

Mizo region and was therefore banned by the established authorities.¹³ Its fighting units were known as the Mizo National Forces Army, made up of approximately 2,500 hard-core guerrillas whose command level leaders were formerly British-recruited Lushai Scouts of World War II fame.¹⁴

Desire for separation from India had been expressed by Mizo leaders earlier, and some underground preparations for an insurrection were made several years in advance. But the decision to strike was not made until early 1966 when these armed units of the movement attacked several important towns in the Mizo area of Assam. Mizo tactics were similar to Naga tactics and included intimidation, looting, attacks, and ambushes. At the height of the fighting the Mizo guerrillas, up to 2,500 strong,¹⁵ surrounded and cut off a number of government outposts. Government forces got the upper hand eventually, but skirmishes between the contestants have continued up to the time of writing. There was strong evidence by mid-1968 that the Mizos and Nagas, in spite of their many differences, were joining forces with the encouragement of Communist China in their struggle against the Indian government, exchanging arms with each other, and linking with Nagas, Chin, and Communist extremists in Burma.¹⁶ In spite of this great unrest and violence in the northeast region of India, there was nonetheless some degree of rapport between the tribes and the government.¹⁷

In 1968 both Naga and Mizo guerrillas were receiving aid and training from Communist China. By summer of that year, an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Nagas had gone to China for a six-month training course in guerrilla warfare. The first group of 200 to have been sent returned by infiltrating from Burma armed with Chinese arms. They established a camp only eight miles from an Indian military headquarters.¹⁸ The Mizos shortly followed the Naga example and by mid-1968 had more than 1,000 of their own forces sent to China for training.¹⁹

Indian central authorities for their part placed great stress on a soft approach in solving the problem of the Naga and Mizo insurgencies. They attempted to underplay forceful measures and instead relied heavily on cutting off the insurgents' supply lines to the villages while setting up negotiations for peaceful settlement and instituting community development projects.²⁰ The Indian security forces continued to operate within the framework of the democratic constitution; it contained no provision for dealing with subversive elements, but did allow the government emergency powers to enact special legislation or deploy armed forces whenever the country or any state within it was threatened with disturbance.²¹

Assam Police and Assam Rifles initially responded to the Naga rebellion when it broke out in the 1950's, but they failed in their efforts to put down the disturbance. Subsequently, the government sent in two companies of the regular army from nearby installations, and in April 1956 was forced to transfer primary responsibility of counterinsurgent operations from police-oriented units to the regular army.²² Peak strength of the security forces pitched against the Naga guerrillas varied according to period and source of information. Between 4,000²³ and 9,000²⁴ Indian soldiers may have been kept occupied by the Naga Federal Government Home Guard during the 1955-1957 period. Another estimate raised the total to between 40,000 and 50,000 soldiers against a population of approximately 300,000 civilians.²⁵ One Naga leader has contended that the continued fighting in the cease-fire zone after 1964 forced the government to send in between 60,000 and 80,000 troops.²⁶ Such high figures would seem unnecessary, however, since under the cease-fire agreement the government pledged in part not to undertake jungle operations, not to raid guerrilla camps, not to patrol 1,000 yards beyond security outposts, not to search Naga villages, and not to conduct air operations.²⁷

On the surface the war against the Mizos appears to have been a more successful enterprise. At least the government forces were able to keep Mizo operations in check and insurgents on the run. A major government operation against the Mizos was the regrouping of

scattered mountain villages in areas under police control and the destruction of some villages and crops to cut guerrillas off from their source of supplies. Screening, identification, registration, and movement control were part of the police-type activities performed by the various security units. By the fall of 1967, 50,000 mountain people had been resettled, 3,500 Mizo guerrillas captured or surrendered, and 350 killed.²⁸ In the latter part of 1968 guerrilla casualties and surrenders continued to rise and the hard core was scattered in the interior areas. Attempts to recruit new volunteers apparently were not successful.²⁹

The danger of similar groups establishing insurgencies of the Naga and Mizo types was an ever-present potentiality in the late 1960's and a continued challenge to police and other Indian forces. In the state of Bihar, for instance, a youthful party known as the Birsa Sewa Dal in mid-1968 assumed the leadership of a movement demanding the establishment of a Jharkhand state governed by the Adivasis, a tribal group found in that region. The movement leadership warned the government in the summer of 1968 that their group would take a violent course if their goals were not achieved through negotiations. At that time, however, they had neither organization nor resources to carry out their threat. Their protest was taken into the streets in the form of demonstrations and disruptive activities in the universities.³⁰ In the state of Kerala during the same year three to five hundred terrorists were attacking police stations and raiding homes in an apparently poor display of guerrilla warfare. One state leader at the time felt little need for great concern.³¹ Earlier in 1967, pro-Peking Communists mobilized tribal Santhals behind a movement set out to displace the state government in West Bengal. The movement based itself in the forest areas of Naxalbari district close to the borders of Nepal and set off on a reign of terror that was broken up by the police in a few weeks of operations.³² The Naxalite threat, which is Maoist oriented and active in the tribal areas and in the urban areas of Eastern India, although small, has recently grown into a comparatively serious revolutionary movement. The police have contained it but have not been able to eliminate it. In these critical areas the major burden of preventing large-scale disorders or more serious forms of mass action was in the hands of security forces performing police functions.

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Problems of Internal Security Forces

Since the Chinese attack of 1962 India has been faced with serious security problems—both external and internal—with which Indian security forces have had to deal. The most serious and constant threat has come from China whose small yearly intrusions into Ladakh and the North-East Frontier Agency from 1957 to 1962 set the pattern of operations. Not only has India had to defend her own borders in that area, but she also took on responsibility for the defense of her three small neighbors: Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal. Special treaty rights with Sikkim included in return the assurance of protection or military assistance by Indian troops already stationed there when it was needed. Bhutan, whose defense and external affairs were informally guided by India, was afforded similar protection.³³ In 1951 and again in 1959, India extended military support to Nepal in an attempt to establish a security barrier against Chinese designs.³⁴ The area's 20,000 foot mountain peaks making logistics and evacuation almost impossible and the altitudes requiring the acclimation of troops added to the difficulty of defending it.³⁵

India's dispute with Pakistan came to a head in August 1965 when 6,000 to 8,000 armed irregulars crossed over from Pakistan-held areas of Kashmir into India. The war escalated further nearly a month later after Pakistani tanks threatened to cut Indian supply lines, forcing Indian troops to open another front. After a month and a half of fighting the U. N. Security Council intervened; the fighting stopped, and two months later the Soviet Union played host to

the two adversaries at a conference in Tashkent where an agreement resulting in the withdrawal of forces to positions occupied before hostilities and the settling of disagreement through peaceful means was signed.³⁶ More than three years later the situation was still tense.

Aside from the state of insurrection in the hills of Assam and the occasional revolts which some states have experienced, Indian security forces in the late 1960's were also charged with containing outbursts of violence generally resulting from political agitation (see Civil Disturbances), smuggling and banditry, and illegal border crossings. Localized violent outbursts, or the threat of such occurrences, ordinarily were handled by state authorities. State governments had the authority to deploy central reserve police battalions to put down or prevent violence on special occasions such as elections.³⁷ Extensive smuggling into the country (especially illegal traffic in luxury goods) and between states required police surveillance. An intoxicating drug used by many Indians, for instance, was smuggled in from Nepal and transported into states that either outlawed its sale or levied taxes and high prices to discourage its use.³⁸ Infiltration of arms and men, including Chinese-trained Nagas and Mizos coming back from China through Burma and Lushai Chin bandits from India crossing into Burma to steal rice and cattle from the peasants,³⁹ became a serious problem in the late 1960's. Fortunately for the government, the letup in the conflict with Pakistan allowed army and police units guarding the borders of East Pakistan to be redeployed to routine matters such as apprehending smugglers, cattle thieves, timber poachers, and infiltrators.

One serious problem of a different nature hindered the effectiveness of military and police action in handling internal security problems. For political reasons, some state governments were unwilling to allow security forces to take action they felt necessary against rebels and terrorists. In these cases, voter responses overrode security considerations.⁴⁰

Internal Security Forces Expansion

Three serious challenges to India's security persuaded policymakers to expand the country's security forces: the Chinese attack, the war with Pakistan, and the Naga and, later, Mizo insurrections. In the few years after independence, India's armed forces, consisting of one-half of a million men, were considered inadequate. There were twelve divisions, including armored and mountain units, and less than two dozen fighter and bomber squadrons made up of planes acquired between 1940 and 1956. As a political force the army matched its small budget, a result of India's heavy reliance on a diplomacy of peace and noninvolvement.⁴¹ The defense minister was relatively unimportant.⁴²

The buildup of the security forces began as early as 1953 when the Nagas rose against central authorities. Police units were increased throughout the Naga hills, new armed police battalion posts were set up, and small detention centers were opened.⁴³ In 1957, Krishna Menon, who became a controversial figure after the Chinese invasion, became defense minister, and through his personal influence was able to gain for the military establishment a more prominent position in the government.⁴⁴

But defense planning for a revised security force came only after the Chinese attack and was spurred again after the war with Pakistan. For months after hostilities between China and India ceased, Indian officials reevaluated the condition of the armed forces. A five-year defense plan was inaugurated in 1964 and set out to increase the size of the armed forces, to expand training to include jungle and high altitude warfare, to revamp intelligence gathering machinery, and to modify the weapons system. As for defense spending, in 1963 the defense budget amounted to \$1 billion—40 percent more than the average for the years from 1947 to

1962. During the period from 1964 to 1969, defense expenditures totalled \$9.7 billion.⁴⁵ In the mid 1960's, defense expenditures represented 5 percent of the national income—a relatively large sum for a country faced with serious economic problems.⁴⁶

Maintaining Public Confidence

Maintaining public confidence in India's government and security forces appears to have been a continuing challenge to the country's leadership. Public opinion interpreted from a brief survey of the public press indicates that informed Indians view their country as a leader among Asian nations equipped to set high standards in international relations.⁴⁷ As for national politics, most informed Indians in the past have shared the goals set by the national leaders but have differed widely on methods used in attaining these goals. Most Indians, especially in the large cities, aspired to improve social welfare and financial and educational opportunities and to eliminate poverty.⁴⁸ The government answered by inaugurating various community development and rural welfare projects (although less than successful) aimed especially at increasing the well-being of the more backward and disadvantaged groups in the country. Many special considerations have been given these groups in the constitution and in much government legislation. But in spite of government efforts to better the lot of its citizens, the rural population has resisted some of its programs and has distrusted its administrators.⁴⁹

Confidence in the security forces appears to have been mixed. Indians generally have avoided members of the armed forces, recognizing, however, the role of the armed forces as protector of Indian independence and also placing military valor high on their list of social values. And when the Chinese attacked India in 1962, the entire population very briefly for the first time united behind the government and many volunteered for service. However, the Indian defeat suffered at the hands of the Chinese caused a widespread and severe lowering of morale and public criticism of the security forces and politicians.⁵⁰

Population Cleavages

India in the 1960's had one of the most complex societies in the world with a wide range of unassimilated sectional interests, castes, classes, religions, and languages, whose divided loyalties were reinforced by the "... vastness of the country, the geographic isolation of communities and regions and the prevailing Hindu concept of social segregation. . . ." Even the boundaries of the Indian states coincided with linguistic regions that were further divided into subregions reflecting the dialectical variation in the main language.⁵¹

Northerners felt superior because of their numerical and political dominance; southerners viewed northerners as "barbarian invaders" and resented their political dominance and the imposition of their language—Hindi—as the country's official language.⁵² Politically, Muslims were overcome by Hindus through the years of their common struggle for independence; that plus the rioting and resettlement after partition left tension-producing feelings between the two religious communities. Other minority religious groups, such as the Sikhs and Buddhists, have been far from contented with official guarantees of cultural autonomy and noninterference, have opposed Hindu domination, and have been the vehicles for Indians of inferior status to escape the Hindu social system. Tribespeople, who have been looked down upon by the Indians, have always lived in isolation throughout India; some have formed close relationships with the Hindu community, while others, such as the Nagas and Mizos have strongly resisted assimilation.⁵³

The government attempted to avoid taking sides with the conflicting social groupings and advocated and supported the fundamental rights of the citizens whatever their religion, race, caste, or place of birth. But these divided loyalties that sometimes led to extreme forms of civil strife forced government security forces to take strong measures to enforce the law and establish order.

Recruitment

Even without conscription, India with its population of nearly 500 million people has had no difficulty in recruiting men for its security forces.⁵⁴ Moreover, enlistment, based on competition and fitness, has been open to all citizens. However, in the early 1960's this resulted in the overrepresentation of several states, especially Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Sikhs and Gurkhas, people with outstanding military qualities, supplied one-fifth of the army strength. The diversity of India's population thus was not found in her security forces.⁵⁵

Officer recruitment apparently has been more difficult. Highly qualified prospective officers, looking for the prestige and the power usually associated with military careers in developing nations, saw little opportunity of achieving these valued goals in the Indian officer corps.⁵⁶ Consequently, during the war with Pakistan in 1965, many officers were drafted to serve on a short-term basis.⁵⁷ Recruitment at the officer level was based on professional considerations; promotion to upper ranks, however, depended heavily on nonprofessional ones.⁵⁸

High-ranking police officers worked their way up through the ranks of the Indian Police Service, a civil-servicelike organization. Applicants selected for police service received their training in a police training college operating along military lines⁵⁹ and became versed in military as well as police operations.

Tribespeople in the hill areas of India were also eligible for volunteer service in India's security forces.⁶⁰ Nagas in large numbers were represented in police battalions, and some volunteered for army service.⁶¹

Collection of Intelligence

The civil system for collecting, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, and interpreting information concerning the security of India in the mid-1960's was operated by the police under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was an enlarged outgrowth of the British system that in colonial days was used primarily against nationalists. In conjunction with this civil intelligence system, a joint intelligence unit for handling military intelligence—Joint Chiefs of Staff—was created after independence. Prior to 1962, most of the attempts to coordinate the activities of these overlapping branches apparently failed, and high policy planners continued to rely heavily on civil intelligence units for strategic information. However, the Chinese attack in 1962 underlined the defects of the intelligence system, and, along with other security units, it was given serious reevaluation. Shortly after the office of director general of security was established in the prime minister's secretariat as a centralized coordinating agency for political and military intelligence. And, by the mid-1960's, a recommendation was made that a new intelligence system be established to remove the police from the processing of strategic intelligence for which they were said to be unsuited.⁶²

Border and Coastal Access

With land boundaries extending over 9,425 miles and a coastline stretching over 3,535 miles, India's borders have been highly vulnerable and subject to penetration by insurgents from the inside and foreign powers from the outside. Moreover, the varying climate and terrain along these many miles have required a wide range of training for those security units that have guarded it.⁶³ From the inside, Naga and Mizo insurgents have used the border with Burma as exit and entry points going to and from China to receive training, supplies, and other forms of assistance.⁶⁴ Smugglers, cattle thieves, and other types of bandits have crossed to and from Burma and Nepal in the conduct of their illegal activities.⁶⁵ From the outside, India faced two hostile powers—China and Pakistan—who at various times entered the country from the North-East Frontier Agency, Ladakh and Kashmir. Had it not been for the presence of foreign fleets in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, India perhaps could also have been subject to penetration by sea.⁶⁶

Insurgent Operations

Insurgent operations in India during the 1950's and 1960's were typically phase one operations familiar to developing countries experiencing insurgencies requiring police actions ranging from population control to cordon searches. Of the several conspiratorial groups operating at some time during this period, the Nagas were the most successful, carrying the insurgency to the brink of an advanced stage and achieving some gains for their effort—statehood and greater autonomy.

The Nagas stepped up operations in the early 1950's from simple acts of civil disobedience. They refused to pay an imposed house tax, to cooperate with government representatives on government-sponsored projects, and to sell supplies to government officials and police. Next, they threatened Naga tribesmen found cooperating with the government and committed acts of kidnapping, assassination, and sabotage. Escalating still further, Naga insurgents used arson, looted and murdered, and intimidated government representatives. They ambushed convoys, sniped continually, and attacked government outposts. Teachers, shops, railway stations, trains and other traffic, and village houses were frequent targets. Many Naga villagers at first supported the rebellion and those who did not were terrorized. Later, support diminished and supplies were more often acquired at gunpoint. Villagers resented the insurgents' increasing use of violence against noncooperating civilians and in some cases set up a solid body of resistance that the insurgents responded to by extreme forms of retaliation. The dominant idea carried in psychological operations themes, slogans, and marching songs was Christian; Nagaland was to be the first Christian state in Asia.⁶⁷

Mizos and some other related tribes in the Assam hills employed a variety of low-scale warfare operations. Their bands of insurgents attacked and ambushed government outposts and patrols, and in 1966 and 1967 inflicted fairly high casualty rates on Indian forces, killing 160 Indian soldiers.⁶⁸ They also terrorized villages close to the Burma border, collecting money and supplies from villagers.⁶⁹ Sporadic fighting between the more determined Naga and Mizo insurgents and government forces has continued.

In 1967 in the Naxalbari area of West Bengal, Communist insurgents there established a government-in-the-bush and conducted a reign of terror against local officials and inhabitants that lasted several weeks. Their operations were short lived, however, as police units managed to break up the organization. In Kerala, a group referred to as the Naxalite terrorists late in 1968 were attacking police stations to capture arms and raiding private homes for

money and supplies. At that time there was some danger of the Malabar ranges being turned into a site of guerrilla operations.⁷⁰

Civil Disturbances

Civil disobedience and coercive public protests were part and parcel of Indian politics before independence and became even more so after independence. In fact, this kind of political behavior was considered a legitimate form of expressing demands and mobilizing public opinion⁷¹ and became well institutionalized in the Indian political process. Many forms of mass actions have been used including riots, strikes, boycotts, work stoppages, obstruction of normal activity, courting of arrests, fasts, marches, processions, and public meetings. Some of these actions have been legal, others illegal. Illegal actions have on occasion included the use of violence. In general, these actions have all shared three attributes: They usually were collective actions, they were public and not clandestine or conspiratorial, and by their nature they imposed restrictions on the authorities compelling them to use the minimum of force in counteractions.⁷² These forms of mass activities required extensive specialized training and knowledge in riot control operations from Indian police and regular armed forces.

Issues over which mass actions were initiated varied widely. Mahatma Gandhi began his campaign of civil disobedience after World War I when he gained control of the nationalist movement. He led boycotts against elections, government schools, and foreign-made goods, and he led a march in 1930 in protest of the government's monopoly of salt.⁷³ The National Congress party began its civil disobedience movement for independence in 1940.⁷⁴ In 1964, riots broke out in various parts of the country over the theft in Kashmir of a Muslim religious relic.⁷⁵ In 1967 sharecroppers and landless laborers revolted in West Bengal because landlords refused to allow the state government to expropriate their lands in the enforcement of land ceiling laws.⁷⁶ Political agitation concerning the compulsory teaching of certain languages led to the arrest of thousands in 1955 and 1957.⁷⁷ And in 1965 in Madras, the ending of English as the country's official language brought to violent protest Tamil nationalists who long opposed the government's language policies. A series of mass actions eventually leading to a general strike was carried on for more than a month. Police and regular troops were called in to quiet the activists.⁷⁸

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ORGANIZATION

Organization

Essentially, India's security forces in the late 1960's consisted of an army, a navy, an air force, and various types of internal security forces including the national police. Since some of these forces fell under different ministries in the cabinet, the prime minister, according to the governmental structure, coordinated their activities with the aid of various committees, and the president was their supreme commander.

Armed Forces

Indian military establishment in its organization and training was highly influenced by the British and even in the 1960's members of the officer corps exhibited a great deal of Sandhurst quality. The British organized the Indian armed forces in part according to race, and even today there still remain regiments of Gurkhas, Marathis, and Jats.⁷⁹ Also during its history

under British direction, the Indian armed forces experienced some military mutinies; an especially serious one broke out in 1857 and lasted more than a year. No incidents of this kind have occurred since independence and the subsequent withdrawal of British forces from India in the late 1940's.

The organization of the Indian armed forces appeared centrally controlled. A National Defense Council, established after the Chinese invasion and reconstituted in 1965, advised the government on defense matters; a military affairs committee chaired by the defense minister and with a membership consisting of the different service chiefs of staffs and the secretary of defense was set up within the council. The central agency for the direction of the three branches, however, was the ministry of defense; and all important questions on defense were settled in that ministry's top committee, the defense committee of the cabinet.⁸⁰ But in spite of all these governing committees at the top, the three services were not well integrated, sometimes leading toward delay and confusion in the field.⁸¹

The defense minister, a civilian, was responsible for a wide variety of activities including the appropriation and distribution of defense funds and the coordination of the three branches for defense purposes. He administered a large number of interservice organizations among which were the National Cadet Corps, the National Defense College, the Defense Services Staff College, the National Defense Academy, and the School of Foreign Languages. He was also responsible for a defense production organization that was in the mid-1960's the largest state-owned integrated enterprise, having under it nearly 30 ordnance factories, and was self-sufficient in the production distribution of stores for all branches of the armed forces.⁸²

In the mid-1960's approximately 900,000 of the nearly one million men in uniform were in the army,⁸³ and by 1969 nearly one-third of these were in mountain divisions. Actually, mountain and plains divisions did not differ much in their organization. However, mountain divisions required high trajectory weapons, pack howitzers, and mortars to be carried on mules; and since evacuation in high areas was not always possible, divisional areas also required larger medical units.⁸⁴ Functionally, the army was divided into branches for military operations, training, recruitment, movement of personnel, procurement, weapons and ammunition, and engineering. Administratively and operationally, it was organized into four commands—western, eastern, southern, and central—and each command was further divided into areas and subareas.⁸⁵ Each command was headed by a general officer responsible to the chief of staff of the army and was reasonably self-sufficient and independent of the other commands. In this way, the organization of the army militated against any possible military takeover.⁸⁶

The navy and air force, 20,000 and 57,000 strong respectively,⁸⁷ were also headed by chiefs of staff. Of the three branches, the navy has been the weakest. In 1963 it consisted of one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, two destroyer squadrons, several antisubmarine and aircraft frigate squadrons, and three minesweeping squadrons.⁸⁸ By 1969 the navy had acquired some submarines; the air force had added surface-to-air missiles and new fighter bombers.⁸⁹

Paramilitary Organizations

Paramilitary and reserve units serving as second lines of defense and as a basis for the expansion of regular forces had been organized by the time the Chinese invaded India in 1962. The Territorial Army, a volunteer service intended for use especially for internal security in times of emergency and possibly for antiaircraft and coastal defense, was set up in 1949.⁹⁰ Its members were part time, recruited to serve in any of the branches, and organized into

urban or rural units along military lines.⁹¹ A People's Assistance Corps was established in 1953 to give basic training to local inhabitants living along border areas. Between early 1955 and late 1966, nearly 700,000 men received training in this organization.⁹² The National Cadet Corps, India's ROTC, was established in 1948 in part to add to reserve manpower to be used for rapid expansion in cases of emergency. Some cadets were able to transfer into the regular armed forces with commissions.⁹³ In 1963, participation in this program for university and college students under 26 became compulsory.⁹⁴ Its strength was to be cut in 1969 and a work-oriented National Service Corps was to provide an alternative. Border Security Forces, established in 1965, was largely concerned with infiltration and smuggling. Under civilian control, its training was less intense than the training of the regular armed forces.⁹⁵

Police Organizations

Internal security problems fell within the range of authority of an estimated 128,000-man force.⁹⁶ Presumably, in the 1960's this included all members of police-type organizations such as the state police forces, the railway police, the rural police, and the volunteer police. (See figure 2.)

During the colonial era, the British were responsible for the administration of law and justice. They established a highly centralized system of police outposts manned by small contingents. According to law, police units were jointly controlled with state governments.

The changeover to independent status brought few changes in police administration. The Indian Police Service came under the Ministry of Home Affairs, recruitment and selection of the officer corps were based on competitive examination, and training received at a central police school. This served to ensure the uniform application of standards and encouraged the development of nationalism. For actual police operations, however, members of the Indian Police Service were controlled jointly by the central and state governments through formal arrangement.⁹⁷ Accordingly, the vital level for police operations seemed to have been the district level; and the many police forces, whose lower ranks were selected by the states, were limited in their operations to their respective territorial jurisdictions.⁹⁸ The district organization was headed by the district superintendent of police. In every day police matters he assisted the district magistrate, a civil servant who headed the state bureaucracy at that level and who was directly responsible for the establishment of law and order. Below the superintendent appeared the lower levels of the police service including his deputies, subinspectors, head constables, and the rank-and-file policemen.⁹⁹

At the national (or union) level, two centrally controlled police forces were established: the Central Reserve Police, a back-up, fast reaction force guarding frontiers and assisting the various states during times of emergency; and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), an investigatory and an corruption arm of the central government. The central government also had the police forces of the centrally administered territories of India under its authority.¹⁰⁰

Aside from the services of the regular police organization, the state of Assam also controlled the operations of an armed constabulary—the Assam Rifles. In the Naga hills of Assam, the Assam Rifles were made up of Kirata tribespeople, popular in the hills and also courageous and accustomed to living under hard conditions. In the late 1950's, the Assam Police and the Assam Rifles were unable to contain the insurgent Nagas. Consequently, two companies of the regular armed forces were sent in by the government to help put down the insurgency. The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure gave civil magistrates the power to call upon units of the armed forces to disperse mobs or unlawfully assembled people. In his absence, military commanders were given this power with the condition that the civil magistrate be notified as soon

as possible.¹⁰¹ All of these security units were reinforced by Village Guards, an organization of local inhabitants supplied with arms and training by government forces and set up to resist the insurgents. Their activities were controlled by local chiefs.¹⁰² In the late 1960's, armed police in Assam were sent to reinforce 57 outposts and three battalions of police were sent into the state to add to the four battalions already operating there following a sudden deterioration of law and order.¹⁰³

The responsibility for the protection of railways, a vulnerable target for bandits and insurgents, was shared by the central government and the individual state governments. The Indian federal government passed a law establishing the Railway Protection Force to guard railroad installations subject to attack or damage, to patrol railroad yards, and to escort trains in insecure parts of the country. A separate railroad police corps organized at the state level was also established to guard railway lines operating within the states and to handle crimes committed on railroad property.¹⁰⁴

The rural police, responsible to local government bodies, was established to handle local routine matters. Its members, who acted as watchmen, formed community patrol units and filled in as intelligence agents noting suspicious and subversive activity; they were illiterate, ill paid, and strongly criticized for their weaknesses. The volunteer police organization consisted of a wide variety of law enforcement forces including Home Guards and Village Volunteer Forces such as the Village Guards previously described. These forces were mobilized for emergency operations and auxiliary police work during floods, riots, and different forms of civil turmoil. They were locally recruited and trained and generally wore distinctive markings such as badges and armbands.¹⁰⁵




Figure 2. Organization of Indian State Police Forces

Military Assistance

When the Chinese invaded late in 1962, India turned to Communist as well as non-Communist sources for military assistance. Immediate assistance was received from the United States, where there was much debate in some quarters on the question of assisting India

in her conflict with China. The year before, the Indian armed forces were employed to evict the Portuguese from their enclave in Goa after the Indian government failed to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal. Goa was subsequently incorporated into the Indian Union, and India was highly criticized for using force after long preaching nonviolent diplomacy. Great Britain and the Soviet Union and later France, West Germany, Japan, and Italy also came to the aid of India.¹⁰⁶ Formal arrangements for \$60 million worth of immediate assistance each from the United States and Great Britain were set down in the Nassau Agreement under which India was to maintain her policy of nonalignment. Both countries followed with further assistance in developing India's defense production capability and her air force combat capability.¹⁰⁷ However, the war with Pakistan changed the entire complexion of India's military needs. In this case, neither the United States nor Great Britain wanted to get involved in such a conflict; in September 1965, both countries halted arms shipments to India.¹⁰⁸ United States aid in grants and loans for economic and military assistance, including tons of food grains, reached \$8 billion over a 20-year period.¹⁰⁹

Objectives and Functions

Two important missions geared the operations of the Indian armed forces in the 1960's: first, the protection of Indian territory against outside aggression; second, the assistance of internal security forces during in-country emergencies.¹¹⁰ The police, under the operational control of the district magistrate, were primarily responsible for the maintenance of law and order and internal security.¹¹¹ This included the investigation of crime, patrolling of streets, regulation of traffic, and the quelling of public disturbances.¹¹² In some states, the police organization was responsible for investigating the backgrounds of potential recruits for government service.¹¹³ Some of the police units, such as the railway police, the rural police, and the volunteer police had more specialized functions, including guard, patrol, and escort duties.¹¹⁴ The border security forces, combining military and police-functions, checked infiltration, smuggling, sniping, and sabotage along India's border regions.¹¹⁵

Methods and Techniques

The central and state governments of India combined the use of police organizations and the regular armed forces in dealing with its internal security problems. The situations clearly defining the roles and functions of the police and the armed forces were not explicit, and in most instances the decision to use the police instead of the army was left up to the local authorities. In cases where the police indicated an inability to cope with the insurgents, regular troops were sent in by the central government at the request of state authorities.¹¹⁶ Police units were also used in some cases in defense efforts and they were called upon to relieve regular units of the armed forces from internal peacekeeping missions.

Central and state authorities had a wide range of emergency powers instituted to give them free rein in coping with activities deemed prejudicial to the security of the country or any of its parts. The constitution allowed the president to declare a state of emergency in the face of external aggression or serious internal disturbances and it made provisions for him to assume the powers of any governor whose government showed inability to handle emergency situations.¹¹⁷ This provision empowered him and the national assembly to proclaim a state of emergency in 1962 in response to the Chinese invasion, suspending all constitutional rights and giving the government almost unlimited control over communications, transportation, finance, credit, and mass media. Moreover, it gave the authorities power to detain persons suspected of endangering national security, to control the movement of persons inside emergency areas,

to control arms and explosives, and to enter, search, and invade without warrants.¹¹⁸ The Preventive Detention Act of 1950 provided for the arrest and detention of persons accused of threatening the social stability and economic development of the country. The central and state governments were able to order the detention of any person for up to one year if his behavior was considered prejudicial to the security of the country or any of its states, or to the maintenance of public law and order.¹¹⁹ And the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed police authorities to ban the assembly of five or more persons in areas designated by them as being out of bounds.¹²⁰

During the period when emergency provisions were still in force (1962-1968), the government's attempts at solving the insurgent problem combined a three-pronged attack including administrative, political, and military actions: administrative plans negotiated with moderate insurgents granting greater autonomy in the Assam hills; political activity intending to isolate the China-trained insurgents on their way back home; and classic counter guerrilla operations aimed at defeating the extremist insurgents in the combat areas of Assam. In the mid-1960's, the government was placing greater emphasis on administrative and political actions.¹²¹

Negotiations for an administrative change in the status of the Assam hills began in 1957 at the peak of the fighting between the Naga insurgents and government security forces. A resolution offering a temporary solution to the conflict prepared by the Naga moderate leaders was presented to and accepted by the government. Amnesty was declared and hundreds of Naga insurgents were released. In 1958 a sixteen-point memorandum calling for the establishment of Nagaland as a separate state within the Indian Union and extending to it limited autonomy was negotiated and again accepted by the government. Nagaland was declared a state in December 1963, held its first election in January 1964, and another in February 1969. Friendly relations between the central government and the government of Nagaland were established. During the negotiations and subsequent to them, peace talks between the government and the extremists who refused to negotiate finally led to a cease-fire in September 1964. High-level discussions between them continued over the years, but by 1969 they were no closer to settlement than they were in 1964.¹²²

The government also attempted to find ways to a peaceful resolution with the Mizos. Central authorities met many times with representatives of the various tribes in Assam to iron out their differences, but the Mizos consistently refused to participate in these talks. Mizo insurgents decided instead to use violence to achieve their goals and pitted their small forces against those of the government.¹²³

In the political field, the central and state governments offered assistance to villages resisting the demands of the rebels. Local tribal chiefs were encouraged to organize village guard units that were supplied with muskets, rifles, uniforms, and training by government security forces.¹²⁴ At the diplomatic level, India struck an accord with Burma whereby both countries exchanged information on the movement of the insurgents with the aim of coordinating actions by their respective security forces.¹²⁵ Naga insurgents captured by the Burmese army in Burma have been handed over to Indian security forces.¹²⁶

Mobile tactics including raids, sweep operations, interceptions, combing and mopping up operations, and resettlement and civic action were but a few of the counter guerrilla actions initiated by government security forces. Many of these actions were directed against guerrilla camps hidden deep in the jungles and were designed to flush out the smaller and weaker insurgent units. In most of these cases government forces captured arms and ammunition and arrested some of the guerrillas. More recently government forces have intercepted armed guerrilla bands as they crossed the border from Burma and East Pakistan.¹²⁷ The army also

conducted mopping up operations in some parts of Assam after a series of clashes between insurgents and security forces. The strength of the security forces in some of these cases had to be increased to prevent insurgents hiding in the thick jungles from escaping encirclement.¹²⁸

Resettlement of Mizo civilians in attempts to cut them off from the insurgents was another tactic used by the government forces. Over a six-week period in 1967 approximately 50,000 Mizos from 106 villages were resettled in eighteen strategic hamlet-type villages. Villagers themselves were required to carry ID cards on their persons and display photos of each member of the household. In this particular case, resettlement was considered only partially successful since it failed to isolate the insurgents from their source of supplies.¹²⁹

In the early years of counter guerrilla operations against the Nagas, the government issued to its security forces explicit instructions not to operate on a wartime footing, but rather to underplay military operations in favor of civic action. Their orders were to assist civil powers in the state, use minimum of force, conduct no reprisals, and offer protection to peaceful civilians against rebel activities. Army units offered medical services to tribespeople, constructed bridges, and built roads. Government forces maintained a good record at least in those early years of counter guerrilla operations.¹³⁰

Although some police units were employed in the Assam hills and in the Naxalbari district of West Bengal in combat operations against insurgents, most of their operations were directed at other types of unrest such as civil disorders. At the request of states, for instance, mobile police units in the past have visited polling stations during elections to ensure orderly procedure. Striking units equipped with wireless sets were rushed to trouble spots within minutes of violent outbreaks.¹³¹ The police lathi charge against unlawfully assembled mobs and crowds has been a very common police tactic. Lathis are long bamboo sticks used to strike at the limbs of the agitators. At times the lathi was used in combination with tear gas to disperse agitators. And upon extreme provocation, police have been known to fire upon crowds.¹³² Police undercover agents also infiltrated the ranks of the agitators in order to break up their organization.¹³³ In all of their activities, police have had to take care not to provoke strong reaction from crowds. Strong-arm tactics or firings on unarmed crowds in some instances have stirred up public sympathy for agitators and antipathy for the law officers.¹³⁴

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India's internal security problems were compounded by serious threats from outside its borders and critical economic and social instability. To deal with these problems, India maintained regular armed forces, paramilitary forces, and a complex police system whose vital level of operations was at the district level. In the following case study of the situation in Thailand, a much more highly centralized police network operating in a more stable climate than India's will be described.

CHAPTER 5

THAILAND

GENERAL

If a successful insurgency is one based on a combination of voluntary support given by large segments of the population, a charismatic leader in the style of Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro to fire the imagination of disaffected populations, and a creative military strategist such as Mao Tse-tung and Vo Nguyen Giap with the ability to establish and direct successfully a centralized guerrilla effort against a superior government security force, then the insurgency in Thailand has no real, solid foundation.

However, this is not to say that those directing the charge against the established authorities in Thailand have nothing in their favor. There are large segments of the population who for years have been neglected by the government and who are ready to give up the present move toward constitutional politics for uncontrolled mass action. The Northeast, which holds one-third of Thailand's population, has been, and is still, potentially fertile as a recruiting ground for insurgent cadres. Moreover, in spite of its appearance as a leaderless and disjointed effort, the insurgency in the three areas of Thailand is receiving immeasurable direction and assistance from outside sources, including the broad guerrilla experiences of the Communists in China, the Viet Minh in North Vietnam, and the Pathet Lao in Laos. Thailand's permeable borders offer no barriers against the importation of these resources.

But if successful counterinsurgency requires the government to be able to mobilize a security force large enough to contain the sporadic activities of insurgents whose numbers are small and position weak and at the same time to invest an enormous amount of effort and resources in community development projects to counter insurgent appeals, then the Thai government should prevail in the final outcome.

Thailand has a large and apparently adequate security force. It is well-trained and well-equipped, centrally controlled, and has received large-scale military assistance from the United States. It has suffered from intraservice rivalry—between the army and the police more recently—which on the surface has not adversely altered the course of counterinsurgency. To its advantage, Thailand's security force—including the National Police Department, controlled by the interior ministry—is integrated organizationally through cross-leadership, which may tend to soften the effects of internal political shifts during the course of the insurgency.

Thailand's community development projects, more extensive in the Northeast, but not concentrated there, appear to have been progressing satisfactorily in spite of their many weaknesses. They at least indicate the government's recently developed sensitivity to the needs of the population outside the urban areas and its recognition of the necessity in dealing with inequitable economic conditions. In this way, these activities may improve the government's image and may eventually lead to winning public confidence. But there is no guarantee that the intrusion of massive technology into the backcountry areas of Thailand will eventually put an end to violent antigovernment opposition. There is in fact a tendency in many parts of the world today for opposition groups to rise from an environment undergoing rapid change resulting from the introduction of technology.




Figure 3. Map of Thailand

The Thai case points up several other problems, more specific than the above-mentioned ones, that will bear heavily on the outcome of the counterinsurgency. The first concerns the government's dealing with the northern tribesmen who were deprived of their traditional methods of livelihood when national laws against opium growing and against the use of slash-and-burn techniques of agriculture were enforced. Successful resettlement of these people and their adoption of new crops and new agricultural techniques introduced by the government presumably will act in the government's favor. The second relates to the government's handling of the Vietnamese refugees, a group charged with sharing the views of North Vietnam. Of special interest are population control measures restricting the refugees' movements inside Thailand and their contacts with the outside. A third problem pertains to Thailand's relations with neighboring countries in attempts to seal off borders and organize joint operations against insurgents operating in and out of Thailand. Agreements with the Laotian and Malaysian governments were concluded, and recent meetings between them may lead to further counter-insurgent measures.

THAILAND'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

In mid-1969 the government of Thailand, with assistance from the United States, carried the major burden in a three-front war against what it described as a Communist-inspired and Communist-led insurgency directed from Peking and Hanoi. Although this insurgency in Thailand did not develop into an armed campaign until 1965, there were signs of a growing opposition that wished to overthrow the established authorities in the early 1950's. Strong governmental measures (mostly police-type actions), including the breaking up of opposition groups in the 1950's and the executing of some of their leaders in the early 1960's, prevented the early subversive groups from maturing into a full-fledged insurgent movement. But since the end of 1964, subversive activities increased steadily prompting the Thai government into instituting a two-pronged counterinsurgent effort combining military and civic action and actively involving the police units of the security forces.

This counterinsurgent effort in mid-1969 was directed against an insurgency that may be characterized in the following ways:

1. It affected provinces in three of Thailand's four main geographic regions—the North, the Northeast, and the peninsula in the south.
2. Events and circumstances that led to its establishment differed so remarkably from one region to another that the country appeared to have been experiencing three independent ongoing insurgent movements within its boundaries.
3. Although the insurgency was presumably Communist-inspired and Communist-led, it had no apparent in-country centralized leadership, in spite of the existence of a weak but genuine Communist organization in Thailand. Operations in the three regions, in spite of some similarities, were uncoordinated efforts of movements having no central direction and little or no exchange of communications.
4. The types of operations initiated by the insurgents typified "phase one" insurgent activities and included propagandizing and intimidating

local inhabitants, assassinating representatives of the central government, and, less frequently, attacking and ambushing small government outposts and patrol units.

In the northern provinces, particularly in Nan and Chiang Rai, Communist agents apparently began operations in 1965. At that time, these agents, Meo and Yao tribesmen infiltrating from Laos and Burma, worked among the thousands of nonintegrated, nonindigenous, semi-nomadic hill people (see Ethnic Conflicts), recruiting potential cadres and taking them across into neighboring countries for indoctrination and training.¹ Many of these same cadres returned to Thailand early in 1967 when Thai government programs restricting opium growing and slash-and-burn methods of agriculture resulted in violent clashes between tribespeople and government forces. The first violent incidents in the north, according to one authority in comments made to the authors, were reported early in 1967 when some police patrols stumbled upon some armed hill tribe bands and were ambushed. The police retaliated by burning down one or more of the villages. An estimated 200 hard-core Communists and nearly 1,700 armed antigovernment fighters,² initiated a wave of assassinations and ambushes in December 1967 that totaled up to 60 reported engagements within a five-month period.³ Although government units were able to disperse a large part of the insurgent forces in December 1967, there were contestable reports in October 1968 that 600 Communists were being mustered in some hill areas of Nan province.⁴

Udon, Sakon Nakhon, Ubon, and Nakhon Phanom are four provinces in the Northeast Region within which the Communists have been particularly active since the early 1960's. The area comprises a large portion of the Northeast, most of which has for many years been isolated from the hub of the country because of difficult communications. It is inhabited primarily by Thai-Lao, a people closely related to the inhabitants of neighboring Laos, and by Vietnamese—about 50,000 postwar refugees and about 20,000 prewar old settlers. The governor of Nong Khai province, commenting on the Vietnamese refugees in the fall of 1968, charged them with conspiring with North Vietnam to overthrow the government in Thailand, but admitted that Thai government forces had no effective ways of countering their clandestine activities.⁵ In comments to the authors, one area expert argued that the one-half million Cambodians in the Northeast have been much more troublesome but so far not as well documented.

It is among the Thai-Lao that members of the outlawed Communist party of Thailand and other antigovernment groups have been working to win their support in attempts to overthrow the authorities in Bangkok through armed violence. (The Vietnamese, commented our authority, had their own Communist organization which, unlike the Communist party of Thailand, had little contact with Communist China or with the Pathet Lao.) In 1967 there were approximately 1,500 armed insurgents based in the Phupan mountain ranges conducting small-scale guerrilla warfare.⁶ In 1968, official estimates included 1,700 to 2,000 guerrillas organized into 80 groups, and 10,000 sympathizers, supporters, food suppliers, or part-time terrorists.⁷

Although the insurgents in the South were regarded for some time as little more than roving bandits, their organized efforts at mobilizing the local inhabitants into an antigovernment force became obvious in the early 1960's. The insurgency in the South can actually be traced back to the late 1940's when a Malay insurrection, precipitated by the mass arrest of Thai Muslims accused by the authorities of taking part in subversive activities, corresponded with the emergency that broke out in Malaya in 1948. The insurrection was put down by Thai military forces, but Muslim bandits continued to operate in the countryside of southern provinces and were eventually joined by Chin Peng, the leader of the unsuccessful insurgency in Malaya, along with his remnant force of several hundred troops. By the middle of 1966, this

forces had grown to an estimated 1,500 guerrillas, students, and auxiliaries.⁸ In midsummer 1968, up to an estimated 800 hard-core Communist fighters were operating close to the Malaysian border.⁹ Although the larger part of this force operated on the Thai side of the border, it appears that some units crossed into Malaysia for food and supplies. In the mid-south, further up the peninsula, added Peter Poole, there was an unrelated and rather small area of dissident activity similar to the type of activity in the Northeast in that it sought to exploit old grievances due to governmental neglect.

Two Communist front organizations, the Thai Patriotic Front and the Movement for Independent Thailand, combined forces in December 1965 in an attempt to provide a unified command, at least for that part of the insurgency operating in the Northeast Region.¹⁰ The common factor among groups comprising the fronts is the old Communist party that was driven underground in 1952. Some of the old guards who were forced to seek sanctuary outside Thai borders returned in 1964 to organize the new structure of the insurgency after having undergone extensive training in North Vietnam and Communist China.¹¹ Although the top leadership has remained relatively constant since then, no dominant insurgent personality comparable to Ho Chi Minh or Fidel Castro has emerged to cement the various groups.

Estimated strength of the Communist party and the antigovernment forces along with their auxiliary units and sympathizers in 1968 seemed to indicate a rather small effort. One source estimated the Thai Communist party membership in 1967 to be fewer than 1,000 members and slightly over 1,000 sympathizers.¹² Another source fixed the active national membership at 5,000, supported by approximately 25,000 villagers.¹³ And still another placed the active membership in the Northeast area alone at from 3,000 to 5,000, with somewhere over 1,000 organized into armed units. Seven hundred of the guerrillas in late 1966 were operating in the province of Nakhon Phanom. Sympathizers included 10,000 villagers, as well as thousands of North Vietnamese who have inhabited the area and who have been considered a potential if not a real threat to the internal security of Thailand.¹⁴ An official U. S. source in 1968 estimated the Communist party membership to be 1,300 in the Northeast and 150 more distributed evenly among three other areas.¹⁵

Fighting units of the antigovernment forces were paramilitary-type organizations, having received regular military training, having possessed a chain of command at least in their respective areas, and by 1968 having operated for three or four years in Thailand. These forces usually operated in small highly mobile units of up to twenty persons, accompanied on most occasions by porters, medics, and wives.¹⁶ However, organizational arrangements and/or modes of operation did seem to vary from one part of the country to another. In the Northeast Region, for instance, the guerrillas in the mid-1960's operated in 50-man teams broken into 12-man units with a network of lookouts and spies.¹⁷ In the southern provinces, each of three regiments of from 56 to 66 troops had been assigned a geographic area in which to operate. The "Independent Platoon," a subunit of the regiment, was highly flexible in operations within its geographic area and was usually called in wherever a large show of force was necessary.¹⁸ These troops in the south presumably represented the military arm of a front organization known as the Nationalists of Southern Thailand. The leader of this group, Chin Peng, although having no exchange of communications with the Northeast insurgents, is believed to have been in direct contact with Peking.¹⁹

Thai insurgents seemed to have solved their logistics problems early in the insurgency. Weapons and supplies were from both domestic and foreign sources and seemed sufficient to carry on their relatively low-scale insurgency. Weapons ranging from bows and arrows²⁰ to more sophisticated military and commercial types obtained from both the free and black markets of Thailand and Laos²¹ had all been discovered by government forces. Military

weapons included rifles and automatic weapons of French, U. S. , Chinese, Soviet, and Czech make. Some quantities of supplies came directly from China; others were obtained by agents and couriers from small villages in the countryside and from distant cities.²² Few open clashes with government forces, especially in the southern provinces, seemed to have precluded a sizeable arms and supply requirement.²³

One of the overriding factors in assessing efficiency and difficulties of the government's response to the insurgency is that in its formative years the insurgency was not viewed at the local level as a serious threat to the security of Thailand.²⁴ Thus, government forces failed to react immediately in the early 1960's, and the extent of their success in the late 1960's consisted of their ability to limit the spread of the insurgency and confine its violent aspects to a relatively small portion of the country.

In large part, counterinsurgency in the early 1960's consisted of responding to actions initiated by the insurgents. By late 1966 and early 1967, government forces had taken the initiative by increasing their patrolling and pursuit operations,²⁵ and multiplying their efforts in the area of community development.²⁶ In early April 1968, 30,000 Thai officials and civilians, backed up by a military and paramilitary force of 30,000 troops, were readied to put down insurgent activity in Thailand.²⁷ In addition to providing normal police support, police organizations were often required to perform limited combat operations to counter insurgent activities.

There was a great deal of difficulty in measuring the success of military operations on the three fronts. According to reported rates of insurgent-initiated incidents, captures, and surrenders (see Table 2), the government was apparently able to restrain insurgents.²⁸ However, government attempts to evacuate hill tribesmen to population relocation centers in order to protect and isolate them from communist insurgents²⁹ were often frustrated by villagers' reluctance to leave their homes. Those who did move to the relocation centers were often dissatisfied with living conditions there. These factors, as well as the government's lack of well co-ordinated strategic plan of operation and some bombing of villages, compounded the counterinsurgency problem.³⁰ In 1968, government forces in the area were approximately 4,000 strong.³¹

TABLE 2
INSURGENT CASUALTIES

	Killed	Arrested	Surrendered
North: 1 February 1967 to 31 May 1968	26	156	4
Northeast: 27 December 1966 to 31 May 1968	323	2,459	2,305
South: 30 April to 31 May 1968	29	427	30

Source: Bangkok World, June 4, 1968, p. 3D.

In the Northeast Region, government forces by 1968 had been holding a tight reign on the insurgency³² while instituting community development programs designed to lessen the appeal of the insurgents. Late in 1967 there were combined civil police and military units that included three army battalions who, however, maintained a primarily defensive posture.³³ The Laotian government by October 1968 had stepped in to cooperate with the Thai government in an attempt to close off the border to insurgents infiltrating into Thailand.³⁴

In the southern provinces, toward the end of 1967 government forces comprised mostly of border police patrols³⁵ were also merely holding the line on insurgent development,³⁶ uncovering during their pursuit operations insurgent installations such as an airstrip and numerous campsites and some proof of Chinese involvement.³⁷ Joint patrol and pursuit operations were held with Malaysian forces, and the governments of Thailand and Malaysia were conferring in the late summer of 1968 on strategy to fight the insurgents operating along their common borders.³⁸

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Problems of Internal Security Forces

The seriousness of the insurgency in the early 1960's seemed to have been underestimated at the local level. Much of the insurgent activity, especially in the southern provinces, was viewed by the local leaders as acts of roving bandits not unfamiliar to the area. Even when this activity was recognized as incipient insurgency, its significance was not immediately fully realized. Consequently, misperception may have prevented top-level government leaders from dealing the insurgents an effective blow at the onset of their activities. As soon as indications of an impending major internal conflict became clearer, however, the Thai government controlled the resources to bring together, with U.S. aid, an internal security force capable of containing the insurgency.

Internal Security Forces Expansion

Thai internal security forces at the beginning of the insurgency's fighting state in the early 1960's consisted of the regular armed forces—primarily army units—and an extensive national police organization consisting of a variety of operational units. (See figure 4.) Home guard and self-defense units were later established in strategically important provinces.

The buildup of the internal security forces in Thailand, at least in the early years, was not necessarily a direct response to a currently perceived threat to internal security. In fact, the military buildup began as early as 1934. A military coup in 1932 resulted in part from conflict between regular army officers, represented by the minister of defense and members of the royal clique, over the defense budget. Upon assuming the leadership in government after 1932, spokesmen for the regular armed forces increased the military budget. Phibun Songkhram, who became the prime minister in 1934, more than doubled the defense budget during his tenure.³⁹

The postwar military buildup began in 1951 and was in part influenced by events in Korea and Indochina. Phibun again was primarily responsible. At that time, both the heads of the army and the national police were given instruction by the government to organize defenses against internal subversion. In April 1951, a national law for the conscription of troops was enacted. By 1952, a plan for full mobilization of troops was under consideration. The annual Thai military budget increased from 1950 to 1957 from \$33 million to \$93 million. By 1957,

total military aid received from the United States amounted to \$138 million, most of that money directed toward the expansion of the Thai armed forces. Supplementary funds for extensive technical and economic assistance were also received through the World Bank.⁴⁰

Maintaining Public Confidence

The Thai government in the 1960's did not have to face the problem of waging a battle against the insurgents to win the loyalty of the local population. On the contrary, it appears that the insurgents were fighting an uphill battle in their attempt to mobilize sympathetic forces.

There were a number of factors at play that favored the government side. First, the political leadership was responsive at least to the small segment of Thai society which comprised the articulate political elite.⁴¹ Second, the Thai, in general, were becoming more aware of the increasing official interest in their welfare, even if this interest came only as a result of the insurgency.⁴² Third, there was among many Thai a national pride in the military, perhaps helped in part by a campaign conducted by Phibun emphasizing the indispensability of the Thai military to the nation's security. Fourth, the hierarchical structure of the Thai military was in close harmony with certain sociopsychological aspects of Thai society and in accord with Thai attitudes where rank and superior roles are more important than equality and freedom. Fifth, the prestige of military officers in Thai society stood high, as indicated by the large number of applicants to military cadet academies.⁴³

There were also some harmful factors. For instance, there were signs in conflict areas of Thai officials being reluctant to remain in the outlying villages after dark for fear of being assassinated. This is understandable; but villagers in these cases could not very well be persuaded to stand up and fight off the Communist insurgents if their officials showed great reluctance to do so themselves.⁴⁴

Ethnic Conflicts

The seriousness of the conflict between various social groups in Thailand was not realized until the insurgency had broken out and government units were sent out to help locally with problems of community development. Until that time, the central authorities in Bangkok deluded themselves by subscribing to the notion that Thailand, compared with other countries in the area, was a socially integrated nation of different peoples loyal to the Thai social and political institutions.⁴⁵ It became clear more recently that there were many people who for various reasons did not feel themselves part of the nation and some who complained about the government, its abuse, and its services. Strong tendencies toward parochial identification, the stress on ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences, and economic discrimination have all contributed to the divisiveness hampering social and political integration and effective counterinsurgency.

In the Northeast, part of the population became alien as a result of official indifference to the area. It represented the end of the road for many government officials and representatives who viewed the area with great disdain. And in its hurry to modernize Thailand, the government concentrated its resources in urban areas, particularly in central Thailand, and more especially in the Bangkok-Thon Buri metropolitan area. Consequently, communications in the Northeast were not developed and government services were not extended to that part of the country. People there complained of the abuse and corruption of the provincial police and

registered grievances about a government administration that showed them little concern.⁴⁶ The Vietnamese population in that area particularly felt the impact of the government's discriminatory practices when it ordered Vietnamese schools and Vietnamese police organizations to be disbanded. Those young Vietnamese refugees who sought Thai citizenship were denied this privilege.⁴⁷

Racial and religious tensions were prevalent in the southern provinces. There, the Muslims who made up 80 percent of the population in five of the provinces suffered what they considered many injustices at the hands of the civil administrators of Buddhist convictions. Muslims were regarded as inferior, thus keeping alive a feeling of distrust between the two religious communities and a desire by the Muslims for unification with Malaysia.⁴⁸

In the northern provinces, hill tribespeople, particularly the Meos, were generally held in contempt by the Thai majority, a contempt manifested officially in many ways by local administrators and police. The highly mobile tribes for their part generally showed little allegiance to the Thai government and in most instances avoided social contact with the Thai. Some initial steps were made officially to assimilate these people into the Thai culture through resettlement and education programs.⁴⁹

As in other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand has a sizeable Chinese minority, significant for its extensive control over certain economic activities. Discrimination against the Chinese thus came in the form of restrictions on economic activities and were imposed even during the eras of liberal Thai politics.⁵⁰ The Thai rural population in general showed little outward hostility toward the Chinese, however; in fact the Chinese rice buyers and the Thai cultivators lived in relatively close association. Moreover, intermarriage between Chinese and Thai was on the increase in the early 1960's. In spite of this, government restrictions were imposed on the Chinese whenever attempts were being made to restrict foreign control over commerce and industry.⁵¹

Recruitment

Manpower for the armed forces and presumably the police in Thailand was recruited from the ethnic Thai, usually farmers and fishermen.⁵² Recruitment in the Thai armed forces never really represented a serious problem for the Thai government. In fact, the army was always able to mobilize large numbers of young recruits into the ranks.⁵³ Conscription into the armed forces was authorized by the Military Service Act of 1954. Noncommissioned officers were usually selected from conscripts wishing to make the military service a career.⁵⁴ In November 1938, authorities were considering drafting conscripts for police duty as well as for the armed forces.⁵⁵

Because of the military's prestige in Thai society, officer-level positions were easily filled from a large pool of manpower. Applicants for cadet academies usually far exceeded available facilities.⁵⁶ Staffing was thus a highly selective process, commissions being awarded to graduates of service academies and universities.⁵⁷

Collection of Intelligence

The Thai government's intelligence-gathering capabilities and operations in the early 1960's, according to one evaluation, were inadequate.⁵⁸ As a police function, the task was performed by smaller units of the national police system that came under the supervision of the Criminal

Investigation Bureau. In the mid-1960's it had 1,500 men, and was primarily responsible for detecting, investigating, and apprehending subversive elements.⁵⁹

In the South, along the Malaysian border, a combined intelligence center composed of Thai and Malaysian personnel cooperated in the exchange of information concerning insurgent activity in that region. However, few successful operations resulted directly from the use of the information provided by the center.⁶⁰ In the Northeast, massive documentation on the movement and activities of Vietnamese refugees was produced as a result of travel restrictions imposed upon them.⁶¹

Border and Coastal Access

One of the most striking features of Thailand's border and a major problem for the country's Border Patrol Police, is its permeability, allowing easy access to outsiders. This easy access is facilitated in part by the physical characteristics of the border areas, which are marked by jungles, hills, and waterways. Even more important to the permeability of the border are the characteristics of the people who inhabit its areas. Culturally and linguistically, as well as in appearance, these people closely resemble groups in Laos, the Shan states of Burma, and the border region of Yunnan in China, making it quite difficult for border police to distinguish Thai citizens from intruders.⁶² Crossings from one side of the Mekong River in the early 1960's, for instance, were common and presented the Communists with an excellent opportunity for establishing an ideal line of communication between Northeast Thailand and North Vietnam through Communist-controlled portions of Laos.⁶³

Insurgent Operations

In 1964, small conspiratorial groups in the three trouble spots of Thailand embarked upon a series of gradually escalating operations that characterize Mao Tse-tung's first phase of revolutionary warfare. By that time, political organizations had been developed and guerrilla bases in the countryside established. But in spite of several years of covert and overt preparations, the insurgents, up to mid-1968, had been unable to press forward into an advanced phase of revolutionary warfare. However, they had been successful in evading defeat and even thrived in the face of changing anti-insurgent policy shifts that focused greater attention on them. Thus, the popular mystique that held that Thailand's well-instituted social and political organizations and their symbols would guard the country against the social disorganization that accompanied South Vietnam's insurgency was at that time seriously being threatened.

Persuasion, terrorism, and small attacks and ambushes were three main categories of actions employed by the insurgents in Thailand. Their use varied according to targets. Against local inhabitants, insurgents combined the effects of persuasion and violence.⁶⁴ Persuasion generally consisted of propaganda activities aimed at winning the voluntary support of the rural population and recruiting volunteers into the ranks of the guerrilla units.⁶⁵ Violence consisted of physically eliminating suspected informers and agents⁶⁶ and was aimed in part at the demoralization and intimidation of the population.⁶⁷ In the southern provinces, the insurgents seemed to have placed great stress on civic action programs—at least until the spring of 1967. Many of the activities undertaken by the insurgents were particularly directed at the youth.⁶⁸ A tax system was imposed in the early years to finance these operations in the South,⁶⁹ and later in 1968 extortion was used against rich planters who were forced to pay large sums of money or face death.⁷⁰

Government functionaries and representatives met with the harsher consequences of insurgent terrorism. These targets included administrators, police, schoolteachers, and pro-government village headmen. Systematic assassination of these and other officials began in 1962 when three fell victim to the insurgents. The rate increased to four in 1963, and to one per month in 1964. By late 1965, ten officials per month were being assassinated;⁷¹ and in 1966, ten officials were being assassinated monthly in scattered villages of the Northeast Region alone.⁷² The insurgent drive against officials was somewhat relaxed in 1967 as fewer assassinations were reported.⁷³ Representatives of the United States, including members of the armed forces, were generally not included as insurgent targets, but Communist documents captured in April 1967 clearly indicated a policy change in which American servicemen were listed as potential targets.⁷⁴ However, by mid-1969, no Americans had been attacked as individuals.

Larger operations, such as attacks and ambushes directed against government military and paramilitary units by mid-1968, had been infrequently used. In fact, in 1964 overt activity initiated by insurgents was conducted on such a small scale that it was not taken too seriously by the authorities.⁷⁵ In the Northeast, the main area of concern of the Thai security forces, open confrontation with police units was avoided until the summer of 1965; attacks on government installations were not conducted until mid-December 1965. Apparent objectives of the insurgents at that time were the disruption of government projects aimed at the economic development of the area.⁷⁶ In mid-1968 there were some signs of a shift in tactics from terrorism to small armed attacks. During that period the insurgents were laying out ambushes against government units⁷⁷, and they also successfully shelled an important American air base. In the southern provinces the insurgent pattern in the mid-1960's was also hit-and-run,⁷⁸ and in 1968 some occasional ambushes were set against police patrols operating along the border.⁷⁹ But guerrilla operations were only rarely conducted, and insurgent groups in that area were more concerned with setting up defenses against patrolling government forces.⁸⁰

Civil Disturbances

Civil disturbances such as demonstrations, strikes, and riots requiring large-scale police action were rare occasions in Thailand.⁸¹ However, the potential for serious uprisings was always there. Deeply imbedded in part of the Thai culture is the belief that someday a messiah will appear to deliver the Thai from evil. This event is referred to as the coming of Pee Boon. Within the last century, monks performing what appeared to be miracles evoked large gatherings of followers who, taking up arms against the government, initiated religious insurrections. One of the latest of such occurrences took place in the north in the mid-1950's and resulted in 500 people killed. It is believed that the Communists are using this mystical belief as an instrument for compelling local inhabitants to rise up against their government.⁸²

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ORGANIZATION

Organization

In the early 1960's Thailand's security forces were composed of three regular military services—army, navy (including the marines), and air force—a paramilitary national police force, a special organization for civic action, and some local self-defense groups. In more peaceful times, the national police (excluding the metropolitan police whose jurisdiction was restricted to the Bangkok-Thon Buri area) was responsible for the maintenance of law and order, the country's internal security, and the protection of its lengthy border. The urgency

of the events in the 1960's resulted in an increase in the responsibility of the regular armed forces, especially the army, securing for them a primary position in the struggle against the insurgency. Superimposed on this structure was the National Security Council made up of the prime minister and members of his cabinet who jointly advised the prime minister on security matters requiring approval or action.⁸³ A special bureau, the Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC), was a joint unit made up of military, police, and civilian personnel, created especially to coordinate counterinsurgent activities concerned with combined military and civic action.⁸⁴

Military Force

One of the distinctive characteristics of the Thai military establishment since 1932 has been its primacy in politics. And like most other politically oriented groups in Thai society, it was beset with personal factionalism, if not with ideological differences, dividing the three services and pitting faction against faction within the same service. It was the intensification of intraservice rivalry from 1955 to 1957 that prompted Marshal Sarit to initiate a move ending the variety of opinions and stimulating greater military discipline and cohesion.⁸⁵

Thai military forces—about 130,000 strong and equipped through U. S. military assistance in the middle 1960's⁸⁶—operated under the control of the prime minister through the minister of defense. The minister of defense in turn presided over a general staff composed of top-ranking officers from each of the three service branches who advised on matters concerning the mobilization, training, and deployment of the military forces. The Supreme Command, for instance, was established in 1960 to aid the minister of defense in the operations and administration of the three services.⁸⁷ Directly below this level, each of the services had its own staff of officers for personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics, headed by a commander in chief—a position comparable to a chief of staff in the U. S. armed forces.⁸⁸ In addition to the several institutions of higher learning,⁸⁹ the defense ministry and its branches also operated some nondefense business enterprises in the general areas of manufacturing, distribution, banking, and others.⁹⁰

The Royal Thai Army has been the largest and most influential of the three branches, and it usually received the largest share of the defense budget.⁹¹ In the 1960's, it represented a force of approximately 88,000 men,⁹² composed mainly of conscripts in the lower ranks and volunteers in the upper ranks. At that time, the army was under the leadership of a commander in chief who was concurrently serving as deputy prime minister, deputy supreme commander of the Royal Armed Forces, minister of interior, and director general of the National Police Force and the Village Defense Corps.⁹³ The Second Army eventually gained control of counterinsurgent military operations in the late 1960's and was gradually gaining influence over the civic action teams, a move judged at that time to be leading toward greater emphasis on military operations and less on civic action.⁹⁴ In Nan province, where most of the fighting was taking place in the North, the Third Army set up headquarters for two battalions, taking the leading role there away from the Border Patrol Police.⁹⁵

The Royal Thai Air Force totalled approximately 20,000 officers and men. Its role in counterinsurgent operations expanded during the late 1960's as the frequency of government air attacks increased in the northern provinces,⁹⁶ and flying operations, especially by the highly mobile helicopter units, were gradually being taken over by Thai pilots from their American advisors.⁹⁷

The Royal Thai Navy and its small contingent of marines consisted of approximately 18,000 and 7,000 men, respectively.⁹⁸ During the course of the insurgency, the navy experienced less combat than the other two services.⁹⁹


National Police

The National Police Department was in the 1960's a highly centralized paramilitary organization consisting of diverse specialized units including commandos and paratroops and equipped with hardware including tanks and armored cars.¹⁰⁰ After World War II when the National Police Department was expanding, it operated the only paratrooper training school in the country.¹⁰¹ A powerful arm of the government, the organization grew from a force of 42,000 men in 1954¹⁰² to approximately 70,000 by 1968,¹⁰³ assisted extensively in its modernization and training by agencies of the U.S. government. By the middle 1950's the Thai police/population ratio was one of the closest in the world with one policeman for every 407 people.¹⁰⁴ Later in the fall of 1968, Thai authorities felt that the size of the police force was inadequate for the nation's security requirements and were calling for 10,000 more.¹⁰⁵ The National Police Department was headed by a director-general officially responsible to the minister of interior—two positions often held by the same individual. Until the middle 1960's the National Police Department had the primary responsibility in counterinsurgency operations, and its forces were increased in the Northeast to meet the threat.¹⁰⁶ A gradual takeover by the rivaling army resulted in a loss of this responsibility, especially in the Northeast.¹⁰⁷

Organizationally, the National Police Department was comprised of four main bureaus: the Provincial Police, which also administered the operations of the Border Patrol Police; the Metropolitan Police, whose jurisdiction remained largely within the Bangkok-Thon Buri metropolitan area; Criminal Investigation, which supervised the 1,500-man Special Branch Police responsible for the detection of subversive elements; and Education. Headquarters in Bangkok had its administrative sections and a variety of divisions which at the time included Legal Affairs, Prosecution, Research and Planning, Technical Services, and Crime Detection. (See figure 4.) A new division, Air Support, was being established in the late 1960's.¹⁰⁸

The Provincial Police, the largest of the department's operational units, consisted of over 30,000 men in the middle 1960's, and had the responsibility of providing its services to all areas of Thailand except the border regions and metropolitan Bangkok.¹⁰⁹ For operational purposes, Thailand was divided into nine police regions, each administered by a commander directly responsible to the provincial police commissioner. Each commander directed training and operations in his appointed region. Regions were further broken down into provinces, districts, and subdistricts. By mid-1967 plans were laid out to extend the police system down to the township and village levels.¹¹⁰

The Border Patrol Police, although administered by the Provincial Police, operated with a great deal of autonomy. Its head was a deputy commissioner of the Provincial Police, and his subordinates in turn were deputies to Provincial Police officials at their respective levels. The Border Patrol Police was one of the best trained and best equipped of the department's operational units, and in the 1960's engaged in civic action projects that required capability in teaching. The Border Patrol Police by the middle 1960's had established 200 schools in remote villages where they taught the first four grades.¹¹¹ Capabilities in first aid and agriculture—comparable to U.S. Special Forces—were also attained.¹¹² After 1966 its 6,800 men usually operated in line platoons of 30, with 10 heavier platoons of 50 men each held in reserve at regional headquarters as quick reaction mobile strike forces. The latter were being expanded in mid-1967. An airborne group, the Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit, was operated by the Border Patrol Police.¹¹³



Adapted from: Area Handbook for Thailand, pp.454-458.

Figure 4. Organization of the Thai National Police Force

The Metropolitan Police, the last of the department's operational units, was operating with a force of approximately 6,000 men in and around the Bangkok-Thon Buri area. The major components—one in northern Bangkok, another in southern Bangkok, and the third in Thon Buri—each headed by a police major general served a combined 40 precincts.¹¹⁴

Other Paramilitary Security Forces

Several other units of Thailand's security forces were established to meet special requirements created by the insurgency and the expanded U. S. role in Thailand. One such unit is the Volunteer Defense Corps, a 25,000-man force in the mid-1960's that operated outside the National Police, but within the ministry of interior. The government late in 1967 apparently intended to train an additional 9,000 men within a two-year period.¹¹⁵ The corps was a part-time militia operating as an auxiliary reserve force for the police at the village level.¹¹⁶ More loosely organized local self-defense units were also being established in various areas. Miao tribesmen were being trained in a Border Patrol Police camp in Chiang Rai in a one-month course on weapons and tactics.¹¹⁷

The Royal Security Guards was a special regimental unit of approximately 4,000 men whose officers were drawn from all branches of the armed forces. They were organized on the basis of an agreement between the U. S. and Thai governments to provide internal and perimeter security for military installations. They operated from company size down to three- and four-man units, depending on the size and importance of the installations.¹¹⁸

Another special unit was the Home Police Guards, similar in some respects to the Volunteer Defense Corps. They were recruited from among volunteer villagers, wore uniforms, and had the special responsibility of patrolling that part of Freedom Road running through Suang Daen Din in the Northeast.¹¹⁹

Some provincial governors apparently had been given authority to manipulate some of the paramilitary units to fit the needs of their respective provinces. Toward the latter part of 1966, the governor of Ubon province established four political action teams comprised of members of the Provincial Police, Volunteer Defense Corps, Border Patrol Police, civil officials, Army Rangers, and monks. A district was divided into four zones with one team operating in each of the zones. These teams, fashioned along lines of similar units in South Vietnam, conducted combined military-political sweep operations.¹²⁰

Noncombatant Counterinsurgent Units

Noncombatant counterinsurgent units were primarily set up to engage in community development projects at the village level in Thailand's rural areas. The Mobile Development Units, each headed by an army colonel or an officer of equal rank from the other services, formed the basic organization for civic action. Each unit was composed of 120 men, including teachers, medics, mechanics, and agricultural experts. After 45 days of operations in a village, the unit was gradually reduced to twenty persons remaining there until the completion of the project and after the village was judged secure.¹²¹ Community Development Committees were organized at the village level to involve the local population in community development activities.¹²² Priorities for projects were established at high government levels, but the projects themselves were directed and administered by a number of Mobile Development Unit headquarters each centrally located in the priority areas and each with its subordinate mobile teams assigned to some of the more needy villages.¹²³ The establishment of Accelerated Rural

Development teams came late and they were charged with laying the groundwork for longer-term¹²⁴ and large-scale construction projects. At first, building roads was their forte, but later the teams branched out to include improvement of fisheries and various educational and health projects.¹²⁵

U. S. Assistance and Participation

U. S. assistance and participation in the Thailand insurgency was in accordance with Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954 and was enlarged by a joint statement issued by the U. S. secretary of state and Thailand's foreign minister as a result of Communist activities in neighboring Laos.¹²⁶ The buildup of U. S. forces did not occur until the 1960's. In 1962, 5,000 U. S. troops were sent to Thailand.¹²⁷ In March 1966 there were 13,000 U. S. troops present in that country, and by the end of that year the figure had risen to 35,000. By 1968 there were 43,000 U. S. troops in Thailand, 33,000 of them air force personnel.¹²⁸ It included U. S. Navy Seabee Technical teams,¹²⁹ a contingent of the U. S. Special Forces,¹³⁰ army advisers kept at the regimental level,¹³¹ and U. S. helicopter pilots who up until early 1967 were training and transporting Thai army and police units into the jungles to fight insurgents.¹³² Combat assignments for U. S. troops in Thailand were ruled out by both Thai and U. S. leaders. According to a high U. S. official in Thailand, no U. S. forces were involved in actual counterinsurgent operations.¹³³ In 1969 discussions for the eventual withdrawal of at least some of the U. S. forces began.

Objectives and Functions

The overriding objectives of the Thai security forces in the 1960's were first to defeat the insurgents attempting to undermine the government of Thailand; second, to protect Thailand from the possibility of external aggression; and third, to maintain law and order for the protection of lives and property of Thai citizens not affected by the insurgency.

Each of the various components of the Thai security forces contributed in its own way toward the attainment of these major objectives. Reorganization of the forces in 1967, however, shifted much of the responsibility of the insurgency from the National Police to the regular army. From that time, then, it bore the major burden of defending Thailand against major attack from outside forces and of protecting it from insurgent forces operating from the inside.

The Provincial Police was charged with supporting the armed forces in national emergencies. Under more peaceful conditions inside Thai borders, it represented the only organized force to ward off an invasion from the outside until the army was able to mobilize fully its own forces. In that way, the Provincial Police up to the end of 1967 acted as the first line of defense against outside aggression¹³⁴ and held primary responsibility in settling accounts with insurgents as well as lawbreakers in most areas of Thailand. In the Northeast, rural villagers in some areas apparently had little faith in the ability of the police to apprehend thieves and bandits and thus formed their own village patrols. However, their success was limited in that they failed to capture wrongdoers and recover the stolen goods.¹³⁵ There were many other functions performed by the National Police and these are indicated by its many bureaus and its many divisions and subdivisions. (See figure 4.)

The objectives and functions of the Border Patrol Police were relatively broad and included not only the protection of borders from smugglers, bandits, Communist infiltrators, and other persons entering illegally but also carried a wide range of responsibilities in civic

action in many parts of the country receiving little attention from the government. Most of the civic action projects in which it engaged were undertaken among tribespeople in hill areas of the northern provinces and in the isolated areas of the Northeast. The objective here was to reduce the conditions vulnerable to subversive manipulation among the less fortunate and even hostile segments of the population.¹³⁶

The Mobile Development Units and the Accelerated Rural Development teams were established for similar purposes, that is, to eliminate popular discontent by carrying government services to near inaccessible and neglected areas of Thailand, and through short-range community development projects, to illustrate to indifferent parts of the rural population the values of self-help as a means of achieving economic well-being.¹³⁷

Other units of the security forces had more specific objectives and functions. The Royal Security Guards, for example, had as a primary mission the protection of security in and around military installations. The Home Police Guards drew the task of guarding parts of Freedom Road.¹³⁸ The Volunteer Defense Corps was established to provide immediate security to villages where the army or police were not readily available, and in some provinces dealt with the problem of infiltration across the Mekong.¹³⁹ The Metropolitan Police units generally provided police service to the Bangkok-Thon Buri area, including the prevention of riots and demonstrations through its mounted riot control force.¹³⁹

The objectives and functions of U. S. assistance to Thailand were based on the principle that a highly mobile, well-trained, and well-equipped security force could reduce the potentiality for internal subversion. In pursuit of these objectives, the United States through its instructors and equipment was to strengthen the internal security forces of Thailand by improving the organization and operations of its various components and by promoting the construction of all-weather roads so that the communications network would reach out to all parts of Thailand.¹⁴⁰

Methods and Techniques

Compared with Vietnam, counterinsurgency in Thailand during the 1960's was low-keyed and most of the operations until late 1967 fell within the competency of the National Police. In the fall of 1967, the army, which until then only complemented police activity, assumed a primary role in the conduct of operations against the insurgents and took control over military and civic actions. The police-army struggle was always clearly reflected in the mission assignments of the two organizations. The army always attempted to assign the distasteful jobs (like small patrols) to the police while giving itself the easier and more prestigious jobs, such as "massive counterinsurgency sweeps."^{*}

Military actions consisted of a combination of ground and air operations. On the ground, the military and paramilitary patrols combed areas in sweep operations designed to flush out insurgent fighting units and to uncover their campsites, their arms and supply caches, and other installations such as small landing strips.¹⁴¹ In the Northeast, the Second Army alone in 1968 had from 3,000 to 5,000 troops combing the mountains and forests for insurgents.¹⁴² In southern Thailand where the insurgent logistics system appeared to have been the most vulnerable part of their operations, interdiction of this system seemed to have been a very successful means of forcing the insurgents out of their jungle camps into open and accessible areas where government forces were able to engage them on more favorable terms.¹⁴³ Although operations in the field were evidently more decisive, Thai troops have been criticized

^{*} Comments by Peter Poole to the authors.

for spending too little time there,¹⁴⁴ and for not going out at all when funds for extra bonuses were lacking. Thai troops were given extra bonuses whenever they were sent out in the field.¹⁴⁵

Pursuit operations launched in response to insurgent-initiated actions were also typical. In fact, these operations may have been more common in the middle 1960's since most Thai units, instead of taking the initiative in keeping the insurgents on the run, remained close to their posts and only responded to insurgent-initiated actions.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, with these operations the Thai forces were able to keep the insurgents in check, and a major weakness was the communications system that needed improvement for speedier response to insurgent actions.¹⁴⁷

Air operations against insurgents, not including the ferrying of troops by helicopter, appeared to have been characteristic of the operations in the North. These offensive tactics consisted in large part in the bombing and strafing of suspected concentrations of insurgents and their supply lines. T-28 planes were used in spotting and strafing insurgent zones in the North.¹⁴⁸ There have been some major criticisms directed at these operations. The Royal Thai Air Force, for instance, knowingly bombed villages where the insurgents were barely visible and where, in some cases, they represented an unwanted element among the tribespeople. Consequently, villages were wiped out but the insurgent terrorists remained at large.¹⁴⁹ However, government officials were aware of the adverse effects of their heavy-handed tactics and were contemplating more subtle ones.¹⁵⁰

One of these more subtle tactics is an "open arms" policy similar to the one instituted in South Vietnam. Its success against target populations appeared to have been greater in the North. There, the Third Army operated a four-language radio station, and its facilities were primarily directed at Meo and Yao tribespeople.¹⁵¹ One report indicated that 1,000 former Communists were aided in starting a new life by means of a corrective training program designed to benefit surrendering or captured insurgents. They were treated as political prisoners rather than criminals and were returned to their former homes after their release.¹⁵²

Population control was also partly characteristic of Thai counterinsurgency. Many of the measures instituted in the 1960's were not new, however, since the Thai government in the past had had some experience in dealing with its opponents and other problem populations. The suppression of known and suspected Communists in the early 1950's came at a time when the National Police Department—its operations and its influence in the government—was expanding. An extensive informer system and a youth detective squad were established to enhance the police intelligence network. Mass arrests and detention, news censorship, and frequent reports of police intimidation characterized the era.¹⁵³

Some of the population control measures were at times directed at specific social groups. Regulatory measures designed to inhibit the economic activities of the enterprising Chinese community were frequent, and the government also frequently stepped in to break up activities of Chinese social groups suspected of conspiring against its authority. Measures regulating the activities of the Vietnamese refugee community were even more stringent. These people were highly suspected by the Thai government of supporting the cause of the North Vietnamese and of becoming a large fifth column force inside Thai territory. On this basis, the Thai government instituted four measures that were designed to prevent the free movement of Vietnamese refugees. First, the refugees were restricted from visiting other villages or from leaving the province without prior consent from provincial police authorities. Such visits were granted for a maximum of 24 hours, and the visitor was usually required to check in with the local authorities of his destination. Second, Vietnamese refugees were unable to change their place of residence unless they were granted an official permit. Third, each family head was

required to report to local authorities all contacts made with individuals outside the village. Fourth, employment outside the restricted area was granted by official permission only.¹⁵⁴ There were other restrictions for the Vietnamese. They could neither operate their schools nor hold public meetings. They were not allowed to work at night; thus, fishing along the Mekong River at night, when the catch is good, was not permitted.¹⁵⁵

Identification cards as a form of population control measure were also employed in Thailand. In problem areas, local law made it mandatory for villagers to be fingerprinted and photographed and to carry their ID cards at all times or face the possibility of being arrested on suspicion. Insurgents managed to acquire these identification cards and infiltrate villages with them, thus limiting their success as a process of weeding out the insurgents from the local population.¹⁵⁶

Civic action as a counterinsurgent technique gained prominence in the middle 1960's. Units of the Border Patrol Police had been engaging in civic action programs for ten years by that time; but since the question of insurgency was relatively unimportant in the earlier years, the objectives of the programs were entirely different.¹⁵⁷ The work of the Mobile Development Units and, later, the complementary work of the Accelerated Rural Development teams was definitely conducted to counter the appeals of the insurgents as well as to develop the backwoods areas of Thailand. Success of these programs seemed to vary from one part of the country to another. In the Northeast, tangible results of the projects, the persuasive aspects of civic action, were not immediately evident in the middle 1960's; in six of the most insecure provinces in the Northeast, only one of 30 villages had been positively affected by civic action teams.¹⁵⁸ In the southern provinces, community development programs were gaining momentum as the government began providing increased health services, new schools, and new roads.¹⁵⁹

* * * * *

The two-pronged effort against insurgent organizations in Thailand required extensive use of the vital units of the centralized police force. In this case the National Police lost to the army its primary responsibility in dealing with the insurgency. In the next case, Bolivia, the army maintained primary responsibility over insurgent matters. It was assisted by a central police force, and, more importantly, by the People's Militia, a paramilitary organization performing police-type work.

CHAPTER 6

BOLIVIA

GENERAL

The selection of Bolivia as a revolutionary center for all Latin America was not understandable, even to many supporters of the insurgency. The country had undergone a major revolution only fifteen years before. Its major industries were nationalized; agrarian reform, educational programs, and universal suffrage were institutionalized. The specific site selected for the beginning of operations, the southeastern section of Bolivia, was particularly inimical to foreign intrusion. The inhabitants of the area were the most devoted followers of General Rene Barrientos Ortuno and his administration. In fact, the selection of any isolated sparsely populated rural area for a revolutionary base was not wise. The population most receptive to revolutionary ideas, the urban proletariat, was to be found in the biggest Latin American cities. This group would be sufficiently large in number to provide the cover necessary for the insurgents. In recent years, insurgent movements originating in the Latin American countryside have been extinguished in a relatively short time—Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela.

An equally important factor in the dissolution of the movement was the lack of cooperation the revolutionary leadership received from those who avowedly were its allies. The in-house fighting among Bolivian Communists concerning their role in the insurgency detracted greatly from any positive effort. Moscow-oriented leader, Mario Monje, literally prevented recruits from joining the insurgent band. The urban network that was established to support the rural base was composed primarily of amateur revolutionaries—university students who were outrageously slipshod about security and who boasted openly about their association with the guerrillas. Individuals responsible for burying caches later revealed their association with the army. The Bolivian press abounded with incidents in which informers and deserters breached the security of the insurgents. Thus, the primary rule of insurgent survival, to keep the rural movement from being discovered while in its embryonic state, was not heeded.

BOLIVIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

Early in President Rene Barrientos' administration, in March 1967, rumors had begun circulating that guerrillas were operating in Bolivia.¹ Denials of guerrilla presence were issued continuously throughout the month to aid in maintaining calm among the population while the government was determining its course.² During this period, however, almost all newspapers reported the clash between Bolivian soldiers and guerrillas in the southeastern department of Chiquisaca and disclosed that several guerrilla commandos were operating in the oil-producing region of Monteagudo around the Tarabucillo, Lambayo, and Rosal areas.³ At the close of the month Barrientos broadcast to the nation that Bolivia had been invaded by Castro-Communists. Barrientos and his cabinet declared a state of emergency in the guerrilla zone.⁴

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


Figure 5. Map of Bolivia

The Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police Force dispatched personnel from La Paz to investigate guerrilla contacts and infiltration routes. They supplemented the intelligence mission that was being carried out by the Second Section of the Bolivian Army division stationed at Camiri and Choretí. To safeguard the state-owned oil installations two army squadrons based in Sucre were ordered to Camiri. The government guaranteed to the population that order would be maintained and that armed, foreign-directed guerrillas working with local agitators would be severely punished.⁵

What had energized the Bolivian government so greatly was the report that Ernesto Che Guevara was personally leading the Castroite guerrilla band in its attempt to establish an insurgent base for a continental revolution. Guevara was the Argentine-born revolutionary who had served under Fidel Castro as a commander in the Sierra Maestras and later as the minister of industries in the premier's administration. Guevara dropped from public view early in 1965. His disappearance intensified rumors that he was continuously plotting revolutions wherever he travelled. By the time he was sighted in Bolivia his reputation as a professional revolutionary was substantial.⁶

The United States, in order to assist Bolivia in this emergency, rushed the delivery of equipment and dispatched Special Forces advisors to train the Bolivian forces in counter-insurgency.⁷ Military equipment that included small arms, radios, medical supplies, and helicopters were flown in to Santa Cruz from Panama.⁸

The first major government drive, primarily a military operation, was directed against a large band of guerrillas operating in the region of Montegudo and Camiri. Camiri was the headquarters of the antiguerrilla operation. This territory was especially suited for supporting the insurgents, for it had abundant stocks of fish, game, and agricultural products, and it offered cover from observation. Pursuing government soldiers, usually Indians from the Altiplano, became uncomfortable and rather inefficient in the hot lowlands. Air reconnaissance missions aided the air force and the army's Fourth Division in harassing the guerrilla group until it disintegrated; its 50 members fled toward the surrounding Indio Mountain range.⁹

While a pincer action of an estimated 2,000 troops was isolating the Red Zone, hindering insurgent communications and preventing the arrival of new recruits, the air force and the ground forces subjected the guerrillas to intense bombing and firing. The three roads leading into the sector were controlled by the military.¹⁰

Patrolling soldiers skirmished with guerrillas seeking to escape the encirclement. Peasants in military-type units went to the Valle Grande area to reconnoiter the Coroico River. Stepped-up reconnaissance flights strafed men fleeing toward the Paraguayan border, and units of the Fifth Army Division operating in eastern Bolivia captured insurgents entering from Brazil.¹¹

Declaring themselves on emergency footing, the Chuquisaca and Cochabamba department peasant militias mustered their troops to fight the insurgents.¹² With them in their effort was the militia organization of the Popular Christian Movement.¹³ Small military units composed of peasant volunteers were deployed as mobile patrols to protect the citizenry and to ensure their normal activities. To prevent urban disturbances the government ministry reinforced the National Guard. Aiding in establishing and maintaining security were the National Public Security Guard officers and civilian volunteers.¹⁴ These units combined their capabilities to perform limited combat and police operations.

It is believed that the military preferred using peasant militias rather than regular army for maintaining security of neighboring towns. The Special Troop Training Center for peasant

youth was established by the Seventh Division based in Cochabamba.¹⁵ Peasant manpower aided national security by not allowing the regular army to be divided too thinly among the troubled spots. At the beginning of April 1967, Barrientos claimed that only part of the army had been mobilized to the southeast. The majority of the troops were still quartered to meet any emergency.¹⁶

During June the guerrilla activities came to a standstill, but in July the insurgents emerged again with strong offensive actions. The Bolivian government responded with two counter-insurgency drives: "Operation Cynthia," directed by Colonel Reque Teran, commander of the Fourth Division, against guerrillas operating south of the Nancabazú River; and "Operation Parabano" covered the northern half of the guerrilla zone and was under direction of Colonel Joaquín Zenteno, commander of the Eighth Division.¹⁷ The Fourth Division of the Bolivian Army operated in Camiri and the Nancabazú region.

In August, the guerrilla movement began to disintegrate. Desertions became frequent when the apathy of the peasants in the countryside toward joining and supporting the movement grew more evident. Supplies dwindled as the Bolivian Army pursued a strong program of containment. In early September a clash between an army patrol and 25 guerrillas yielded captured documents and sufficient information from prisoner interrogations to enable the Bolivian government to arrest a group of political suspects in La Paz. By this act, the army and police effectively disintegrated the urban network that had provided the insurgents with intelligence and support.¹⁸

By the end of September 1967, the townspeople of Alto Seco reported that Che Guevara had appeared in their village, strategically positioned at the edge of a desert mountain area, the only natural barrier to an escape route from the eastern jungles to Cochabamba and the Pacific coast. During a three day "liberation" of the village, Guevara was unsuccessful in recruiting the frightened peasantry. He and his followers departed and separated into three groups.¹⁹

The ever-tightening encirclement of 2,000 troops achieved its goal, and on October 8, 1967 Che Guevara and several of his men were captured and shot.

An examination of violent incidents that occurred in Bolivia from February 1966 through January 1968 revealed that 1966 was a year of predominantly urban violence, primarily a police problem, which peaked in March, May, and June. It was during this period that General Barrientos was nominated by the Revolutionary Front for the presidency and subsequently elected. In January 1967, student agitators, miners, and priests sent the incident rate soaring during a rebellion in the mining area. The focus of violent activity shifted in March to the rural southeast when the insurgents made contact with the Bolivian Army. In June the government declared a state of siege and suspended constitutional guarantees. By August, the fate of the guerrillas was sealed as government forces tightened security perimeters and isolated guerrilla positions. The downward trend in reported incidents of violence began in July 1967 and continued through January 1968. (See figure 26.)

In Bolivia, the department that experienced the greatest amount of activity was Santa Cruz; during the two-year period studied, over 40 percent of all reported incidents occurred there. The departments of Oruro and La Paz, the mining districts, and Cochabamba followed in decreasing order of violence. (See figure 6.)

Among security forces initiating actions against antisocial groups, especially against insurgents, the Bolivian Army was the most active. In newspaper incidents reported, it had initiated more than twice the number of actions than did the police force. Its main targets were the insurgents and their installations. (See figure 7.)

Location	Year	
	1966	1967
Cochabamba	2	12
Chuquisaca		5
El Beni		
La Paz	12	17
Oruro	10	19
Pando		
Potosi		
Santa Cruz	9	64
Tarija		
Nationwide (different parts of the country)	1	8
Not Located		2
Total	35	127

Figure 6. Total Incidents, Location by Year: Bolivia 1966-1967

Between 1966 and 1967, terrorism was the most predominant action taken by the antisocial groups in Bolivia, and the most costly. Assaults, the second highest action in frequency, occurred mainly in 1967 in the guerrilla zone and were directed against members of the armed forces. Rioting was used widely against government officials and official installations, and the high number of robberies took their toll from public installations. (See figure 8.)

Bolivians engaged frequently in mass action types of operations, such as urban riots, demonstrations, and miners' strikes. (See figure 9.) These large gatherings of unestimated numbers were handled by the Bolivian security forces primarily with crowd control measures and less frequently with investigations, arrests, and shows of force. (See figure 10.)

Of those persons engaged in antisocial actions, the left-wing insurgents were most active. They accounted for nearly one-half of the activity. Their attention was focused on military personnel, public installations, and private homes. A considerable portion of the remaining antisocial activity involved one civilian fighting against another. Students in demonstrating their opposition as a group, directed their activities against government officials and official installations. (See figure 11.) Their riots were noted for serious and costly property damage. (See figure 12.)

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Problems of Internal Defense Forces

The internal security problems of the Bolivian government were wrapped in a strange set of misperceptions and paradoxes, which, when viewed in terms of strengths and weaknesses from both sides of the conflict, can be seen as somewhat favorable for the security forces. The

		Initiators															
		REGULAR ARMY	MILITARY POLICE/ NATIONAL GUARDS	ALLEGED MILITARY	NATIONAL POLICE	JUDICIAL POLICE	FARM POLICE/FARM GUARDS	INTELLIGENCE, CUSTOMS, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE	POLICE	ALLEGED POLICE	PRIVATE POLICE	UNSPECIFIED	HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	AIR FORCE	RANGERS	MILITIA	
1966	MILITARY																
	POLICE																
	INSURGENTS							1	1			1					
	INSURGENT CAMPS											1		2			
	BANDITS							1									
	TRANSPORTATION																
	CIVILIANS	2						1					2				
	PRIVATE HOMES										3						
	OTHER												1				
	MILITARY																
1967	POLICE										1			1			
	INSURGENTS	27			1			2					1		3	1	
	INSURGENT CAMPS	6						1									
	BANDITS							1									
	TRANSPORTATION																
	CIVILIANS	4			1			3	1		1	1	1		1	1	
	PRIVATE HOMES							2									
	OTHER								1			1					

Figure 7. Incidents Initiated by Internal Security Forces
and Their Major Targets: Bolivia 1966-1967

		Targets												
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS	MILITARY	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	POLICE	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	PUBLIC UTILITIES	TRANSPORTATION	LEFT WING INSURGENTS	CIVILIANS	PRIVATE HOMES	UNSPECIFIED	
1966	Antisocial Actions	DEMONSTRATIONS	4											
		RIOTS	3				2							
		MURDER									1			
		ASSASSINATION												
		KIDNAPPING												
		ROBBERY							1					
		TERRORISM	1			1		1			1			
		SABOTAGE												
		ASSAULTS												
		SHOW OF FORCE												
1967		DEMONSTRATIONS				1								
		RIOTS	5	2		2								
		MURDER												
		ASSASSINATION												
		KIDNAPPING									2			
		ROBBERY		1			1	6				1		
		TERRORISM		1	1			4	1			1	6	1
		SABOTAGE								1				
		ASSAULTS			13	1				1				
		SHOW OF FORCE												

Figure 8. Antisocial Actions and Their Targets: Bolivia 1966-1967

		Number of Persons Involved				
		NOT REPORTED	LESS THAN 10	10 to 100	OVER 100	CROWD UNESTIMATED
Antisocial Actions	DEMONSTRATIONS			1		3
	RIOT			1	1	3
	MURDER		3			
	ARRESTS		2	1		
	SEIZURE OF PROPERTY	2	1			
	1966 KIDNAPPING					
	ROBBERY		2			
	TERRORISM	2	4	1		1
	SABOTAGE					
	ASSAULTS	2		2		
	SHOW OF FORCE	2				1
	DEMONSTRATION					1
	RIOT					9
	MURDER					1
	ARRESTS		8	2		
	SEIZURE OF PROPERTY	2	4	1		
1967	KIDNAPPING	1	1			
	ROBBERY	3	4			
	TERRORISM		14	3		3
	SABOTAGE		1			
	ASSAULTS	27	6	9		5
	SHOW OF FORCE	11	4		2	1

Figure 9. Number of Persons Involved in Antisocial Actions: Bolivia 1966-1967

		Targets									
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	INSURGENTS/SYMPATHIZERS	INSURGENT CAMPS	MILITARY	POLICE	BANDITS	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	TRANSPORTATION	PRIVATE HOMES	CIVILIANS
Government Initiated Actions	1966	ARREST	2				1				
		SEIZURE OF PROPERTY		1							1
		ASSAULT								2	
		SHOW OF FORCE								2	
		INVESTIGATION									
	1967	CROWD CONTROL									
		ARREST	5				1			2	
		SEIZURE OF PROPERTY		4					2	1	
		ASSAULT	16	5						2	
		SHOW OF FORCE	11			1				4	
		INVESTIGATION									
		CROWD CONTROL									

Figure 10. Actions Initiated by Government Forces: Bolivia 1966-1967

		Targets											
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS	MILITARY	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	POLICE	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	PUBLIC UTILITIES	TRANSPORTATION	LEFT WING INSURGENTS	CIVILIANS	PRIVATE HOMES	UNSPECIFIED
Antisocial Groups	POPULAR MOVEMENTS										2		
	CIVILIANS			2						2			
	STUDENTS	2						1					
	1966 RIGHT-WING INSURGENTS												
	LEFT-WING INSURGENTS	1			1			1					
	UNIONS	1						1					
	BANDITS								1				
	UNIONS					1							
	CIVILIANS		1	2							4		
	STUDENTS	5	2										
	1967 RIGHT-WING INSURGENTS												
	LEFT-WING INSURGENTS		2	15			9	1	2		2	5	
	ALLEGED GUERRILLAS					1					1		
	BANDITS						1						

Figure 11. Antisocial Groups and Their Targets: Bolivia 1966-1967

		Property Damage or Loss			
		NONE OR NOT REPORTED	DAMAGE REPORTED (No Estimate)	LESS THAN \$1,000	\$1,000 to \$100,000
Antisocial Actions	1966	RIOT	6		
		RANSOM	1		
		ROBBERY	1	2	
		TERRORISM	2	5	1
		SABOTAGE			
		INSURGENT SHOW OF FORCE	3		
		MURDER	3		
		ARRESTS	3		
		ASSAULTS	3	1	
		OTHER			
	1967	RIOT	4		
		RANSOM		1	
		ROBBERY		9	1
		TERRORISM	9	11	
		SABOTAGE	1		
		INSURGENT SHOW OF FORCE	17	1	
		MURDER	1		
		ARRESTS	9		
		ASSAULTS	43	4	
		OTHER			

Figure 12. Property Damage or Loss Through Antisocial Action: Bolivia 1966-1967

insurgents had clearly misread the temper of the country when they selected Bolivia as a country that possessed a good potential for revolution. They felt that the country had already demonstrated the classic Bolshevik form of revolution in 1952 and would continue to be receptive to revolutionary leadership. They tanked on the economic and job market frustrations of the people, the long-term exploitation by foreign investors of natural resources such as metals and petroleum, the political instability and inefficiency of the government, and the combativeness of the Bolivian people.²⁰

The insurgents chose as their site for the guerrilla operations an area in southeastern Bolivia where the peasant inhabitants were strongly pro-Barrientos. President Barrientos expressed his confidence in the population by giving them arms, especially where guerrilla sightings were reported.²¹ Hundreds of peasants, mainly those living in El Valle and Cochabamba, and peasant unions of various departments requested mobilization and were equipped with modern weapons and uniforms in preparation for joining regular army troops.²² In Camiri, the center of the antiguerrilla operation, the Civic Patriotic Antiguerilla Committee was formed,²³ and all inhabitants of the Jose Carrasco province were solicited by the citizens of Tora, its capital, to fight guerrillas and terrorism.²⁴ Even women's groups dedicated themselves to the support of the national army as cities and provinces joined the national civic mobilization. Organizations from Cochabamba, Tarija, and Potosi, professional groups, Chaco War veterans' organizations, as well as political parties issued statements in support of the government policy of national sovereignty and economic development.²⁵

The strangest twist in the internal security situation during the insurgency period was that the Moscow-line Communists, the Bolivian Communist party, whose strength was estimated at 4,000 members, gave no support to the guerrillas and actively prevented others from joining the guerrilla band. The small pro-Chinese Revolutionary Workers party, an old group of Trotskyites numbering about 1,000 members, and the Peking-line splinter group from the Bolivian Communist party, were unable to render much assistance, although both parties were advocates of violent revolution. The National Liberation Front, affiliated with the Bolivian Communist party, was noted for its cooperation with Guevara. It was a young organization that recruited from students, miners, and urban workers.²⁶

The insurgents had been cautioned by Mario Monje, the Communist party chief, to wait for a sharp political crisis when selecting a time to initiate insurgent activities. They settled for a strike.²⁷ A miners' rebellion had broken out in the La Paz area. Large numbers of Catholic priests working along with the Communists and Communist union leaders were attempting to pull concessions from the Mining Corporation of Bolivia, which managed the nationalized mines and provided 80 percent of the property taxes for the national government.²⁸ Barrientos perceived this rebellion as an act of economic sabotage and a diversionary tactic for the insurgents who had just made their presence felt.²⁹ Barrientos was concerned about the necessity of dividing his few poorly equipped troops between the miners' rebellion in the west and the guerrillas in the southeast. Of the 15,000 troops in the army, 9,000 had been inducted only two months before the insurgency crisis began at the beginning of March. With great urgency, military assistance was requested and received from Argentina and the United States.³⁰

Internal Security Forces Expansion

Although the focus of this work is on the militia and the police, the Bolivian account would not be complete without a brief summary of other forces.

The past decade of history of the Bolivian internal security forces involves a unique sharing of power among the army, police, and militias. Conditions for this arrangement evolved from

the insurgency preceding the Revolution of 1952 in which General Seleme, minister of government for the military junta of General Hugo Ballivian, arranged to betray his government in return for the presidency of the new regime. He offered the support of the carabineros and a supply of weapons for the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) cadre. In his scheme, Seleme intimated to Ballivian that the army commander and his high-ranking officers were intent on subverting the government. Consequently, the "questionable" troops were ordered out of the capital city; conscripts were discharged and replaced by novices who would be ineffective in handling arms.³¹ Responsibility for the safety of the chief of state was turned over to the carabineros and the Presidential Guard. Seleme then brought police from all over the nation into the capital on the pretext of giving them a refresher course.³²

At five o'clock in the morning of April 9, 1952 fighting carabineros manned the strategic spots in La Paz and distributed government arms to workers who swarmed in from the suburbs. The 3,000 police and 1,000 armed peasants and workers outdistanced the junta forces composed of the 600-man Presidential Guard, 240 men of the 2nd Engineer Battalion equipped with only three rounds of ammunition each, and 400 cadets from the War College.³³

Once in power, the MNR President Paz Estenssoro purged the armed forces to prevent a counterrevolution from forming. Over one thousand men in the officer corps (80 percent of the total), were demoted, imprisoned, confined to unhealthy parts of the country, or exiled. The police, operating on orders from the regime, carried out the entire operation. Conscripts were discharged, leaving only a few men to guard the barracks, and the cadets of the War College were dismissed. An editorial in El Diario on September 4, 1953 stated, "The army was always an unknown quantity politically, but that does not hold true today, for it simply no longer exists."³⁴

Even the carabineros who had supported the Revolution of 1952 were not immune from the "purification" of the MNR. Two hundred carabinero officers and noncommissioned officers were shipped to the provinces, and 800 privates were discharged. It was reported that 70 percent of the organization had been purged.

To assume this power, armed militias were established on a national scale. Each union organized its own militia, requesting from the government as many arms as it had men. The mainstay of the militias was the Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB), the powerful miners' union, whose chief of staff was Juan Lechin. Men from the mines of Catavi, Llallagua, and Siglo XX boasted of a regiment of 25,000 well-armed miners—possessing their own transportation, health, and communication services—who could be mobilized at a moment's notice and sent to any point in the country. At the same time, regiments of Indians in the rural areas were also being formed into a group known as the "Armed Forces of the Peasantry."³⁵

Individuals who were fearful of the potentially unstable militias, those who wanted to reconquer a Chilean seaport, and those who saw the army's potential for aiding in the economic development of the country pushed for the reestablishment of the army. In February 1953, the Sixth National Convention of the MNR decided to reorganize the army under the leadership of officers who were sympathetic to the MNR and to reestablish a National Carabineer Corps, opening in the spirit of the new revolution. In addition, the MNR resolved to appoint political instructors to all units of the army and National Carabineer Corps, exact a loyalty oath to the MNR from the officers, and change the name of the Army of Bolivia to the Army of the National Revolution, reflecting the army's new identification. This was the MNR's formula for maintaining the fine balance of power between the army, police, and militias.³⁶

The power equilibrium was upset by President Paz Estenssoro in 1963 when he decided to oust the mining faction from the MNR. The union had long resisted attempts to make mining operations more efficient, and was known to have been infiltrated by extreme leftists and Communists. The president undercut Lechin's support in nonmining unions and successfully moved against him with the support of the army and loyal peasants. He had legalized the use of the army as an armed political supporter using the Organic Law of the Armed Forces of the Nation passed in December 1963. It stated that the armed forces could intervene to maintain the internal security of the country when the Bolivian police or other forces organized for such a purpose were insufficient. The form of the intervention was to be determined by the captain-general (the president).³⁷

Population Cleavages

Bolivians experienced several divisive factors in their society—class, language, ethnicity, regionalism, and town-country distinctions. The social order imposed by the Spanish conquerors had persisted until the Revolution of 1952. It was a rigid, ethnically based caste system in which the Spaniards reserved all positions of power and authority for themselves, while assigning the native Indians to subservient, peasantlike positions. The mestizos, persons of mixed ancestry, evolved into a petty bourgeoisie whose most important function was to oversee Indian labor. The Revolution of 1952 made strides in reducing the vast class differences by breaking the old oligarchy and by elevating the lowest class both legally and materially. The Indians were then able to make a rapid transition to mestizo class by discarding Indian dress and by learning the Spanish language.³⁸

On top of that, a rift had been developing between urban and rural groups of such magnitude that it was considered the probable line of division in the next civil war. After being overthrown in 1964, Paz Estenssoro reportedly claimed that he could have defeated the urban rebels, if he had had time to mobilize his rural militia, which had become drunkenly immobile during the fiesta season.³⁹ Three years later, President Barrientos was accused of courting disaster by forming a peasant party that would divide Bolivians into urban and rural groups.⁴⁰ The Revolutionary Barrientista Peasant Movement was created, according to Barrientos, because the peasantry and the armed forces were the bulwarks of defence of national sovereignty, as demonstrated by the successful antiguerrilla campaign. He believed the peasantry guaranteed the continuity of the Bolivian revolution and was its best instrument for national development.⁴¹

Lastly, extreme regionalism has characterized Bolivia, because of its geographic barriers, primitive communication facilities, historical political jealousies and economic conflicts, all exaggerated by differences in language, culture, and race. Particularly strong in outlook was the department of Santa Cruz, which claimed no specific Indian cultural heritage, boasted of its Hispanic background, and resented the political domination of Indian-governed La Paz, which had ignored consistently the economic needs of the eastern provinces. Political revolts resulted that were answered by considerable bloodshed.⁴²

Collection of Intelligence

The highly supportive Bolivian population created a very advantageous condition for intelligence operations. The Criminal Investigation Department of the National Police Force and the Second Section of the Bolivian Army were assisted liberally in their intelligence mission by the peasant population. Even Regis Debray, the French philosopher and correspondent, who was arrested and confined in Bolivia for his part in the Guevara insurgency, reported that

the peasants were organized in well established, locally administered communities and perceived the guerrillas as foreign intruders in their homeland.⁴³ The revolutionaries, he claimed, were associated with pain and bloodshed in the minds of the local citizens. Their presence not only was reported, but peasants voluntarily sought out their trail and informed the Bolivian authorities of their whereabouts.⁴⁴ The Bolivian Peasant Affairs Federation, representing this sector of society that had been Barrientos' main support, carried in its publication interviews and commendations of the peasants reporting a guerrilla sighting.⁴⁵ The leaders of the federation conferred on problems arising from the outbreak of guerrilla activities in Chuquisaca and backed the administration in its policies.⁴⁶

Successful intelligence was attributed to a poor recruitment procedure for the guerrilla movement. Several of its defectors gave the Bolivian Army sufficient information to track down the guerrillas before they were prepared for combat. One of the deserters claimed that operations were to have started in August, but because of premature disclosure they began in March.⁴⁷ On the basis of the detailed evidence presented to the meeting of the Organization of American States in Washington, D. C., revealing foreign intervention in Bolivia, it was speculated that counterinsurgent agents had infiltrated Guevara's movement. Matching fingerprints, his guerrilla diary, and excellent photos of Guevara were all produced.⁴⁸

Intelligence was also secured through numerous captured and deserted caches containing documents, as well as engineering instruments, books, identification cards, Castro-Communist propaganda, tape recorders, typewriters, high frequency radio transmitters, dynamite, modern weapons, and jeeps.⁴⁹

Border Control

Since Bolivia is landlocked by five countries, the problems involved in preventing personnel from infiltrating and goods from being smuggled were considerable. Some broad scope intelligence was provided by the Inter-American Security Committee, a hemisphere-wide program curbing the travel of Latin American subversives and guerrillas to and from Cuba, as well as curbing a flow of arms and propaganda.⁵⁰ But by August 1967, the situation was out of control, and the Bolivian armed forces commander in chief, General Alfredo Ovando, urged the Organization of American States for more stringent regulation of travellers.⁵¹ In addition, Colonel Kolle Cueto, personal envoy of Barrientos, visited the governments of Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil, and requested that these countries increase control over their borders to prevent Bolivian guerrillas from being supplied from or escaping to their countries.⁵²

In Argentina, an arms shipment to the guerrillas was discovered under a load of fertilizer in a railroad car at General Guemes Station in Salta province, which borders Bolivia. Guerrillas were reported securing supplies in a village, and shots were reported to have been fired by the gendarmerie in the village of La Quena. Unrest was noted in several border communities, as gendarme troops moved through that area.⁵³ In Brazil, several hundred soldiers of the Chasseur Battalion were deployed from a little village of Cuiaba, Mato Grosso state, to prevent guerrilla infiltration from the states of Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Goiaz.⁵⁴ The Bolivian customs patrol on Lake Titicaca through which the Peruvian-Bolivian boundary runs policed the vessels for contraband.⁵⁵

President Stroessner of Paraguay dispatched a military mission headed by General Hipolito Viveros to Santa Cruz expressing their country's intention to act energetically against any subversive activity.⁵⁶ An agreement was reached by military officers from Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Peru to share information on guerrilla activities from all

sections of the continent. However, the vigilance and control measures established did not permit the forces of any nation to intervene in the territory of any other. The border patrol of these four countries seemed to be effective, for the guerrillas travelled over 800 kilometers to western Bolivia to escape through Chile, the only country not included in the cooperative antiguerrilla effort.⁵⁷

Insurgent Operations

It was Che Guevara's plan to establish a foco insurreccional, an insurgent center for operations, which would extend from Bolivia, the heartland of South America, to all of its nations. This would lure the United States into creating two, three, or more Vietnams in Latin America from which she would never be able to extricate herself. According to the revolutionary theory espoused by Guevara and Fidel Castro and formulated by Regis Debray in Revolution in the Revolution?, the permanent forces of the revolutionary foco should undertake the creation of the insurgent organization. Around the foco would arise the semiregular forces of the neighborhoods in which it was operating, and lastly, as in the Cuban revolution, the militias would come into play.

Debray claimed that the focos should operate in the rural areas, demonstrating to the people by their military successes that the police and armed services were vulnerable. The situation in many Latin American countries, Debray continued, was that the conservative forces, such as the Peace Corps, had gained control of the countryside by integrating themselves into an area with hard work and real sacrifice. The advantage that a foco had over a fixed base of operations was that it could disperse into little patrols, cover a great amount of territory, and become harder to encircle by government forces. Its disadvantage lay in its inferiority vis-à-vis full strength opposition.⁵⁸

The first foco established in Bolivia was sponsored by Fidel Castro. Its military and political chief, Che Guevara, was joined by sixteen or seventeen Cuban officers who entered the country legally by different routes. Leonardo Tamayo, a Cuban survivor of the original Guevara band, claimed that in December 1966, their unit's full strength was 36 men: 16 Cubans, 18 Bolivians, and 2 Peruvians.⁵⁹ According to most sources, at the peak of the movement there were approximately 40 to 60 men. To prepare for their arrival in Bolivia, Roberto "Coco" Paredo Leigue had scouted the Nancahuazu River Valley seeking a small base. In July of 1966, for \$1,500 a plot of land was purchased, complete with two-room adobe hut topped with a corrugated iron roof. The guerrillas set up their encampment about a two-hour march from this site, on the other side of the Nancahuazu River, a tributary of the Rio Grande. The terrain, which included hundreds of ravines lying between sharp, straight-sided hills, was covered with impenetrable vegetation.⁶⁰

The Bolivian intelligence service claimed that the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers party secured money from foreign sources to obtain this land near Santa Cruz for training groups in terrorism and sabotage. Captured insurgents confirmed that three training centers were operating in Bolivia under the auspices of Peruvian and Venezuelan liberation fronts.⁶¹ The guerrillas were reported to be well organized and fully staffed—including physicians—and having underground shelters at their disposal. Their supplies, evaluated as being adequate, were probably delivered by plane, for aerial photographs disclosed that landing fields were cleared in the forests away from the path of commercial and military air traffic.⁶² Evidence of gas and oil drums along the bank of the Rio Grande disclosed an additional landing strip. There was also a broadcasting station, the National Liberation Radio, located in Sucre, from which the guerrillas tried to recruit new members⁶³ and a station in Camiri from which a

woman known as Tania, relayed coded messages to Che Guevara in a "Miss Lonelyhearts" broadcast.⁶⁴ She was one of the three people who were serving as liaisons for Guevara, although he expressed later that they were of no value at all.⁶⁵

Because of the many breaches of security, Guevara was able to remain in the Nancabuaru area only two months after the initial clash with the army on March 23, 1967. In April a series of minor clashes were reported in various towns, and the main foco had split into smaller segments. With a series of wins behind them, one group led by Guevara and Coco Paredo travelled north across the Rio Grande into the territory of the Eighth Division of the Bolivian Army. The band of ten who attempted to follow them across the river was demolished after they encountered plainclothes security men in the area of the crossing. By September two events had made Guevara's band virtually inoperative. First, Colonel Zenteno, commander of the Eighth Division, sent into the guerrilla area 600 Rangers newly trained by the U.S. Special Forces. Second, the guerrillas' urban support organization was completely exposed and disintegrated.⁶⁶

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ORGANIZATION

Armed Forces: Aim and Organization

According to the 1967 constitution, the Bolivian Army was given the responsibility of guarding national independence, ensuring the rule of the legally constituted government, and cooperating in the overall development of the country.⁶⁷ The president of the republic, as supreme head of the armed forces and captain-general, was advised by Casa Militar, a small personal staff. Also on a high level was the Council of National Defense, over which the president presided, and which created general policy for national defense, including economic and international considerations. The army, air force, and navy functioned under the administrative control of the minister of national defense and under the operational or technical control of the commander in chief of the Bolivian armed forces. Each of the individual services was headed by a commanding general or admiral.⁶⁸

The army headquarters also was directed by a commanding general and a general staff that operated with five sections—personnel, intelligence, plans and operations, logistics, and the latest section concerned with history, cartography, and public relations. Spatially, the army was divided into nine military regions which corresponded to the nine political departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosi, Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Beni, Santa Cruz, Pando, and Tarija with regional headquarters located in La Paz, Sucre, Tarija, Potosi, Trinidad, and Cobija.⁶⁹

The army's tactical organization consisted of six combat divisions, one training division, and several military assistance program supported units—the 1st Motorized Battalion, the elite Presidential Escort Guard, and the four engineer battalions. Each division had an authorized strength of only 600 to 700 men, but in actuality it was closer to 200 men. Although the army established its full complement at 7,000 to 8,000 men, the number usually dwindled to 4,000 to 4,500 at the end of the year because of insufficient funds for training and support. With the exception of the military assistance program supported units, the Bolivian Army was rather impoverished. For a number of units the principal occupation was securing sufficient food, and since 50 percent of the time was devoted to farming or subsistence activities, the military capability of the units remained low. The average unit was unable to supply a rifle for each man. Those arms which it did have were an assortment of German, French, Czech, and American makes.⁷⁰

Civic Action Programs

One of the most crucial programs undertaken by the army in 1962 was civic action, which was used both as a counterinsurgency tool and as a nation-building instrument. General O'Meara, United States Army Commander in Chief of the United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

In addition to achieving the objective of enabling the military to gain the confidence of the populace and winning them away from the subversive revolutionaries, the money makes a distinct contribution to the economic development of the area. . . . In reality it goes much further because the military acquire an intimate knowledge of the basic problems of their country and an enthusiastic interest in the solution of these problems. . . .

A considerable measure of the successes achieved against guerrillas must be attributed to civic action. . . . In Bolivia the school building, road building and medical programs of the Armed Forces convinced large groups of the Indian population that these Armed Forces which they had historically considered their enemies were in fact their friends.⁷¹

The United States supported the Bolivians in their civic action program, which worked through USSOUTHCOM located in the Canal Zone. The commander in chief of this unified command reported directly to the joint chiefs of staff and was able to provide an intermediate level of policy between the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) and the Department of Defense. USSOUTHCOM operated the School of the Americas at Fort Gulick for Latin American military personnel. The curriculum stressed counterinsurgency, with special attention on civic action. Both the Civil Affairs Group and Special Forces provided Mobile Training Teams to missions in Latin America. When civic action was used in the context of an overt or nearly overt insurgency, Special Forces rendered aid; nationbuilding fell within the scope of Civil Affairs units.⁷²

All three branches of the military force were engaged in civic action programs, although Bolivia's naval force and air force were rather small and undeveloped in relation to the army. The Bolivian air force, commanded by a general and his staff, was divided into a combat element and a transport element--Military Air Transport Service. In 1966, approximately 1,800 air force personnel had at their disposal 70 aircraft. The Bolivian naval force, established in 1963, served the region of the Amazon basin while developing the country's inland waterways. The admiral commanded a unit of 2,000 men, divided into two naval districts.⁷³

Working closely with the military civic action program was the Agency for International Development (AID). Among its objectives were the development of a transportation network especially suited to colonizing new territory and assistance in general social development, with primary emphasis on a limited number of impact projects--community self-help activities for small villages, water supply units, and school construction. Though AID had considerable operational control over civic action because of the funding formula, the U. S. Army was largely responsible for support in terms of personnel. The Bolivian Army was delegated to grassroots development and its military engineers were employed in road construction. Building access roads into the interior for colonization had been the duty of construction battalions, which were poorly equipped to do the job. They operated on less than an adequate budget and owned very little of the necessary heavy construction equipment.⁷⁴ More devastating than these restricted budgets and rains that washed out the newly built roads was the heavy rule of militarism after the November 1964 coup d'état. When the caretaker military government began to function,

government agencies responsible for colonization were virtually paralyzed and funds were not available when needed. In this interregnum, officials of all ranks were uncertain of their responsibilities and authority.⁷⁵

The administration of President Barrientos, inaugurated in August 1966, continued to support civic action activities. A second Organic Law of the Armed Forces devoted an entire chapter to "The Armed Forces in National Development and Production." General Alfredo Ovando Candia, the commander general of the Bolivian armed forces, substantiated this interest when he pledged that the military establishment was working for the people, not just military concerns.

The Militia


The People's Militia, a paramilitary organization performing police-type work and authorized by the constitution to function as part of the reserve of the armed forces, was governed by special regulation. Its main purpose had more to do with the preservation of internal security than with formal combat. The intention of the MNR in building up these units after the revolution was to have a party-controlled militia system operating in each peasant and industrial union that would come to the aid of the regime. Officially the industrial unions were controlled by the minister of national defense, and the campesino militias by the minister of rural affairs, but most militias were in fact autonomous, democratically electing their own leaders and loyally supporting them. Because of the uncertainty involved, the MNR had reduced the strength of the groups so that they could not carry out their own revolution but would be capable of handling disorderly mobs.

The most important civilian militias were those of the miners, campesinos, and factory workers. Paz attempted to break the strength of the miners' militia, the Trade Union Federation of Mine Workers of Bolivia, when their union balked at the reforms suggested by the MNR. Until this power clash, it had been the best organized, trained, and equipped militia. The campesino militias, possessing the largest membership, had an intimate knowledge of the land and its resources, and they were best equipped for guerrilla units. The militias most effective in the urban areas were those of the factory workers, who lived in the cities and who could respond fastest to incidents of mob violence. Professionally, the groups lacked training and modern weapons but compensated in exuberance for their task. Since training was contingent on local leaders, its performance was considered very erratic in many respects, but morale was generally high because of the prestige and status of serving a respected leader.⁷⁶

Police

The police system was a highly centralized institution run by the director general of the Police and Carabineros who was appointed by, and directly responsible to, the president of the republic. (See figure 13.) When public order and safety were threatened, the president—the commander in chief of the carabineros and all other police forces—had the authority to directly administer the activities of the police corps. Normally the administrative control was the responsibility of the ministry of government, justice, and immigration, and the operational control was vested in a director general. During wartime, however, the uniformed carabineros were customarily transferred to the ministry of national defense and integrated into the armed forces.

BOLIVIAN POLICE SYSTEM



Source: Area Handbook for Bolivia, pp. 638-648

Figure 13. Bolivian Police System

The director general, usually a high-ranking carabinero officer, served as commandant of the National Police Academy, head of the National Identification Service, and chief of the Bolivian contingent that was allied with the International Police. His office was national headquarters for all police and carabinero activities. The staff consisted of a command component and twelve sections that planned, supervised, and administered corps personnel, plans, operations, supply maintenance, religious services, medical services, transportation, communications, morale, and discipline. Only the Second Section of the Bolivian Army dealing with political control, operated independently of police and was under direct orders from the regime.

The national police stationed throughout the country were responsible only to their central office. Subordinate headquarters were established in the capital of each of the departments and run by a chief of police and staff sections similar to those in national headquarters. Each headquarters, or brigade, operated in two commands: urban and provincial in which personnel patrolled, investigated, and operated police stations and local jails. Within a department, units regardless of their size, composition, or mission were considered to be part of the brigade. However, in areas that were particularly susceptible to disorder, independent carabinero units were assigned. For example, La Paz had two separate regiments under the direct control of the director general and the president. Departmental brigade personnel of the rural command were assigned to duty on the frontier and on lake and river ports of entry. Customs personnel had been integrated into the corps to combat smuggling and illegal border crossing.

Personnel of the police corps were composed of three groups: uniformed police, known as carabineros, that comprised about 80 percent of the total; technical and auxiliary personnel such as physicians and communications specialists who were either carabineros or civilians; and police investigators and identification personnel who were almost exclusively civilians. Members of the corps, most of whom had had some military training, received small-unit training in riot control and counterinsurgency through the auspices of AID. It was reported that the police units, at least in La Paz, who were equipped with machineguns, rifles, and carbines, compared favorably with the army in combat effectiveness.⁷⁷

* * * * *

A highly supportive population created an enormously advantageous condition for military, paramilitary, and police operations against the insurgents in Bolivia. In Guatemala, a peasant militia contributed to the government's success in countering insurgent operations in the rural areas. But in the cities, as we shall see in the next case study, the government was faced with a polarized situation pitting against each other extremists from both the Right and the Left and receiving little support from moderate-liberal and conservative groups.

CHAPTER 7

GUATEMALA

GENERAL

From the study of security problems in Guatemala, several factors emerged that seemed to intensify and probably perpetuate the guerrilla movement. The highly disproportionate distribution of land and wealth created tensions in the society and there were no mechanisms for achieving a more equitable situation. The Communist party was outlawed, forcing it out of responsible government positions and pushing it into a violent posture. Access to power through unionization was also denied to the common people by strong harassment by the powerful conservative factions.

The insurgent movement, which gained momentum in the early 1960's, was given the advantage of time by refusal of President Enrique Peralta, who came to power in March 1963, to recognize the violence in Guatemala as being incipient insurgency and countering it in its early phase. When Peralta did authorize operations, some units of the security forces lost the confidence of the population by treating them in a heavy-handed way when their cooperation was essential in aiding the government forces to recognize the indigenous guerrillas. A situation developed in which many sectors of society became, and continue to be, intensely involved—students, peasants, Communists, and Roman Catholic missionaries siding with the Left, and most military personnel, landholders, and businessmen generally siding with the Right. The extreme polarization of society has blocked the government from instituting what moderates feel are sorely needed social and economic reform.

This is the general situation that has provided the backdrop for internal security operations shared by the Guatemalan Army and several police agencies (whose effectiveness was somewhat limited by their acute interest in politics).

GUATEMALA'S INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

Along with all the problems of previous administrations, Peralta had to deal with a two-pronged incipient insurgency that had its origins in 1960, after the Cuban Bay of Pigs operation was aborted, and political opposition from several factions developed. A former 2nd Lt., Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, led an unsuccessful military coup against the then President Miguel Ydigoras, and this group remained together to form the 13th of November Revolutionary Movement (MR-13). In February 1962, it began Viet Cong-style operations in the northeastern province of Izabal, which is surrounded by dense jungle and rugged mountains and from which Lake Izabal flows out to the Caribbean Sea.¹ Led by Yon Sosa, who had been trained in counter-insurgency operations in Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone,² the insurgent group fought to a draw. Toward the close of the year, the MR-13 band in bits and pieces sought shelter in Honduras. By his own admission five years later, Yon Sosa disclosed that this group would not have been able to offer any solutions to the overwhelming problems facing his country, even if they had been successful. The second group of Communist insurgents was headed by ex-lieutenant Luis Augusto Turcios. Turcios also had received extensive military training by the




Figure 14. Map of Guatemala

U. S. Army. He broke away from the Castroite leader, Yon Sosa, and led his followers into a collaborative effort of indoctrination and propaganda with the Guatemalan Labor party. Yon Sosa continued to assert his militant philosophy as the head of a rejuvenated MR-13 movement.³

Peralta, not realizing the strength of the insurgent groups, escalated the violence and conflict by his heavy-handed misuse of the army against peasants and insurgents alike. The extreme actions used on many peasants by the Guatemalan Army turned their sympathies toward the insurgents. Ineffective intelligence and lack of training in counterinsurgency hampered the army's initial efforts.⁴

As a counter to the stepped-up actions against them, several left-wing groups had consolidated and expanded their membership and operations. By 1965 the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) consisted of the Guatemalan party, the Edgar Ibarra Guerrilla Front, and the Workers Patriotic Youth, who merged to restructure themselves as a new organization. Their stronghold was the Las Minas Mountains in the northeastern provinces of Izabal and Zacapa, extending to the south central portion of the country into the capital, Guatemala City. In this area FAR dominated by controlling segments of the one-of-a-kind superhighway from Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean Sea to the capital city.⁵ Military patrols were ambushed and towns were seized; one town was Rio Hondo, which was the location of the hydroelectric plant that served the entire province of Zacapa and was guarded at the time of its capture by an army detachment.⁶

In the city resistance groups were operating to annihilate persons known for their harsh actions against the peasants. What so terrorized the population were FAR-published lists of individuals who were to be executed or kidnapped for an enormous \$75,000 ransom each. The Rebel Armed Forces were successful in fulfilling their pledges. Soon, leftist terrorists began kidnapping and blackmailing businessmen and industrialists. Whenever Peralta attempted to assure the population that his army was in control of the situation, FAR would plan a spectacular kidnapping or release of a victim for ransom. In the months of November and December 1965, FAR had extorted more than \$300,000.⁷ The terrorized and insecure citizens pressured Peralta's government for increased police protection and removal of the insurgents. The governmental army and police intensified their efforts.⁸

Hope for some political stability hinged upon holding constitutional elections whose results would satisfy the dissidents and curb the raging violence. The intensity of the warring diminished as the electoral machinery was put into gear. But on the eve of the election, news broke out that two top officials of the Guatemalan Labor party, Victor Manuel Gutierrez and Leonardo Castillos Flores, along with 28 other Communist leaders, had been taken into custody by Peralta's police. Demands by the Association of University Students (AEU) and others that these men be given public trial or that their fates become known were met with silence from the Guatemalan Government Information Office Secretary. Rumors spread that these Communists had been secretly executed.⁹

In retaliation, FAR kidnapped Supreme Court Chief Justice Romeo Augusto de Leon and the Government Information Secretary. Their release of them was contingent upon the freeing of the 28 political prisoners. The impossible exchange resulted in the killing of the Information Secretary.¹⁰

In the midst of this tumultuous episode, March 1966, a fair election was held. The Peralta-backed candidate, Colonel Juan de Dios Aguilar de Leon, ran second to the candidate of the Revolutionary party, a reformist non-Communist group, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro. His win was somewhat unusual, as he was the only civilian in a contest usually won by the military. As dean of a law school, and reputed to be liberal in policy, Mendez Montenegro was an

attractive candidate to students and reformist groups. Mendez was also supported by FAR and the Guatemalan Labor party (whose support he had not solicited), who intended to keep Peralta's Democratic Constitutional party and the ultrarightist National Liberation Movement from gaining legitimacy through the election.¹¹

Upon taking office, Mendez attempted to strengthen his position with the extremists of both the Right and Left. It has been reported by army and civilian sources that Mendez was compelled to accept a series of conditions from the army in order to enjoy its support for his administration.¹² However, three months of fruitless negotiations with the rebels created anxious concern among the military, who in turn pressured Mendez into a decision to turn against the guerrillas. In September 1966, in a live address to the nation, Mendez pledged that he would tolerate no extremism; in October he unleashed the most intense military and police campaign against the insurgents up to that time. Pursuant to the directive from the president, the commander of the northeast army base in Zacapa deputized 2,000 not too well trained peasants as law enforcement agents whose task it was to set up operations against insurgent groups.¹³

Aiding in this rather successful counterinsurgent action was the early death in October 1966 of Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, chief of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces. The FAR organization's decision to renew ties with Yon Sosa's MR-13 movement had been thwarted by Turcios.¹⁴ His successor, a young Communist lawyer, Cesar Montes, attempted to reunite forces with the other guerrilla faction, but proved to be a less satisfactory leader because of his inferior skills in military strategy.¹⁵ In order to survive, the insurgents were forced to leave the northeast for the cities, where instant and intense anti-Communist feelings gave rise to the operation of a score of right-wing extremist action groups, the most effective being the Organized Movement of Nationalist Action (MANO), the New Anticommunist Organization (NOA), and the Anticommunist Confederation for the Defense of Guatemala (CADEG), described more fully later.

These secret rightist groups who had merged into a single organization by the close of 1967, the Organization of Associations Against Communism (ODEACEC), were effective in reducing leftist terrorism to an all time low.¹⁶ What was so distressing to the middle-of-the-road public was that some government and army personnel were linked with the operations of these right-wing organizations, whose tactics began to match those of the left wing. Determined to oust the Mendez administration, MANO attempted and carried out a spectacular plan of kidnapping Archbishop Casariego, the leading Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authority in heavily Catholic Guatemala.¹⁷ They believed that this outrageous occurrence would be attributed to the leftists, evoke violence from the Catholic population, and precipitate a coup by the irate military.¹⁸

MANO, with the support of conservative factions, began to plot for the ouster of the Mendez administration. The origins of the plot were identified quickly, however, and Mendez moved in a surprisingly assertive fashion to gain control. He dismissed his defense minister, the military officer who was in charge of the anti-Communist forces in the northeastern provinces, and his chief of the National Police Force, also reputed to be a member of the ultraright organizations. Other army officers with conspicuous MANO records were assigned to less desirable posts.¹⁹

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces: Expansion of Power and Forces

In the late 1960's, the president of the republic was empowered by the constitution of Guatemala to gain full control over all the mechanisms of government, both civilian and military, for the purpose of curbing lawlessness, eliminating seditious activities, and maintaining control in times of public calamity. The Law of Public Order enabled the president to govern in his capacity as head of the security forces, working through the defense ministry to mobilize his country's resources. Depending on the severity of the conditions, the decree could be issued for any one of four stages: (1) state of prevention for which the president did not have to confer with his Council of Ministers; (2) state of alarm; (3) state of public calamity; and (4) state of siege and war. In any of these states, the personal rights of the individual could be abrogated according to the discretion of the president. It was necessary to include in the Law of Public Order decree the justification and the territory involved. Thirty days was the maximum time the law was in effect, but it was renewable upon expiration.²⁰ A state of siege, effective from November 1966 to March 1967, was then reduced to a state of alarm, and in May 1967 was removed entirely.

The following is an example of the range of activities controlled through the Law of Public Order Decree. After Mendez placed the country in a state of siege, all authorities and institutions in the country were to render assistance and cooperation to him, as president of the republic and general commander of the armed forces. All private organizations, legal or not, discovered to be conducting subversive activities or in any way opposing public order were dissolved immediately and persons responsible were brought before the courts.

All political activities of private citizens and parties were suspended. Accordingly, all persons attending public or private gatherings of a political nature were arrested, and where appropriate the meeting spot was closed down. During the state of siege and without a previous judicial order, the authorities had the power to arrest immediately any person suspected of plotting against the government or acting to upset the public order through acts of terrorism or similar means.

All police branches were placed under military authority to extend the scope of the internal security forces, as were all public services. Mobilization of all military personnel was effected. Persons serving in branches of the government, other than the armed forces, and military men on leave or in reserve were required to report immediately to their nearest military post. Their power and authority were extended. No longer were warrants needed to enter and search any home or consecrated building. All authorities had the right to stop all vehicles for inspection; and those vehicles operating between the hours of 1830 and 0600 were required to keep the inside of their vehicles lighted and not exceed the speed of 30 kilometers an hour.²¹

Restrictions were placed on the sale and use of arms to reduce the citizens' potential for violence. All permits for importing weapons were cancelled. In fact, the sale, use, or possession of any type of weapon or materials used in weapon making was forbidden. Those persons who were already in possession of arms were required to surrender them to the military authorities in return for a receipt, and those who had a need to use explosives in private or state enterprises had to apply for a permit from the defense ministry. The only segment exempt from the arms prohibition were the owners of rural farms, their administrators, and their legal representatives, who were deputized as law enforcement agents. They were to enforce the law on their farms. According to the law, the men would be responsible for any misuse of authority outside their territory. This, however, was difficult to enforce.²²

During the state of alert, it was the prerogative of the government to hold prisoners as a security measure without allowing them to be processed through the ordinary court system.²³ After the decree terminated, prisoners were either released or remanded to the courts. In 1966, using the new constitution as a guideline, those prisoners accused of committing common crimes were transferred from the jurisdiction of the military court to the civilian courts for trial.²⁴

The government also decreed that the publicity media cooperate with the government during the perilous times to create an atmosphere of public order. Publishers were enjoined not to use materials that would cause confusion, exacerbate a deteriorating situation, print information originating with the rebels, or engage in any kind of propaganda or activities against the constitutional government. All government public relations services were centered at the Presidency's Information Secretariat, which was the only official information medium for the duration of the emergency.²⁵ These restrictions produced a highly restrictive flow of information that angered and frustrated both the public and press. Because of the vacuum, rumors abounded, giving more advantage to the guerrillas than to the incumbent government.²⁶

The Public Order Law also made it incumbent on private citizens to cooperate actively with the government under certain circumstances. Persons whose cars had been stolen or missing were compelled to report the incidents to the authorities or be liable as accomplices.²⁷ Physicians were obliged by law to report to authorities any case of persons who sought medical attention from them for injuries sustained in an accident or in the course of committing an illegal act. Also covered under this law were pharmacy owners, medicine salesmen, personnel of first aid stations, and nurses.²⁸

To decelerate tensions, Mendez in the early months of his administration took some remedial legal steps to aid persons of the extreme Right and Left factions. An amnesty decree was proposed and approved by the Constituent Assembly for all army and police officers who acted illegally while countering subversion.²⁹ This, however, did not deter law suits from being filed against police officers.³⁰ To placate the leftist factions, secret blacklists of persons opposed to the governments of Castillo Armas, Ydigoras, and Peralta were burned by order of a government official. These lists had been growing since 1954 when the Arbenz government had been overthrown, and 1,300 names of Arbenz' allies had been recorded.³¹ In addition, the government ordered that incommunicado cells no longer be used and that extreme forms of prisoner interrogation be discontinued.³²

Population Cleavages

The efforts of the Mendez government to resolve the conflict between the extreme factions of modern Guatemalan society were thwarted by insolvable and traditional problems based on highly inequitable distribution of land and wealth among the population. The wealthy were adamant about not participating to any degree in social reform that would limit their positions of power in society. Taxation, universal education, land redistribution, and unionization of workers were equally detested and feared. This core of conservative thought was the basis for the opposition of the conservative element to the Mendez government. Left-wing insurgency based its appeal on reform. The middle class, both in socioeconomic terms and political feelings, was not substantial enough to temper the dichotomization of society.

Underlying this rupture was the fact that assimilation had not occurred on a full scale. Society was divided almost equally into ethnic groups. The Indian half was composed of four

main groups: Quiche-Maya, Cakchiquel, Tzutujil, and Mam, speaking sixteen or more identifiable Indian languages. The non-Indian sector, the Ladinos, spoke Spanish, the official language of the country. Economically, the population worked autonomously in subsistence units, unrelated to each other or a national business interest.³³ Even the predominant Catholic religion took on localized form and was individualized for each community, weakening the possibility of unity through a religious institution. Education was too diversified and scarce to impart to the young people a feeling that they were first of all Guatemalans who shared a common set of symbols and values.

Border and Coastal Access

A more immediately pressing problem for security forces has been border control, an important police function difficult to achieve in this crisis; from every surrounding country, men and armament have reputedly entered illegally. Continuous smuggling of arms along the Guatemalan-Mexican border has alerted the customs police to a position of strict surveillance.³⁴ The western department of San Marcos has been a popular route from Mexico; caches of bazookas, fragmentation grenades, and submachineguns have been confiscated from farmhouses by the police.³⁵ Large supplies of materials for explosive manufacturing have been obtained from persons transporting it for the insurgents from Vera Cruz, Mexico. It is alleged that on the Mexican side of the border in Tapachula City, warehouses have yielded tens of thousands of guns, machineguns, and rounds of ammunition.³⁶ A second well-used route into Guatemala has been from Yucatan, Mexico. This northeastern most tip of Mexico is directly across the water route to Cuba. From here it is reported that weapons from the United States, Cuba, and Mexico were shipped southward across the border to Guatemala. Raul Castaneda, a student terrorist, upon capture, told the police that a Guatemalan truck driver bribed the border guards along this route so that he could haul a load of armaments to predestined sites.³⁷ Involvements in the contraband business have occasionally come to light in cases other than that of Cuba. In the latter part of 1966, Julian Lopez Diaz, a Cuban diplomat who was the third secretary of the embassy in Mexico, implicated both Russians and Yugoslavs in the penetration of Latin America.³⁸

Mexico, the most efficient route from Cuba to Guatemala, was the passageway for Guatemalans who traveled to the Communist island for political purposes. While visiting Guatemala, Mexican President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz was petitioned by the National Liberation Movement to refuse passage to those citizens who had undergone indoctrination in Cuba.³⁹ Another strategy, used by the Communists in relation to Mexico, was to ask for asylum at the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala. Officials believed that once the Guatemalan guerrillas were in Mexico, they met to draw up new plans and strategies to return once again across Mexican borders.⁴⁰

Communist organizations in other neighboring countries such as Honduras had been known to send agents into Guatemala to train in insurgency techniques.⁴¹ Guatemalan guerrillas discovered entering Honduras were executed by Honduran border patrols.⁴² El Salvador and British Honduras have borders which were repeatedly violated with the smuggling of arms.⁴³

Non-Communist Insurgency

Plotting against the government in Guatemala has always been a well institutionalized phenomenon and almost always involved some discontented military officers. Very rarely have these military attempts to unseat presidents or, in fact, any form of political intervention by the army been well coordinated and well organized. This was the case with the non-Communist subversive elements in the 1960's—not too well organized and certainly not cohesive.

The best known right-wing extremist group was the Organized Movement of National Action (MANO). MANO means "hand" in Spanish, and it represents the five-man cell that was the basic structure of the organization. Each of these units performed the functions of the hand, execution being one of the most essential.⁴⁴ MANO was the offspring of Raul Lorenzana who solicited large landholders for contributions of 1,000 quetzals; those who had reservations about making a donation were kidnapped for a ransom of 75,000 quetzals—the going ransom rate for both left- and right-wing extremists.⁴⁵

The administration of the right-wing terrorist groups was loosely linked with larger legitimate institutions and groups. The National Liberation Movement, organized by the late Castillo Armas, was reputed to control the key men in MANO; many retired and some active military officers were the power in the New Anti-Communist Organization (NOA) and the Anti-Communist Confederation for the Defense of Guatemala (CADEG). Estimates of the number of murders committed by right-wing groups vary, but the Latin American Confederation of Christian Labor Unions reported that in eighteen months of 1967 and 1968, right-wing extremists were responsible for the deaths of over 2,800 intellectuals, students, workers, and peasants. MANO was headquartered in the same building as the police, and from there it attempted to coordinate its activities with the two other anti-Communist groups.⁴⁶

The right-wing extremists had selected a large variety of targets including government officials, union leaders, influential peasants, students, and a large body of persons who were thought to have connections with the insurgency and revolutionary politicians.⁴⁷ Although the right-wing groups were affiliated informally with some police and military groups, they were reputed to have eliminated those police who seriously attempted to bring extremists to justice.⁴⁸ Labor union leaders in large masses were threatened by the Organization of Associations Against Communism with having to leave the country or face execution.⁴⁹ It was a common occurrence for peasant leaders and successful farmers to be kidnapped or terrorized.⁵⁰ Even government officials, judges, police, and local administrators who were considered not extreme enough in their anti-Communist beliefs were harassed. To enhance the terror effect, the Right extreme groups published and distributed lists of persons who were considered to be Communists.⁵¹

However, public sentiment shifted discernably after the kidnapping of the Catholic Archbishop, and the head of MANO who formerly had been seen openly in Guatemala City night spots had to go underground.⁵² Government security forces offered a 5,000 quetzal reward for information leading to the capture of MANO's chief, as they widely distributed photographs via television and newspaper. Other MANO members sought refuge in the embassies of Costa Rica, Mexico, and Honduras.⁵³

Communist Insurgency

Communist guerrilla operations began in 1962 in the northeastern province of Izabal, in the rugged Sierra de las Minas. Until 1966 this stronghold of the guerrillas centered about the territory between Puerto Barrios and Zacapa. There was a greater proportion of Ladinos to Indians in this region than elsewhere.⁵⁴ Insurgent success in the eastern provinces was contrasted with their campaign in the heavily populated Indian regions, the western mountain departments of San Marcos, Huehuetenango, and Quezaltenango. In these departments it was impossible for the insurgents to obtain cooperative leaders from the Indian community or to provide them with a Ladino chief. Their strong tribal identities allowed little manipulation from outsiders.⁵⁵ Guerrillas, whether white or Ladino, were unwelcome aliens to the Indian. Oddly, the FAR leader, Cesar Montes, attributed his failure to the area's pacification by U. S. Peace Corps workers and religious missionaries.⁵⁶

Members of the FAR considered themselves essentially part of a national agrarian movement. Their demand was land, but their slogans and appeals changed from area to area. For example, in the western department of Huehuetenango, the peasants owned land, but their minifundia were not sufficiently large to provide a family with a minimal existence; in the southern coastal plain, latifundia prevailed and the landowners refused to distribute their lands. The FAR felt that they should not attempt to institute any reform measures until armed groups were established to ensure security. Little was offered to the villagers in the way of assistance under these conditions and much was asked of them—food, young recruits, loyalty, and military intelligence.⁵⁷

The FAR leader, Cesar Montes, boasted that no Czech and Soviet arms had been turned up by government forces, nor had any Cuban agents been captured on Guatemalan soil.⁵⁸ According to his claim, it was a war fought with Guatemalan forces and resources. This contention was substantiated in a hearing by the subcommittee of Latin American affairs of the U. S. Senate.⁵⁹

The Communist guerrillas financially supported their cause by kidnapping and robbery. Ransoms were collected at the rate of \$75,000 per victim. Other income was derived from the robbery of banks,⁶⁰ railroad offices, various business enterprises, and embassies. Weapons were bought with these funds and were also captured from officers and soldiers.

In the rural campaigns the insurgents had no fixed camps. Each day they would march in the area of the Sierra de las Minas from 6 a. m. to 4 p. m. and cook their last meal just before dark. Frequently this regimen was followed for twenty consecutive days, with the only allowance for comfort being the placement of food caches along the way. During its travels, the group seized villages, organized cells in their wake, and executed peasants and others believed to have associated with the government forces.⁶¹ Another typical action of the insurgent was to trace the whereabouts of important officials of previous administrations and assassinate them. Jorge Cordova Molina, secret police chief of the Arana regime, had returned to a small town in south central Guatemala to take up farming; he was found there riddled with bullets fired by persons unknown.⁶²

The guerrillas admittedly played cat-and-mouse games with the internal security forces of Guatemala. The Atlantic Highway, one of the few major roads connecting Puerto Barrios on the Caribbean Sea with the capital city, runs parallel to the Sierra de las Minas. As army troops entered the mountains from the highway, the guerrillas filtered down to the highway, destroyed the vehicles, and immediately retreated. This progressive strategy was finally retired when the army learned to keep troops positioned on the highway.⁶³ Guerrillas often ambushed military police in the rural zones and attacked police stations and substations.⁶⁴ Actions were also directed against large landowners and factory owners. In the coastal region of Tiquisate, large quantities of stored cotton were burned; in Esquintla, the police-guarded Iodesa and Aguapa factories were attacked. In Taxisco, Chiquimulilla, Puerto San Jose, Santa Lucia, and Rio Bravo, FAR-endorsed groups destroyed telephone wires, cut the fences of the large landowners, removed the cattle, and burned down the posts.⁶⁵

Telegraph and telephone wires were sabotaged in hundreds of towns, international roads and bridges were bombed, and roads were strewn with nails and made impassable for hours with blocked traffic. Powerlines were torn down, and radio and telephone broadcasts were disrupted. Terrorists exploded bombs in front of buildings, such as those housing the facilities of the U. S. Peace Corps newspaper, *La Voz*, and homes of political personalities.⁶⁶ Priests who spoke against the terrorists were threatened. Money was extorted from banana workers employed by the United Fruit Company.⁶⁷ And peasants and estate owners were held up for food and medicine—their "voluntary" contribution to the insurgent cause.⁶⁸

The sympathy and cooperation of the university students greatly contributed to the force of the guerrillas. Although the students represented only a small proportion of the population, they had become very active and effective weekend guerrillas.* One informant stated that among the 400 fighters he knew, 300 were students, and 100 were peasants. Initially, it was rather easy for two college boys to slip away for a weekend trip on their motorbikes, but as the insurgency expanded, military and police patrols spotted, detained, or turned back such travelers.⁶⁹

At the University of San Carlos in March 1968, a subversive organization was uncovered in which a group of professors led by Mario Raul Toledo was operating indoctrination, propaganda, and resistance cells. Their large-scale sabotage plans had netted the movement over a million dollars in damage.⁷⁰ Much propaganda and political material of the illegal Communist party were distributed through the Association of University Students (AEU). In January 1966, the AEU had requested international organizations to oversee the presidential election to ensure a fair election.⁷¹ In April 1966, the organization submitted an extraordinary writ of habeas corpus to the Guatemalan Supreme Court for twenty missing persons who were believed to have been arrested but who were among the 28 Communist leaders allegedly executed during Peralta's term in office.⁷² The student association in 1968 also issued propaganda claiming that thousands of Guatemalans had died because of the constant abuses heaped upon them. The theme of solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the world was laced with concomitant jibes at American colonialism.⁷³

General Pattern of Violence

The occurrence of violent incidents reported in the newspapers fluctuated from month to month and year to year during the period studied—March 1963 to January 1968. A flareup in guerrilla activities associated with Peralta's coup d'état to prevent the possibility of the liberal candidate, Juan Arevalo, from gaining office was reflected in the statistics of early 1963. The incident rate dipped appreciably after that and remained at that level until December 1964, when the leftist guerrillas spurred an anti-Peralta drive in both the mountains and urban areas. During May of the following year violence peaked on the heels of a government-ordered austerity drive following a two-year economic boom, and the resignation of assembly members resulted after the defeat of a constitutional amendment which was designed to bar leaders of military coups from becoming president. The greatest surge of terrorist activity occurred from October 1966 through 1967 when the army and right-wing groups began their intensive campaign against the Communist guerrillas in the rural areas and then dealt with them as they infiltrated Guatemala City. (See figure 26.)

In fact, more than one-half of the violent incidents reported in the five-year period occurred in the department of Guatemala, where Guatemala City, the capital, is located. This high occurrence of incidents may be attributed to several factors: the department of Guatemala is the most populous subdivision of the country and it contains most of the country's wealth. For these reasons, antisocial groups bent on terrorism and extortion to subvert the government could find no more advantageous base of operations. Furthermore, the newspaper selected by the authors for the analysis of violence was published in Guatemala City. It is possible that isolated incidents in outlying areas may not have been known, or newsworthy. In 1965, over 80 percent of the incidents occurred in the department of Guatemala, whereas in 1966 and

*Statistics on violent incidents derived from newspapers in 1966 and 1967 did not add support to the claim that students participated extensively. In fact, Guatemalan insurgents showed less preference for initiating operations on the weekends than weekdays. (See figure 15.)

1967 the distribution was more widespread, with most political subdivisions experiencing some violence. Next to the department of Guatemala, the departments of Jalapa, Izabal, Zacapa, and Escuintla led other areas in the number of violent incidents. (See figure 16.)

Antisocial groups employed a wide variety of small-scale violent actions against an array of targets, presenting the security forces, and particularly the police, with a formidable task. Terrorism, the most widely used action, was directed most often against public installations, private homes, and transportation facilities. Robberies, the second most frequent action, were aimed at stores, buildings, restaurants, banks, gas stations, political headquarters, and other civilian installations. Transportation facilities too were victimized. The number of assaults ran highest in 1966 and 1967 and were primarily directed against police and military personnel; the previous peak in assaults in 1963 was aimed at private homes, military installations, and the police. Assassination, murder, and kidnapping, in that order, were employed against civilians, who were the prime targets, although government officials, military, and police personnel were included among the victims. It is estimated that over 4,000 persons died by violent means between 1966 and 1968. (See figures 17-19.)

The pattern of violence emerging from the Guatemalan experience points to a prevalence of hit-and-run actions that could be executed by a single person or a small group. (See figure 20.) Sources contended that armed bands of insurgents from both the right and the left sides of the political spectrum contributed substantially to the violence, although according to the news media, of 299 reported actions, supportive evidence indicated that only 17 could be attributed to right-wing groups. (This is probably a function of the political climate.) Direct confrontation with the security forces was avoided with these antisocial actions—terrorism, robbery, murder, and assassination—but a substantial amount of property damage was incurred through terrorism. (See figure 21.)

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

Regular armed forces and a system of police agencies comprised the internal security forces that had to deal with rural insurgency and urban terrorism. Top heavy with officers, poorly equipped, poorly organized, and lacking in counterinsurgency capabilities, these forces were nonetheless able to control the guerrillas in the countryside and for brief periods establish some modicum of security in the capital city.

Armed Forces: Aim and Organization

The Guatemalan military during the 1950's and 1960's, although divided in its political commitment, was considered a vital force in the political life of the country. The administrations of Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz survived only as a result of the tacit support they received from the military. When the army withdrew its support of Arbenz in 1954, his administration was overturned by a weak third force, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and his band. Later the army backed Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdias in turning General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes out of office.⁷⁴ The administration of Mendez Montenegro was reputed to exist because of the backing of the army. It was reported that Mendez agreed to place all armed groups including the police under the army's leadership and not interfere in any measure with its administration. In each of the above administrations, military officers held many executive, advisory, and administrative positions at all levels.⁷⁵ Constitutionally, however, the army was cited as an obedient, nonpolitical organization. Its stated aims were to defend the territory of the nation, its sovereignty, and independence and to preserve internal




Figure 15. Total Incidents by Day of Week by Year: Guatemala 1963-1967

Location	Year				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Alto Verapaz					1
Baja Verapaz				1	2
Chimaltenango				1	1
Chiquimula				5	
El Peten					
El Progreso				3	4
El Quiché					
Escuintla		2	1	6	17
Guatemala	43	32	60	74	108
Huehuetenango					
Izabal	14	5	5	7	5
Jalapa				1	3
Jutiapa	1	1			4
Quezaltenango	5	2	1	4	2
Retalhuleu	2	2		2	2
Sacatepequez				1	
San Marcos	1			3	
Santa Rosa			1	1	4
Solola				1	
Suchitequez	2			1	1
Totonicapan					
Zacapa		2	3	14	15
Not Located	5	2	2	6	5
Total	73	48	73	132	187

Figure 16. Total Incidents, Location by Year: Guatemala 1963-1967

		Targets											
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS	MILITARY	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	POLICE	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	PUBLIC UTILITIES	TRANSPORTATION	LEFT WING INSURGENTS	CIVILIANS	PRIVATE HOMES	UNSPECIFIED
1963	DEMONSTRATIONS										2		
	RIOTS												
	MURDER										2		
	ASSASSINATION	1				1							
	KIDNAPPING										2		
	ROBBERY		1				6		1		1		
	TERRORISM		1				6	2	6		2	5	2
	SABOTAGE							2	2				
	ASSAULTS				3	3	1	1	1			6	
	SHOW OF FORCE												
1964	DEMONSTRATIONS												
	RIOTS												
	MURDER										3		3
	ASSASSINATION	1		3		1							
	KIDNAPPING												
	ROBBERY						4				2		
	TERRORISM		4		1		4	1			1		2
	SABOTAGE							1	1				
	ASSAULTS			1	1	2							
	SHOW OF FORCE												

Figure 17. Antisocial Actions and Their Targets: Guatemala 1963-1964

		Target												
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS	MILITARY	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	POLICE	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	PUBLIC UTILITIES	TRANSPORTATION	LEFT WING INSURGENTS	CIVILIANS	PRIVATE HOMES	UNSPECIFIED	
1965	Antisocial Action	DEMONSTRATIONS												
		RIOTS												
		MURDER			1						4			
		ASSASSINATION	1		1		3				2			
		KIDNAPPING									4			
		ROBBERY					1	3						
		TERRORISM	3	5	1	1	1	1		1		4	3	1
		SABOTAGE												
		ASSAULTS			1									
		SHOW OF FORCE												
1966		DEMONSTRATIONS												
		RIOTS												
		MURDER	1				1				7			
		ASSASSINATION			2									
		KIDNAPPING	2				2				4			
		ROBBERY						6	5	3		3	2	1
		TERRORISM	3	2	1			10		8		4	9	5
		SABOTAGE						6						
		ASSAULTS			5		13			1				
	SHOW OF FORCE													

Figure 18. Antisocial Actions and Their Targets: Guatemala 1965-1966

		Target											
		GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	OFFICIAL INSTALLATIONS	MILITARY	MILITARY INSTALLATIONS	POLICE	PUBLIC INSTALLATIONS	PUBLIC UTILITIES	TRANSPORTATION	LEFT WING INSURGENTS	CIVILIANS	PRIVATE HOMES	UNSPECIFIED
Antisocial Action 1967	DEMONSTRATIONS												
	RIOTS												
	MURDER										12		
	ASSASSINATION	9		3		1							
	KIDNAPPING	3									11		
	ROBBERY	1	1				7	1	5		1	2	
	TERRORISM	4	7	1		4	8	2	5		7	13	3
	SABOTAGE							1	1				
	ASSAULTS		1	9		5			1		1		
	SHOW OF FORCE												

Figure 19. Antisocial Actions and Their Targets: Guatemala 1967

		Antisocial Action											
		DEMONSTRATION	RIOT	MURDER	ASSASSINATION	ARREST	SEIZURE OF PROPERTY	KIDNAPPING	ROBBERY	TERRORISM	SABOTAGE	ASSAULTS	SHOW OF FORCE
1963	NOT REPORTED					3	2					2	1
	LESS THAN 10			2	1	8		2	9	25	3	5	
	10 to 100								1	1	1	4	
	100 OR MORE	1											
	CROWDS UNESTIMATED	1	1										
1964	NOT REPORTED											2	
	LESS THAN 10			6	4	7			5	15	2	2	1
	10 to 100		2		1				1	1		1	
	100 OR MORE												
	CROWDS UNESTIMATED												
1965	NOT REPORTED						1			1		4	1
	LESS THAN 10			8	7	10		4	11	20	2	2	
	10 to 100	1											
	100 OR MORE					1							
	CROWDS UNESTIMATED												
1966	NOT REPORTED						1			1	1	10	1
	LESS THAN 10			9	7	5		8	12	47	6	14	1
	10 to 100			2		1			3			4	
	100 OR MORE												
	CROWDS UNESTIMATED												
1967	NOT REPORTED		1	3	1		1		1	8		2	
	LESS THAN 10			13	15	8	1	18	16	55	2	4	
	10 to 100				1			1	1	1		5	
	100 OR MORE												
	CROWDS UNESTIMATED		1										

Figure 20. Number of Persons Involved in Antisocial Actions: Guatemala 1963-1967

		Antisocial Action											
		RIOT	RANSOM	ROBBERY	TERRORISM	SABOTAGE	INSURGENT SHOW OF FORCE	DEMONSTRATION	MURDER	ASSASSINATION	ASSAULT	ARREST	SEIZURE OF PROP.
Property Damage or Loss	1963		2	1	8	1	1	2	2		10	11	1
Property Damage or Loss	1964												
Property Damage or Loss	1965												
Property Damage or Loss	1966												
Property Damage or Loss	1967												

Figure 21. Property Damage or Loss Through Antisocial Action: Guatemala 1963-1967

security and public order. As commander in chief of the army, the president of the republic had the prerogative to request the army to act in emergency situations, disasters, or in activities in the national interest.⁷⁶

The strength of the Guatemalan armed forces was approximately 10,000 men; 1,000 served in the air force and 200 in the navy. The air force had been almost totally demolished in an intraservice conflict at the end of 1962. By the end of 1966, the air force had a total of 40 operational planes: 15 fighters, 8 bombers, 6 transports, 10 trainers, and 1 other craft.⁷⁷

Military Assistance

Through the U. S. Military Assistance Plan (MAP), begun with Guatemala in 1955, in more than a decade the Guatemalans have received about \$15 million. Since 1962, they have received \$1 to \$3 million annually, some in the form of war material, light aircraft, and communications equipment. Because military supplies were furnished by the United States, rather than the world market, parts and replacements were available to lengthen the serviceability of the equipment. Along with material aid, the United States provided a military mission of approximately 30 men for army, navy, and air force services.⁷⁸

Recruitment

Guatemalan Army manpower was supplied by male citizens between the ages of 18 and 30 who served an average of two years. On a semiannual basis, around June 30th and December 31st, the appropriate males were requested to present themselves for the organization of new military units.⁷⁹ If the quota for enlisted men fell short, then the recruiting officers selected those persons who had not yet served from among the crowd on market day after the area had been cordoned off. Of the 40,000 eligible draftees, 3,000 were selected each year;⁸⁰ they were almost exclusively Indian, young, and illiterate.

During peacetime, mandatory service was one year, with two years required for the artillery, cavalry, and engineer corps. The air force set its own regulations.⁸¹ Reenlistments were accepted from very few men; only those who had acquired a special skill, such as mechanics or radio operation, could continue their stint for another two years. This personnel policy left the organization without the core of trained noncommissioned officers that usually gives continuity and stability to an army.⁸²

Commissioned officers, however, were in good supply. Most received their training from the Politecnica, a quality military school, and approximately one-half were additionally trained by the U. S. military in counterinsurgency. Officer promotion was generally granted according to time in grade, creating a situation in which there was a heavy proportion of high-ranking officers: one colonel for 25 men. The responsibilities relegated were diminished as a result, with colonels performing duties accorded to lieutenants elsewhere. The rank of general, however, was not overextended; in 1944 all 63 generals were retired, and until September 1968 no one had been promoted to that rank.⁸³ Promotion to the rank of general required approval by Congress on the proposal of the president of the republic; for ranks of second lieutenant through colonel, promotions were made by the president alone.⁸⁴

Military Civic Action Program

The bilateral military assistance agreements between the United States and Guatemala originated in the early 1950's on the basis of hemispheric defense, but in 1961 the emphasis of the program was switched to internal security. President Ydigoras established a department under the minister of defense in the Guatemalan armed forces called "Public Relations, History, Cultural, and Civic Action Services."⁸⁵ Its aims were to improve the relationship between the civilian community and the military and to assist in the socioeconomic development of the country.

In nonindustrialized countries such as Guatemala the army had generally the best resources and organizational capability for constructive ends. It was felt that basic reforms had to be initiated by the central government, however, if the civic action program was to have much meaning or effectiveness within the community. Since crucial land reform had not materialized, the impact of the civic action programs was lessened.

In 1967, of the more than 10,000 men available to the army, only 400 were assigned to civic action programs on a full-time basis.⁸⁶ Civic Action Projects offices were set up in every military zone headquarters, including the navy and air force divisions. Overseeing the planning of the organization was the Military Civic Action Commission, consisting of two U. S. officers and two Guatemalan Army officers whose responsibility it was to visit each of the survey teams to learn what project plans had been suggested by the Community Relations Councils in local towns and villages. Projects sought were those which required little or no expenditures, so that local persons and Guatemalan military personnel would be able to undertake and complete the plans with a feeling of self-sufficiency and autonomy.

Under all circumstances, the role of the U. S. civic action officer was as an advisor only.⁸⁷ Supporting the advisor in this program were the U. S. embassy, the Agency for International Development (AID) program, and the United States Information Service. Lack of coordination between departments prevented maximum effectiveness of the effort.⁸⁸ To rectify the situation in 1963, AID hired a full-time civic action coordinator from the U. S. military personnel in South America.⁸⁹

In the eastern and central departments of Izabal, Zacapa, El Progreso, Baja Verapaz, and Alta Verapaz and in the southern and westernmost departments of San Marcos, Quezaltenango, Suchitepequez, and Escuintla, experimental civic action programs were set up to extend for a five-year period.⁹⁰ The program was substantially broadened in December 1966 to give more coverage to the destitute northeastern region of the country that was the target of the Communist insurgency. All agencies, both domestic and international, grouped their services in "Plan Piloto." This included AID, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and the Military Assistance Program of the United States, as well as the Guatemalan ministries of health, education, and communications.⁹¹

The five most essential tasks within the tri-goal program were road construction, school building, hot lunch program, literacy training, and mobile medical teams. In working with the health problems, two nutritional centers were established by the Guatemalan Army and several others by civic and business organizations to care for the children suffering from malnutrition and parasites.⁹² The hot lunch program served high protein meals to over 301,000 children in 3,073 primary schools.⁹³ The army contributed the transportation for the food and the building of warehouses for its storage. In Guatemala City, donations of food by the army quartermaster at lowered prices were made to benefit the shoppers at slum area markets.⁹⁴ In another facet of the program, mobile health units visited outlying areas to extend free medical and dental

services. Innoculations in the tens of thousands have been given through the mobile units and through volunteer groups such as Amigos de los Americas.⁹⁵ Dispensaries had been built and repaired, and a more healthful environment has been created through water purification and sanitation services.

Military civic action units undertook the building of roads through jungle, improved existing ones, built bridges, and did minor repairs to churches.

The improvements in education initiated by the civic action program were the building of schools, the forming of alphabetization centers for illiterate inductees, and educational radio programming through both "The Army Hour" and conventional teaching methods.⁹⁶ Over 104,000 persons are reached each year through these methods. At the 503 literacy centers, approximately 10,000 persons have been taught by a volunteer staff of close to 5,000 teachers. The army printing presses have supplied this operation with 1.5 million books and other training materials.⁹⁷

Additionally, the Guatemalan air force contributes to the betterment of military-civic relations by offering both passenger and air freight service and assistance to settlers of pioneer country.⁹⁸

All of the programs were enhanced by a publicity campaign that focused on the work of the disaster relief crews, reforestation program, agricultural know-how in the area of cattle raising and veterinary services, donations of free haircuts to poor civilians, Christmas parties for hospitalized children, and educational benefits including gifts of food and shoes to school age children.⁹⁹ Seemingly, from the extensive scope of the self-help plans outlined and the number of lives touched by the programs, the value of such programs should have been immeasurable. However, ambitious undertakings were impeded because of insufficient funds and less than full enthusiasm from some factions of the Guatemalan Army. They felt that their manpower should be put to use in totally military projects. Health, construction, and educational ends could be served equally well by civilian personnel. Lastly, the bureaucratic machinery that managed the system minimized its benefits by inadequate coordination and vulnerability to graft and corruption by local officers and politicians.¹⁰⁰ But in spite of all these shortcomings, the civic action program "brought an encouraging response" from the peasants.¹⁰¹

Police Organization

For a long period in its modern history, Guatemala attended to its policing functions in a random, haphazard fashion. Standardization was not a goal in the mission, duties, administration, qualifications, or training of the police. During the regime of the caudillo Jorge Ubico, 1931-1944, the National Police were considered to be a private army serving the dictator any way he saw fit. One of the main functions of the police was to round up and to attend to peasants who were obliged to offer their services to Ubico's projects—the construction of highways and buildings. Peacekeeping for the most part was relegated to the plantation owners, who were granted absolute authority on their haciendas.¹⁰²

Fifteen years later, in 1959, few advances had been made in the police force. The minister of the interior under President Ydigoras bemoaned the fact that the budget for the National Police had remained on the same level since 1944. The number of police in Guatemala City, the capital, was in no way adequate for the protection of persons or property. To alleviate the situation somewhat, the president inducted into public service the police who were serving

as private guards of property for individual citizens. A private police force was established to function under the supervision of the National Police to replace these guards. The salaries for these private police were contributed by the individual persons and institutions that requested their services. The minister of interior also put into active duty police serving in auxiliary positions, such as tailoring and carpentry.¹⁰³

The most recent statistics of the Guatemalan police force are not available to the public. The military, under whom the police worked during the emergency crisis, regard this information as confidential and have not shared it even with the civilian government. What is known of the organizational structure is that in the mid-1960's the force was headed by a director general who was responsible to the minister of interior. As head of the 4,500-man police force, the director general was a "potential challenger" in a military government managed by officers of the regular armed forces. To meet this challenge, the president appointed a new police head at intervals of about nine months, thereby disrupting communication and control within the police organization.¹⁰⁴ (See figure 22.)

The policing units, directly appointed by the governors of the 22 departments or mayors of some of the country's cities, varied in composition from department to department depending on the governor. In Alta Verapaz, for example, the governor had under his personal supervision civil guard units and the public prisons. The guard unit was composed of a chief, assistant chief, and two subchiefs (each commanding a small detachment of National Police in a county seat), one sergeant, four inspectors (one of whom was also in charge of a National Police unit in a county seat), and 45 guards. Each of the counties (municipios) within the department maintained some police service of its own, usually with a rotating volunteer service. If budgets were low, no remuneration was given. Constables outside of the main villages worked without pay under the direction of the deputy mayors. On occasion, the deputy mayor was deputized on a temporary basis to establish order on a large plantation, but his brand of justice was reputed to be partial to the interests of the plantation owner.¹⁰⁵

In Coban, capital city of the department of Alta Verapaz, civil guards and four officials paid by the county performed police duties, whereas in the department of Quezaltenango, containing the country's second largest city, the policing for all counties was administered by the department directly. In small cities like San Antonio in Sacatepequez, protection was provided by a team of four constables and sixteen auxiliaries serving in one-week shifts of one constable and four auxiliaries. The men on the team served for one year without pay and often recommended other men of sufficient financial means to replace themselves. Even the small traditional Indian community with no formal government structure maintained both police and fire protection.¹⁰⁶

In 1967, attention was turned to the police departments that had been neglected as agents in curbing the increasing terror and violence. For 4.5 million persons, there were only 3,717 police and administrative personnel, an exceedingly small ratio.¹⁰⁷ AID offered a grant of \$625,000 for the training and modernizing of the force. Because transportation and communication equipment were sorely needed, AID furnished scout cars, jeeps, communication systems, and a portable laboratory for detective work, as well as materials for riot control. The Guatemalan government was able to finance from budget cuts the hiring of 2,000 additional policemen in August 1967 at a cost of \$2 million.¹⁰⁸

A general reorganization of the police force was necessary for a number of reasons. It had achieved a reputation for corruption and inefficiency, and furthermore, during the previous military regime of Peralta Azurdia, hundreds of persons reportedly had been tortured by the police. Investigations of police abuse were made, which resulted in orders from Mendez to




Figure 22. Organization of Guatemalan Police Forces

discontinue the use of torture and dungeon-like incommunicado cells.¹⁰⁹ Other pressures militated for reorganization and replacement of personnel: a crime wave in the capital city, a police search of the home of the National University Rector (an unpardonable abuse in Guatemalan tradition¹¹⁰), a charge against police officials for buying their positions,¹¹¹ and an infiltration into the Guatemalan police force of alleged Communists who acted as informers to subversive groups.¹¹²

During this reorganization period, training programs were set up at the police academy for all personnel. New officers who did not meet the course requirements were dropped, but those who had ten or more years of seniority were given additional time to qualify. Officers also were given technical instruction at the International Police Academy in Washington, D. C.¹¹³ Police were given assistance in the method of reporting incidents. Special report books with sets of questions to be answered were created to aid in obtaining complete data. To streamline the police department administration, the minister of the interior unified the traffic and judicial divisions, established a single complaints office and a single laboratory, and established a file of criminals to eliminate duplication and wasted effort.¹¹⁴

Two security agencies, one operating in the urban centers and the other in the rural areas, were responsible for enforcing the emergency decrees during crisis periods. The Judicial Police came under the control of the Director General of the National Police. A force of approximately 1,000 undercover agents, they were used primarily to round up subversive elements and insurgents in the country's cities. In the rural areas, a system of military commissioners performed similar functions. As a unit of the regular armed forces, they answered to their commanding officers and their operations remained outside the scope of civilian police and civilian courts. Personnel for this force were selected from retired army officers and served without pay. The size of the force in the 1960's was not known, but in one department it was estimated that there were 971 military commissioners and deputies—one agent for every 50 adult males.¹¹⁵

There are several other police or paramilitary organizations which can only be identified, because information on them is unavailable. These include a border or customs police agency,

presumably under the direction of the minister of the treasury, stationed along borders and coasts to guard against smugglers and infiltrators. Compared with other agencies it is small and extremely limited in counterinsurgency ability. Also included are a rather extensive private police force, mentioned earlier, and a 2,000-man militia made up of deputized peasants.

Methods and Techniques of Countering Insurgents

Security organizations utilized a broad spectrum of techniques including counter guerrilla warfare in the rural areas and counterterrorist police activities in the cities. Security operations against the Communist guerrillas were begun at the end of Peralta's regime, in the latter part of 1965. Operation Falcon, a three-phase assault on the guerrilla forces, was aimed at destroying the Edgar Ibarra Front that had established itself solidly in the north-eastern provinces. The Las Minas mountain ridge located in that area offered the insurgents advantageous terrain from which to conduct their campaign.

The first phase of Operation Falcon was staged in mid-September 1965 with an emphasis on psychological operations. Air-dropped leaflets implored the guerrillas to lay down their arms and stop fighting for international communism. According to an FAR leader, this portion of the military campaign against the guerrillas had some degree of effectiveness.¹¹⁶ The second phase was the cutting off of the guerrillas from their peasant support. However, the army's campaign was so heavy handed that it failed to achieve its purpose; towns were cordoned off, peasants were questioned, and then they were harshly treated. The third phase brought into the area new troops who had difficulty in coping with the rugged sierra terrain, who were not skilled in counterinsurgency techniques, whose actions were not coordinated, and who had no intelligence units—all combining to produce severely demoralized fighting men.¹¹⁷

Following the inauguration of President Mendez Montenegro there was almost total suspension of terrorist activities from the Left for a five-month period. During this period Mendez and the Communist insurgents carried on truce negotiations, which became deadlocked, and by the fall of 1966, the army and the conservative elements pressed Mendez for a new campaign against the Communists.

During this interim period the Guatemalan Army had been receiving intensified training in counterinsurgency in Zacapa from U. S. military advisors. Techniques of survival in the mountains, camouflage, intelligence gathering, and handling of prisoners were covered. For special air operations the U. S. advisors presented a program aimed at rapid action and close support of ground forces. Tactics were demonstrated for both night and day air drops, low-level navigation, ordnance delivery, reconnaissance, and operations in unfamiliar territory.¹¹⁸

Toward the end of 1966 the new counterinsurgent effort was staged. Small light aircraft and helicopters were used to spot guerrilla camps. Areas were cordoned and searched and some contact made with the guerrillas. To intensify the pressure on the insurgents, the commander of the main army post in Zacapa effectively deputized 2,000 peasants, armed them, and loosed them on the countryside to hunt Communist insurgents. Although untrained, undisciplined, and indiscriminate in their operations, the amateur deputies were credited with much of the success of the campaign.¹¹⁹ By March 1967, military and paramilitary forces had forced the Communist insurgents into a defensive posture¹²⁰ and, in fact, almost crushed the entire guerrilla movement.¹²¹

In the cities, two security agencies actively carried out police operations. In Guatemala City and other urban centers, the undercover agents of the Judicial Police gave chase to insurgents and subversive elements and searched out insurgent bases and supply depots. Their




Figure 23. Incidents Initiated by Internal Security Forces and Major Targets: Guatemala 1963-1966

		Targets												
		REGULAR ARMY	MILITARY POLICE/ NATIONAL GUARDS	ALLEGED MILITARY	NATIONAL POLICE	JUDICIAL POLICE	FARM POLICE/FARM GUARDS	INTELLIGENCE, CUSTOMS, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE	POLICE	ALLEGED POLICE	PRIVATE POLICE	UNSPECIFIED	HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	AIR FORCE
Initiated Action 1967	MILITARY													
	POLICE	1	1		1									
	INSURGENTS	13	1		2	2			2					
	INSURGENT CAMPS	1	1		1	1								
	BANDITS				3									
	TRANSPORTATION				1									
	CIVILIANS					1				3				
	PRIVATE HOMES													

Figure 24. Incidents Initiated by Internal Security Forces
and Major Targets: Guatemala 1967

		Antisocial Action										
		DEMONSTRATION	RIOT	MURDER	ASSASSINATION	SEIZURE OF PROPERTY	KIDNAPPING	ROBBERY	TERRORISM	SABOTAGE	ASSAULTS	SHOW OF FORCE
1963	POLICE	1	1	1				2				
	ARMY									1	2	
	UNSPECIFIED							1				
1964	POLICE			1	1			2	2		1	
	ARMY											
	UNSPECIFIED											
1965	POLICE			2	1		1	6	11		3	
	ARMY											
	UNSPECIFIED											
1966	POLICE			5	1		2	3	1	1	1	1
	ARMY										1	1
	UNSPECIFIED											
1967	POLICE		1			1	2	2	9		5	
	ARMY			1	1				1		2	
	UNSPECIFIED											

Figure 25. Arrests and Detentions: Guatemala 1963-1967

heavy-handed techniques were at times too clumsy to be very effective, and resulted in generating opposition to the government from normally nonpolitical elements of the population. Far more extensive and sophisticated in its activities was the system of military commissioners in the rural areas. This system was initially established as a recruiting agency for the armed forces, also supervising the drilling of reserve units and the maintaining of military installations. During the 1960's these tasks were broadened to include observing and reporting on the activities of insurgents, political organizers, and strangers; questioning and detaining suspects; and conducting joint patrol operations with units of the regular armed forces.¹²⁷

The police were the most active of all the government forces participating in countering the insurgents; they initiated over one-half of the total government encounters and nearly doubled the actions of the regular army. The National Police, most active of the police forces, along with the Judicial Police, focused predominantly on insurgents and insurgent camps, bandits, and civilians, in that order. (See figures 23-24.)

An analysis of arrests and detentions suggested a change in the efficiency of police operations during the course of the insurgency. (See figure 25.) In 1965, incidents involving the police in Guatemala resulted in more arrests and detentions than in 1966 when reported incidents nearly doubled. In 1967, however, the number of arrests and detentions became proportionately larger than the increase in the number of incidents themselves. Police actions were distributed evenly over the years from 1963 to 1967, rising only slightly during the latter years, indicating an increasing role of the regular armed forces during the intensification of violence. The regular army, which was most active in 1966 and 1967, initiated approximately one-third of the government-initiated actions, focusing on insurgents and their camps and installations.

* * * * *

Counterinsurgency warfare in Bolivia resulted in some measure of success in the rural areas. In the cities, however, security forces in police-type activities were unable to deal effectively with terrorist activities. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to summarize significant aspects of the four case studies.

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY REPORT OF CASE STUDIES*

Thus, four countries diverse in historical development and situational factors have been studied to determine their methods of handling insurgency problems. Their governments varied in political form from the highly active federal republic of India to the military oligarchy of Guatemala; all, however, were experiencing the common difficulties of economic and social instabilities. India had the dual task of defending against invasion from Pakistan and China, while curbing extensive domestic unrest. Thai security forces appeared to have three weak insurgencies under control, but they were grappling with the resettlement-resocialization of the agitated northern tribespeople, the handling of Communist-sympathizer refugees, and the control of insurgents operating in and out of the country. Guatemala's insurgency situation, more intense and critical than Thailand's, centered on insurgencies of both the Right and Left, complicated by the infiltration of the security forces by insurgents. The insurgency most discernible was found in Bolivia. It consisted of a small band of foreigners in a hostile environment, susceptible to being extinguished by the government in power.

The response to security threats differed in temper from country to country. India deliberated long after open hostilities had occurred about modifying its security forces. In a like manner, Guatemalan officials chose not to recognize the seriousness of the violence occurring until the insurgents were in control of a large northeastern section of the country. In contrast to this long delay in responding, Bolivia mobilized her forces immediately and requested aid in training and supplies. Even before their insurgency became visible the Thai had built up an extensive, well-prepared security force.

The prestige of the military in Thailand was a boon in recruiting and maintaining high quality military personnel at all levels. Of the four countries studied, India alone had no conscription policy and few conscription problems on the lower levels. It was mainly the illiterate Indian peasants who were recruited for short and irregular periods of time, depending upon the military budget. Officers were obtained on a short-term draft. The reverse condition held for Guatemala and Bolivia where officers were a prestigious group, and the required number of officers were available.

In an evaluation of intelligence, three of the four countries lacked an adequate system. India's coordinated police and military intelligence did not yield adequate information for security and was in the process of being revamped, and the police force was relieved of the responsibility of strategic intelligence. The Thai government's intelligence operation, which was run by the police in the Criminal Investigation Bureau, was considered inadequate by some observers in the early 1960's. Another source of intelligence on the southern insurgents in Thailand was the combined Thai-Malaysian Center, whose information led to few successful operations. Guatemala's intelligence was muddled, its police force was infiltrated by right insurgents, and its population was extremely reluctant to volunteer information even under pressure. Bolivia was the only country whose intelligence was adequate to meet the insurgency. It was a combination of civilian and military intelligence units, working in conjunction with an actively supportive population.

* See table 3 for a tabular summary of the case studies.

TABLE 3
TABULAR SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES

	India	Thailand	Bolivia	Guatemala
Political climate	Federal republic, parliamentary, democratic, diffuse executive powers except during emergencies	Constitutional monarchy, highly centralized military oligarchy, bureaucratic	Authoritarian, oligarchy with strong military influence	Authoritarian, oligarchy of civilians with strong military influence
Population cleavages	Religious, linguistic, regional, ethnic, caste	Religious, linguistic, regional, ethnic	Regional, linguistic, ethnic	Social, linguistic, ethnic
Security forces problems	External threat from China and Pakistan, responsible for neighbors' defense, smuggling and infiltration	Slow initial response to insurgency, three concurrent insurgencies	Smuggling and infiltration, foreign agents	Slow response to insurgency, threat from Right and Left groups, insurgents within security forces, smuggling and infiltration
Expansion of security forces	Police expansion in response to insurgency, armed forces expansion in response to external attack, Communist and non-Communist external assistance	Part of long-term program of expansion, Home Guard and self-defense units established during insurgency, external assistance from U.S.	In response to internal security problem, expansion of National Guard, activation of militias, external assistance from U.S.	Low-keyed for civic action programs, stepped up in response to insurgency, reorganization of police force, army counterinsurgency training, deputization of peasants
Recruitment	No conscription—volunteer army, short-term draft at officer level, some 'regiments' traditionally military	Conscription—required service, officer positions easily filled, all social groups not represented	Conscription army, recruits mostly Indians, officers white and mestizo	Conscription army, recruits mostly Indians, officers white and Ladino
Collection of intelligence	First a police function, later also military, difficulty in coordinating	Performed by Criminal Investigation of National Police, combined intelligence center of Thai and Malay-Indians in south	Both civilian and military intelligence with very cooperative citizenry	Nonsystematized collection of intelligence and uncooperative populace
Border and coastal access	Highly permeable borders, sea access protected by presence of foreign fleets	Highly permeable borders, difficulty in distinguishing outsiders, cooperation with neighbors in preventing infiltration	Highly permeable borders, cooperation with four of five neighbors in the control of borders	Highly permeable borders, neighboring Mexico—passageway to Cuba
Insurgent operations	Phase one operations by Naga and Mizo tribes in Assam hills	Phase one operations including persuasion, terrorism, and small attacks and ambushes in three areas	Aborted in initial stage	Phase two operations extensive temporally and geographically
Civil disturbances	Widespread and well-institutionalized civil disobedience and coercive public protest	Rare	Usual state of affairs instigated by students and unions	Rare—antisocial behavior manifested in terrorism
Security organization	Three regular military services, paramilitary and reserve units, police units including Indian Police Service, Railroad Police, and Village Guards	Three regular military services, National Police including Border Patrol, Volunteer Defense Corps, Royal Security Guards, Home Police Guards, noncombatant Mobile Development Units	Three regular military services, National Corps of Police and Carabineros, People's Militias	Three regular military services (extremely small navy), military civic action unit, small national police, civil guards
Methods and techniques	Combined use of police and military operations, wide range of emergency powers, negotiations, resettlement, operational arrangement with neighbor country	Low-keyed police and military operations, "open arms policy," population control, civic action, joint operations with neighbor country, exchange of information with another neighbor country	Predominantly military operations in rural areas, crowd control in urban areas by National Guard, mobilization of militia, continuing civic action	Military operations in rural areas, police operations in urban areas, limited paramilitary operations, civic action

All of the countries shared the common difficulty of possessing highly permeable borders with its attendant problems of smuggling and infiltration. Because of these borders, Bolivia entertained scores of foreign intruders but was able to terminate the life of these bands before they were able to enlist the support of many native Bolivians. Guatemalan insurgents beat a path through Mexico to seek aid from Cuba, or to escape from Guatemala's security forces, but the insurgency itself was a homegrown product. At the peak of power in late 1966, it had exhibited signs of a phase two operation, controlling the northeastern section of the country. However, neither in India, with its native insurgencies by the Naga and Mizo tribes, nor in Thailand, with its three seemingly disparate insurgencies, was the guerrilla force able to develop its war beyond a phase one operation.

In addition to coping with insurgent operations, the Indian and Bolivian governments were required to deal with widespread civil disturbances—institutionalized in India and the accepted weapon of unions and student groups in Bolivia.

All of the countries involved employed security personnel that were basically a combination of both military forces and police forces. Peasants were deputized to eliminate Communists in a very successful Guatemalan operation. Militias were mobilized in Bolivia to protect the citizenry and ensure the peace, and the National Guard was reinforced to deal with urban disturbances. Thailand's regular army, with the support of the National and Provincial Police, were responsible for defeating the insurgents. In Thailand, Mobile Development Units and Accelerated Rural Development teams attempted to lessen popular discontent. Additionally, specific missions were carried out by the Royal Security Guards, Home Police Guards, the Volunteer Defense Corps, and Metropolitan Police Units. In conjunction with its police and military operations, India organized paramilitary units such as the volunteer Territorial Army, a People's Assistance Corps, National Cadet Corps, and Border Security Forces.

A closer examination of specific incidents of violence as reported in capital city newspapers in Guatemala and Bolivia revealed the following significant information.

The governments' evaluation of the public's reaction to insurgency and insurgency-related news presumably determined the priorities given this news in the public press. In both countries such news increasingly received more newspaper space; and, especially in Bolivia, government-initiated incidents increasingly received more space than incidents initiated by insurgents and other antisocial groups. References to antisocial actions and antisocial groups are made to include actions and groups that are insurgent and noninsurgent. For instance, very often a distinction cannot be made between a robbery committed by an insurgent group and a robbery committed by noninsurgent criminal elements.

In both countries, total violent incidents reached high peaks in 1967. (See figure 26.) After several months of violence in 1963, Guatemala continued to experience sporadic upsurges which became more frequent well into 1966. From October 1966, the campaign of violence from both rightist and leftist groups became more constant. In Bolivia, there were few reported violent incidents in 1966 and they were urban centered; in 1967, as a result of a rural-based insurgency, violent incidents reached peaks in March and June, but rapidly decreased after August.

Violent activity was conducted by a broad spectrum of groups in both countries. Left-wing insurgents, centering their actions primarily on civilians and police personnel, but also directed at transportation facilities, public installations, private homes, government officials, and the military were responsible for most of the violence in Guatemala. Right-wing terrorism was more widespread than news accounts indicated. In Bolivia, left-wing insurgents were

responsible for nearly one-half of reported incidents, and union members and students accounted for a smaller portion. The former concentrated on military personnel, public installations, and private homes; the latter on government officials and official installations.

Terrorism was the most widely used insurgent action in both countries. Public installations, private homes, and transportation facilities were the most frequently hit terrorist targets in Guatemala; in Bolivia, terrorism was directed against private homes and public installations. Robberies involving public installations and civilians, and assaults against police and military personnel ranked second and third, respectively, to terrorism in Guatemala. Assaults against units of the armed forces and riots aimed at government officials and official installations were second to terrorism in Bolivia.

The immediate response of government forces to antisocial actions in both countries usually was investigation. This was the response to terrorism and to a lesser extent to assassinations, sabotage, and kidnappings. Only one-third of the robberies investigated resulted in arrests and detentions. Assaults and riots, which confronted antisocial groups with greater risks, were answered with counterassaults, crowd control, and a large number of arrests and detentions.

The division of effort among government forces was not clear cut but could be inferred from news accounts. In Guatemala, the police initiated twice as many actions as the armed forces and directed their offenses at insurgents and insurgent installations, bandits, and civilians. Operating mostly outside Guatemala City, the army accelerated its effort against insurgents and insurgent installations in 1966 and 1967. The army was the most active of the government forces in Bolivia, focusing on insurgents and insurgent installations.

Government forces, especially in Guatemala, generally responded to antisocial actions and initiated few of their own. Arrests and assaults were the most frequently initiated actions by government forces in Guatemala; in Bolivia, assaults outnumbered other government actions.

More arrests and detentions resulted from incidents involving police units than in incidents involving military units. In part this could reflect the large role of police-type units in insurgencies at low levels of development.

Numbers of persons involved in antisocial actions differed between the two countries because of the different types of actions. In Bolivia, government forces had to contend with urban riots and demonstrations as well as miners' rebellions involving large crowds of unestimated numbers. In Guatemala, terrorism, robbery, murder, and assassination were all hit-and-run tactics involving a single individual or a small group.

Terrorism was the most damage-producing action in both countries. The greater frequency of terrorist acts in Guatemala resulted in greater damage. Kidnapping of prominent individuals held for ransom in Guatemala and student-led riots in Bolivia also resulted in serious and costly loss.

Violent incidents in both countries were concentrated in small geographic areas. Each year Guatemala City experienced more than one-half of the reported incidents; and in 1965, over 80 percent of the incidents occurred there. Santa Cruz was the most intensively subjected area in Bolivia.

Most violent incidents occurred on weekdays. The preference on the part of government and insurgent forces to initiate most of their actions on weekdays rather than weekends cannot be explained.




Figure 26. Monthly Distribution of Violent Incidents:
Guatemala and Bolivia, 1963-1967

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D		
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)		
1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) The American Institutes for Research Kensington Office		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified
		2b. GROUP --
3. REPORT TITLE Police Role of Internal Security Forces in Internal Defense		
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Technical Report Summer 1968 - Spring 1970		
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) Norman A. LaCharité and Joan Rodman Wolfgang		
6. REPORT DATE May 1972	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES viii + 146	7b. NO. OF REFS Numerous
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. DAHC 19-70-C-0015	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NO (S)	
b. PROJECT NO.		
c.	9b. OTHER REPORT NO (S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This DD 1473 supersedes original issued with report dated May 1972.		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Behavioral Science Division, ARO Office, Chief of Research and Development Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.
13. ABSTRACT <p>This report consists of four case studies on the organization and operations of police and police-type security organizations. The countries selected for study are India, Thailand, Bolivia, and Guatemala. The report also deals with a vast array of problems facing the internal security forces such as recruitment, the collection of intelligence, and the security of border and coastal access points as well as the nature of insurgent operations, the public's confidence in the incumbent government, and the cleavages in the population and the civil disturbances arising from them. Discussion includes the political parameters of the conflict, the social and economic dimensions that contributed to its intensification, and the influences within the community that tended to ameliorate the conflict and lighten the government's effort.</p>		

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	Security Forces Internal Security Insurgency India Thailand Bolivia Guatemala						

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